Mixson v. Rossiter, 16702

Decision Date12 January 1953
Docket NumberNo. 16702,16702
Citation74 S.E.2d 46,223 S.C. 47
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesMIXSON v. ROSSITER et al.

Jefferies, McLeod & Unger, Walterboro, Dowling & Dowling, Beaufort, for appellants.

Randolph Murdaugh, Hampton, W. Brantley Harvey, Beaufort, for respondent.

BAKER, Chief Justice.

The respondent brought this action for damages for the alleged breach by the appellants of a contract of employment with the respondent. The complaint alleges that the appellants, husband and wife, on March 10th, 1948, entered into an oral contract with the respondent to perform certain services during a period commencing March 10th, 1948, and ending December 31st of the same year. It is alleged that the agreed compensation was to consist of a salary of one hundred and seventy-five ($175) dollars per month and the use of a house in which the respondent could live during the term of the contract.

The complaint then alleges that the respondent fully performed the duties required of him by the contract, but that the appellants, on or about June 2nd, 1948, without just cause or excuse, discharged the respondent, compelling him to give up the house provided for him, with the result that he had to rent a house elsewhere for which he paid fifty ($50) dollars per month as rent.

The complaint further sets forth that the respondent received his agreed salary through the month of May, 1948, and that for the balance of the contract term he was entitled to twelve hundred and twenty-five ($1225) dollars by way of salary and in addition the sum of three hundred and fifty ($350) dollars to reimburse him for rent for seven months at the rate of fifty ($50) dollars per month.

The complaint also alleges that the respondent had been unable to secure other employment "and there is no reasonable certainty that he will be able to secure employment for the remainder of the above mentioned period."

The answer of the appellants is in effect a general denial.

The case was tried before the court and a jury and resulted in a verdict in favor of the respondent for the full amount of his claim. Motions for a nonsuit, for a direction of verdict, for a new trial, and for judgment non obstante veredicto were refused.

The appellants set forth ten exceptions, but they base their case in this Court upon three questions which we will take up in the order presented by the appellants.

The material facts disclosed by the record are as follows:

The appellants in the early part of 1948 purchased a farm or plantation in Beaufort County. At the time of this purchase the respondent was living on the plantation under a contract with a former owner. This contract, according to the undisputed testimony, was to run for a period of a year. The duties of the respondent consisted of the management of the farming operations, including the raising of cattle and hogs.

On March 10th, 1948, after the respondent learned of the purchase of the property by the appellants, he conferred with them upon their invitation relative to his employment and according to the testimony, which however is disputed by the appellants, it was agreed in substance that the respondent's employment in the aforestated capacity would continue for the balance of the year 1948, that is to say, from March 10th, 1948 to December 31st, 1948.

Shortly after the appellants acquired the property--apparently in April, 1948--the appellants indicated to the respondent that they had concluded not to farm the property and invited the respondent to resign. This he declined to do, stating that he intended to continue carrying out his contract until he was discharged.

The respondent and his family were already in the occupancy of a residence on the property under the arrangements with a former owner.

The salary of the respondent covering the period March 10th to March 31st, 1948 and for the month of April, 1948 was paid by checks of the appellant Zalie Naidenoff Rossiter, and apparently these payments were made by the appellants and received by the respondent without comment except as above indicated. The salary of the respondent for the month of May, 1948 was paid by the check of the appellant Earnest Rossiter.

At the time of the delivery of the May check to the respondent, there apparently was some further suggestion from the appellants that the respondent resign, for the stated reason that the appellants had decided to discontinue the farming operations. This, however, the respondent refused to do, reiterating that he intended to continue performing the contract upon which he relied until he was discharged.

The respondent was in fact discharged June 2nd, 1948. This occurred when, on June 2nd, 1948, he was handed the above mentioned check for the services performed by him during the month of May.

On the back of this last mentioned check the appellant Earnest Rossiter had written "Final Payment." The respondent signed his name on the back of the check under the quoted words. The bank stamps on the back of the check indicate that it was used about June 11th, 1948.

The suit was instituted in October, 1948, prior to the expiration of the period of the alleged oral contract of employment. It was tried after the expiration of such contract period.

On the question whether, during the period June 2nd, 1948 to December 31st, 1948, the respondent obtained or could have obtained other employment to minimize his alleged loss and the damages recoverable for the alleged breach, the testimony of the respondent, which was not disputed, is to the general effect that he applied for work at several places named by him and "several other places," but was unable to obtain employment. He did, however, during the contract term and until January following, participate in the construction of a residence for himself. In this undertaking he was assisted by his son, a cousin and some Negroes. He also employed a superintendent who was a carpenter.

"The first substantive error" charged by the appellants is stated by them to be "whether or not there was a complete Accord and Satisfaction of any indebtedness due the plaintiff by virtue of his endorsement and cashing of the last salary check, marked 'Final Payment' after there was a dispute between the parties concerning the amount due."

This assignment of error is disposed of by the fact that the testimony discloses no dispute between the parties concerning the amount due, so as to furnish a basis for the application of the doctrine of accord and satisfaction.

The amount of the salary and other compensation which the respondent was to receive prior to his discharge is not a...

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7 cases
  • Hughes v. Oconee Cnty.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • October 11, 2007
    ...Wrongful Discharge, 44 A.L.R.3d 629 (1972). Whether an employee has fully mitigated his damages is a question of fact. Mixon v. Rossiter, 223 S.C. 47, 74 S.E.2d 46 (1953). Accord, Chastain, 310 S.C. at 419-420, S.E.2d at 835; Drawdy v. Town of Port Royal, 308 S.C. 462, 466, 419 S.E.2d 215, ......
  • Small v. Springs Industries, Inc.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 15, 1989
    ...Wrongful Discharge, 44 A.L.R.3d 629 (1972). Whether an employee has fully mitigated his damages is a question of fact. Mixon v. Rossiter, 223 S.C. 47, 74 S.E.2d 46 (1953). 3. Offer of (a) Bona Fide Offer One source of employment which may serve to break the chain of causation in an employee......
  • Williams v. Johnson, 18237
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • July 6, 1964
    ...of the consideration agreed upon. These allegations set forth the essential elements of an accord and satisfaction, Mixon v. Rossiter, 223 S.C. 47, 74 S.E.2d 46, and, if proved would constitute a complete defense to plaintiff's cause of action. 1 Am.Jur.2d, Accord and Satisfaction, Section ......
  • Garrett v. Locke, 1846
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • May 11, 1992
    ...to decide credibility issues nor did it have authority to resolve conflicts in the testimony and evidence. See Mixson v. Rossiter, 223 S.C. 47, 74 S.E.2d 46 (1953) (the determination of whether evidence supports one or the other of conflicting views is for the jury and not for the court). A......
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