MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickels
Decision Date | 27 February 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 971441,971441 |
Citation | 497 S.E.2d 331,255 Va. 314 |
Parties | MNC CREDIT CORPORATION v. Charles W. SICKELS, Esq., et al. Record |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Jeffrey D. Herschman (Tracey Gann Turner, Baltimore, MD; Benjamin S. Boyd, Washington, DC; Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, MD, on briefs), for appellant.
Carol T. Stone (John O. Easton; Jordan Coyne & Savits, Fairfax, on brief), for appellees.
The primary issue that we consider in this appeal is whether a claim of legal malpractice against an attorney may be assigned by a former client to a third party.
Because this case was decided on demurrer, we will state the facts "in accordance with well-established principles that a demurrer admits the truth of all material facts that are properly pleaded, facts which are impliedly alleged, and facts which may be fairly and justly inferred from alleged facts." Cox Cable Hampton Roads v. City of Norfolk, 242 Va. 394, 397, 410 S.E.2d 652, 653 (1991).
In September 1992, Ashburton Limited Partnership, a Virginia limited partnership, and John D. Long, Sr., (the developers) executed a contract to buy and develop land in Fairfax County. The developers planned to construct a residential subdivision on the property. Fairfax County and the Virginia Department of Transportation required the developers to post collateral to ensure that certain contemplated public improvements in the proposed development were, in fact, constructed as planned. Maryland National Mortgage Corporation (Maryland National), a Maryland corporation, provided letters of credit as collateral. Maryland National retained Charles W. Sickels and his law firm, Hall, Markle, Sickels & Fudala, P.C., to prepare the necessary documentation required for the transaction.
Fairfax County and the Virginia Department of Transportation refused to accept the letters of credit as collateral, and Ashburton and Maryland National posted cash bonds. The attorneys "were aware of this change and accepted the responsibility for drafting any and all documentation necessary to insure that Fairfax County and [the Virginia Department of Transportation] returned all funds so posted directly to [Maryland National] when the public improvements were completed." Maryland National posted two cash bonds with Fairfax County totaling $919,000 and a separate cash bond with the Virginia Department of Transportation in the amount of $145,500.
Pursuant to the terms of an "Asset Purchase Agreement," Maryland National assigned all its rights, interests, and obligations in connection with a loan to MNC Credit Corporation (MNC Credit). 1 Subsequently, Fairfax County released to the developers all but $153,000 of the cash bond that Maryland National had posted, and the Virginia Department of Transportation released to the developers the entire cash bond of $145,500 that Maryland National had posted. MNC Credit made repeated demands to the developers for repayment of these funds, but the developers refused, asserting that they were not required to return the funds under the terms of the loan documents that the attorneys had drafted.
MNC Credit filed its amended bill of complaint against the attorneys, as well as Ashburton and Long. 2 MNC Credit asserted in its amended bill that: Maryland National had assigned its claims of legal malpractice to MNC Credit; the attorneys had committed acts of legal malpractice; the attorneys had breached express and implied contracts; and MNC Credit was a third-party beneficiary of the contracts between Maryland National and the attorneys. The attorneys filed a demurrer to the amended bill, asserting, among other things, that a client may not assign a legal malpractice claim to a third party, and that MNC Credit failed to plead sufficient facts to show it was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Maryland National and the attorneys. The trial court entered a judgment sustaining the demurrer, and MNC Credit appeals.
MNC Credit, relying upon Code § 8.01-26 and court decisions in other jurisdictions, asserts that legal malpractice claims are assignable in this Commonwealth. We disagree.
The General Assembly has declared that "[t]he common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same, and be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly." Code § 1-10. Even though the General Assembly may abrogate the common law, the legislature's intent to do so must be "plainly manifested." Hyman v. Glover, 232 Va. 140, 143, 348 S.E.2d 269, 271 (1986) (quoting Hannabass v. Ryan, 164 Va. 519, 525, 180 S.E. 416, 418 (1935)). Accord Wackwitz v. Roy, 244 Va. 60, 65, 418 S.E.2d 861, 864 (1992).
The common law of this Commonwealth did not permit the assignment of legal malpractice claims. At common law, contracts for legal services were not assignable because of the fiduciary duties inherent in the attorney-client relationship. See McGuire v. Brown, 114 Va. 235, 242, 76 S.E. 295, 297 (1912); Epperson v. Epperson, 108 Va. 471, 476, 62 S.E. 344, 346 (1908).
In 1977, the General Assembly enacted Code § 8.01-26 which states in relevant part: "Only those causes of action for damage to real or personal property, whether such damage be direct or indirect, and causes of action ex contractu are assignable." In view of the highly confidential and fiduciary relationship between an attorney and client, we hold that this statute does not abrogate the common law rule which prohibits the assignment of legal malpractice claims in this Commonwealth because the General Assembly did not plainly manifest an intent to do so.
There are a number of reasons why the common law prohibited the assignment of legal malpractice actions. As one court has explained:
Goodley v. Wank and Wank, Inc., 62 Cal.App.3d 389, 133 Cal.Rptr. 83, 87 (1976).
Furthermore, the common law rule which prohibits the assignment of legal malpractice claims safeguards the attorney-client relationship which is an indispensable component of our adversarial system of justice. As the Supreme Court of Indiana has observed:
Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338, 343-44 (Ind.1991).
Indeed, most courts have held that...
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