Mixon v. State, 26127

Decision Date05 November 1970
Docket NumberNo. 26127,26127
PartiesRay MIXON v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Reinhardt, Ireland, Whitley & Sims, Glenn Whitley, Tifton, for appellant.

W. J. Forehand, Dist. Atty., Tifton, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

ALMAND, Chief Justice.

This appeal is from an order overruling the defendant's motion to quash the indictment, which order was certified for direct review by the trial judge.

Ray Mixon, under an indictment charging him with the offense of criminal trespass in that he did 'knowingly and without authority enter upon the land and premises of Ocilla Oil & Fertilizer Company, a corporation, for the unlawful purpose of burglary, in that the said accused did intend to without authority and with the intent to commit a theft therein, enter within the storehouse and store building of the said Ocilla Oil & Fertilizer Company,' filed his motion to quash on the grounds: '1. The indictment returned by the grand jury against the defendant charging the defendant with the crime of criminal trespass is based upon Georgia Code § 26-1503(b)(1) (Ga.Laws 1969, pp. 857, 859) which reads as follows: '(b) A person commits criminal trespass when he knowingly and without authority: (1) Enters upon the land or premises of another person, or into any part of any vehicle, railroad car, aircraft, or watercraft of another person, for an unlawful purpose;' and said statute is null and void and in violation of Article I, Section I, Paragraph III of the Constitution of the State of Georgia (Due Process Clause) in that said statute is so vague, uncertain and indefinite as to be incapable of enforcement in a criminal proceeding because the statute is of doubtful construction and describes the act denominated as a crime in terms so general and indeterminate that honest and intelligent citizens are unable to determine what particular act is condemned by the statute. 2. The indictment returned by the grand jury charges the defendant with entering the premises of the Ocilla Oil & Fertilizer Comany, a corporation, for the unlawful purpose of burglary from a storehouse and store building owned by the Ocilla Oil & Fertilizer Company and under the laws of Georgia (Ga.Code § 26-1601) burglary can only to committed by entering the dwelling house of another or a building, vehicle, railroad car, water-craft or other such structure designed for use as the dwelling of another, with the intention to commit a felony or theft therein, and since the indictment shows upon its face that the premises and buildings described therein, which the defendant is charged with having entered for the unlawful purpose of burglary, are commercial buildings and not a dwelling of another, the indictment is defective, null and void because the defendant could not legally commit the offense of burglary from such commercial buildings under the laws of Georgia.' Held:

1. The statute is attacked as being in...

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14 cases
  • State v. Albers
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • March 29, 1973
    ...(E.D.Mo.1968) (three-judge court), vacated on other grounds, 401 U.S. 988, 91 S.Ct. 1235, 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971); see Mixon v. State, 226 Ga. 869, 178 S.E.2d 189 (1970). This interpretation of the words 'unlawful act' in RSA 609-A:1 II (Supp.1972) cures any vagueness which may have inhered i......
  • People v. Williams
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • February 16, 1990
    ...382.) Courts in other States have construed similar language as involving violations of criminal laws. (See, e.g., Mixon v. State (1970), 226 Ga. 869, 178 S.E.2d 189; State v. Albers (1973), 113 N.H. 132, 303 A.2d 197; State v. Truby (1947), 211 La. 178, 29 So.2d 758.) These cases held that......
  • Briggs v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 29, 2006
    ...§ 16-8-60(b), is inherently vague and renders the statute unconstitutional. We disagree. As this court observed in Mixon v. State, 226 Ga. 869, 870, 178 S.E.2d 189 (1970): "The uncertainty in a statute which will amount to a denial of due process of law is not the difficulty of ascertaining......
  • State v. Johnson
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • September 5, 1972
    ...Wash.2d at 805, 809, 479 P.2d 931. Thus, the phrase 'unlawful purpose' has been upheld as not constitutionally vague. Mixon v. State, 226 Ga. 869, 178 S.E.2d 189 (1970); State v. Bulot, 175 La. 21, 142 So. 787 (1932). Indeed, the words 'unlawful act' contained in unlawful assembly statutes ......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Local Government Law - R. Perry Sentell, Jr.
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 51-1, September 1999
    • Invalid date
    ...108 S.E.2d 870, 871 (1959)). "An 'unlawful purpose' clearly includes 'a purpose to violate a criminal law.'" Id. (quoting Mixon v. State, 226 Ga. 869, 870, 178 S.E.2d 189, 190 (1970)). 98. Id., 506 S.E.2d at 115. The city denied the permit because plaintiff intended to violate O.C.G.A. Sec.......

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