MJK Bldg. Corp. v. Fayland Realty, Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 March 2020
• Docket Number: Index No. 607643/15,2016–10070
• Citation: 122 N.Y.S.3d 67,181 A.D.3d 860
• Parties: MJK BUILDING CORP., et al., Appellants, v. FAYLAND REALTY, INC., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

181 A.D.3d 860

122 N.Y.S.3d 67

MJK BUILDING CORP., et al., Appellants,

v.FAYLAND REALTY, INC., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

2016–10070

Index No. 607643/15

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—October 25, 2019

March 25, 2020

Kim & Associates, LLC, Commack, N.Y. (John Y. Kim of counsel), for appellants.

Cullen and Dykman LLP, Garden City, N.Y. (Brian Donnelly and Jennifer McLaughlin of counsel), for respondents Fayland Realty, Inc., Marathon Petroleum Corporation, and Speedway, LLC.

Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C., Uniondale, N.Y. (E. Christopher Murray of counsel), for respondent L.M.I. Commack Realty Corp.

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., COLLEEN D. DUFFY, HECTOR D. LASALLE, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for further proceedings, and thereafter, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that an agreement recorded in the Suffolk County Clerk's Office in Liber 8377 at page 213 is enforceable, and that the plaintiffs do not have an easement by express grant, prescription, adverse possession, or estoppel over real property located at 2104 Jericho Turnpike and 15 Harned Road in Commack, New York.

The plaintiffs commenced this action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring, in effect, that they hold an easement over adjoining parcels of real property to the west of their own parcel (hereinafter the subject property), and directing that certain physical barriers and a reconfigured curb cut be removed to accommodate that easement. The plaintiffs premise this alleged easement interest upon a restrictive covenant established in a deed conveying the parcel to the east of the subject property in 1950, at a time when all the parcels in question were owned by a single grantor. That covenant guaranteed, among other things, mutual access for the patrons of businesses located to the east, west, and south of the subject property, which the plaintiffs' ultimately acquired, but the subject property was not included in that covenant. The original grantor also covenanted not to use any of the other aforementioned parcels as a roadside stand or restaurant. In 1977, the original grantor conveyed the subject property to the plaintiffs' predecessor in the title by a deed that made no mention of these restrictive covenants, and shortly thereafter, the original grantor and the purchaser of the parcel to the east of the subject property entered into an agreement cancelling all the restrictive covenants in the 1950 deed. In the alternative to their allegation that they possess an express easement over the neighboring parcels to the west of the subject property, the plaintiffs asserted that they possess an easement by prescription, adverse possession, and/or estoppel arising from their patrons' regular use of the western parcels to access their business since the 1990s.

The defendants Fayland Realty, Inc., L.M.I. Commack Realty Corp., Marathon Petroleum Corporation, and Speedway, LLC (hereinafter collectively the defendants), moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them, inter alia, on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing to enforce the restrictive covenant that had been terminated in 1977, and that they failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action for an easement by prescription, adverse possession, or estoppel. In an order dated August 1, 2016, the Supreme Court granted the motion. The plaintiffs appeal.

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( T. Mina Supply, Inc. v. Clemente Bros. Contr. Corp. , 139 A.D.3d 1040, 1040–1041, 34 N.Y.S.3d 82 ; see Leon v. Martinez , 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87–88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511 ). "Where evidentiary material is submitted and considered on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and the motion is not converted into one for summary judgment, the question becomes whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has stated one and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, dismissal should not eventuate" ( Agai v. Liberty Mut. Agency Corp. , 118 A.D.3d 830, 832, 988 N.Y.S.2d 644 ; see Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg , 43 N.Y.2d 268, 275, 401 N.Y.S.2d 182, 372 N.E.2d 17 ). Additionally, in considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), "the documentary evidence must utterly refute the plaintiff's factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law" ( Gould v. Decolator , 121 A.D.3d 845, 847, 994 N.Y.S.2d 368 ; see Leon v. Martinez , 84 N.Y.2d at 88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511 ).

"Restrictive covenants, also categorized as negative easements, restrain servient landowners from making otherwise lawful uses of their property" ( Fleetwood Chateau Owners Corp. v. Fleetwood Garage Corp. , 153 A.D.3d 1238, 1239, 61 N.Y.S.3d 287 ). " ‘However, the law has long favored free and unencumbered use of real property, and covenants restricting use are strictly construed against those seeking to enforce them’ " ( id. at 1239, 61 N.Y.S.3d 287, quoting Witter v. Taggart , 78 N.Y.2d 234, 237, 573 N.Y.S.2d 146, 577 N.E.2d 338 ). Here, the defendants utterly refuted the plaintiffs' claim to an express easement arising from the deed originally conveying the parcel to their east by showing that the subject property did not benefit from the easement, and that the owners of the parcels that did benefit from the easement validly terminated it by agreement in 1977. The record also utterly refutes the plaintiffs' allegations that the agreement terminating the easement...