Miyazaki v. Works
| Decision Date | 06 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | 11-P-2176 |
| Parties | KIKUKO ZUTRAU MIYAZAKI v. STANLEY WORKS & others. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Kikuko Miyazaki brought the present action in Superior Court against defendants The Stanley Works company and Porter Square CVS, Inc., and CVS Pharmacy, Inc., (collectively CVS) for compensatory damages for personal injuries resulting from a fall as she approached the automatic doors at the entrance to the CVS store in the Porter Square section of Cambridge. At the conclusion of an eleven-day trial, the jury returned verdicts for the defendants upon the common law claims of negligence and breach of warranty against Stanley Works and the claim of negligence against CVS. The trial judge reserved the plaintiff's claim of unfair or deceptive conduct within the meaning of G. L. c. 93A, § 2, against Stanley Works, and rejected it. Judgment entered against the plaintiff upon all claims. She has timely appealed. For the following reasons, we now affirm the judgment in favor of the defendants. Background. On the afternoon of June 6, 2003, Kikuko Miyazaki, then seventy-six years old, fell in the entryway to the CVS store. She suffered serious injuries. She filed suit on May 26, 2006. By her amended complaint, she alleged that the automatic bifolding doors at the entrance had 'suddenly and unexpectedly closed upon her' and had 'knock[ed] her to the ground' so as to cause 'a fractured hip and multiple other physical and emotional injuries rendering her permanently disabled.' As causes of action, she alleged (1) that defendant Stanley Works had negligently manufactured and maintained the automatic doors; (2) that Stanley Works had breached its express and implied warranties of merchantability of fitness and safety of the automatic doors; and (3) that those breaches of warranties constituted a violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 2. The plaintiff alleged parallel claims of (1) negligence, (2) breach of express and implied warranties, and (3) violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 2, against CVS. At trial she pursued only the negligence claim against CVS.
The jury answered special verdict questions. As to Stanley Works, they found (a) that the company had acted negligently; but (b) that the negligence had not been a substantial contributing cause of the injuries of the plaintiff; and (c) that Stanley Works had committed no breach of warranty. As to CVS, the jury found (a) that it had acted negligently; but (b) that the negligence had not been a substantial contributing cause of injuries to the plaintiff. We shall refer to additional facts and evidence as we address each of Miyazaki's appellate contentions.
Analysis. 1. Exclusion of the Zutrau video. On the day after the accident, the plaintiff's adult son visited the storefront with his two children. The two children approached the entryway from various angles and speeds and caused the bifolded doors to strike them. At trial, counsel for the plaintiff offered the video as evidence that the automatic doors could strike individuals as they approached the entrance. The judge viewed all or most of the video, and excluded it both in the course of the plaintiff's direct case against both defendants and in the course of plaintiff's counsel's cross- examination of Stanley Works's expert witness. In multiple rulings, the judge excluded the video as an unreliable or misleading reenactment of the accident because he believed that the children were approaching the doors at angles and speeds different from the approach of their grandmother. The judge reasoned, 'Even if offered only for impeachment purposes, the prejudicial effect of the alleged reenactment of the accident by [plaintiff's] grandchildren outweighs any possible relevance for impeachment.'
The plaintiff had testified that she had walked straightforwardly toward the entrance of the CVS store and at a normal pace behind another person. A proposed reenactment or demonstration must rest upon conditions similar to the circumstances surrounding the disputed accident and must not tend to confuse or mislead the jury. Calvanese v. W.W. Babcock Co., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 730 (1980). Read v. Mt. Tom Ski Area, Inc., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 903 (1994). Lally v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 317, 332-333 (1998). The judge's observation of a significant discrepancy between the video and the plaintiff's description of the accident was valid. In light of the governing case law, his exercise of discretion was sound, as well.
2. Chapter 93A claim against Stanley Works. After the delivery of the jury's special verdict answers, the judge dismissed the c. 93A claim against Stanley Works. The plaintiff argues that she was entitled to pursue the claim to the judge by additional postverdict evidence. That position is groundless. The c. 93A claim against Stanley Works derives entirely from her claim of breach of warranty. The jury's rejection of the warranty claim eliminated any ground for the c. 93A claim. In addition, the plaintiff was not entitled to an adjunct, separate, jury-waived trial or evidentiary hearing upon a c. 93A claim without prior permission from the judge. Since the statutory claim rested exclusively upon the common law claims submitted to the jury, the plaintiff should have, and presumably did, submit all relevant evidence for that theory of liability to the jury. The judge correctly disposed of the c. 93A claim.
3. Instructions upon substantial contributing cause. The judge instructed the jury originally upon the concept of substantial contributing cause without objection. During deliberation, the jury asked for additional instruction upon the concept. With the approval of all counsel, the judge reinstructed, and included again the point that a substantial contributing cause can be one of several causes of an accident but that it must be one 'without which [the accident] would not otherwise have occurred.' Plaintiff's counsel requested additional language that 'the plaintiff is not required to prove the exact manner in which our accident occurred. . . .' The judge declined the request.
The judge's instructions satisfied the required definition. His choice not to enlarge upon the definition did not constitute either an error of law or any abuse of discretion. Nor did his refusal, on the following day, to recall the jury to the courtroom and expand substantially upon the meaning of causation to which all counsel had been agreeable at the outset of deliberation.
4. Inconsistency of verdict answers. The plaintiff argues that the jury's finding of negligence on the part of Stanley Works operates incompatibly with its finding of no breach of warranty by the company. She argues that the judge wrongly failed to require further deliberation and consistency on the part of the jury. The plaintiff relies upon the rule that, by definition, negligently defective design of a product constitutes a breach of warranty. Hayes v. Ariens Co., 391 Mass. 407, 410 (1984). See Caccavale v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 404 Mass. 93, 98-99 (1989) (). For two reasons, we do not believe that the acceptance of the two special verdicts answers creates reversible error.
First, the answers are not necessarily...
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