Hyman v. Glover, 830529

• Decision Date: 05 September 1986
• Docket Number: No. 830529,830529
• Parties: Elizabeth H. HYMAN, et al. v. Mary Elizabeth GLOVER. Record
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 269

348 S.E.2d 269

232 Va. 140

Elizabeth H. HYMAN, et al. v. Mary Elizabeth GLOVER.

Record No. 830529.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

Sept. 5, 1986.

Joseph B. Hyman, Alexandria, Va., for appellants.

David R. Clarke, Fairfax, Va., for appellee.

Present: All the Justices.

THOMAS, Justice.

In this appeal, we must construe the will of Janet McClymont Hannan who made certain bequests using the word "issue." The question for decision is whether the word "issue," as used by the testatrix, includes an adopted child.

The will was executed on March 13, 1977. It provided in pertinent part as follows:

I direct my Executrix to divide [my estate] into as many equal shares as there shall be children, me surviving, plus the number of my children predeceasing me but leaving issue me surviving, and I give, devise and bequeath one of such shares to each of my children me surviving and one share to the issue of each deceased child of mine, such issue to take, collectively, per stirpes, the share of their deceased ancestor.

The testatrix died on April 2, 1982, survived by four children, Elizabeth H. Hyman, William Everett Hannan, Jr., Kenneth Heron Hannan, and Isabella Hannan Pfeil (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Hyman"). Her fifth child, James M. Hannan, had died of cancer in May 1977. Under a decree entered in January 1977 by the Probate Court of Cumberland County, Maine, James had adopted Mary Elizabeth Glover, his wife's 35-year-old daughter by a former marriage.

Mrs. Glover filed a petition asking the court below to declare that "petitioner is the issue of decedent's son James Hannan, and as such is entitled to a prescribed share" of his mother's estate. Upon consideration of the pleadings, memoranda of law, and argument by counsel, the trial court ruled that, under Code § 64.1-71.1, "[t]he word 'issue,' standing alone, now includes persons who qualify by or through adoption." Accordingly, the court granted Mrs. Glover's motion for summary judgment and entered final judgment awarding her a one-fifth share of the testatrix's estate.

On appeal, Hyman contends that the trial court erred in its construction of the statute. We agree. Therefore, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court based its ruling upon Code § 64.1-71.1 which reads, in part, as follows:

In the interpretation of wills and trusts, adopted persons and persons born out of wedlock are included in class gift terminology and terms of relationship in accordance with rules for determining relationships for purposes of intestate succession unless a contrary intent shall appear on the face of the will or trust.

The rules for determining relationships for purposes of intestate succession, referred to in Code § 64.1-71.1, are set forth in Code § 64.1-5.1. That statute provides in pertinent part as follows:

If, for purposes of Title 64.1, a relationship of parent and child must be established to determine succession by, through or from a person:

1. An adopted person is the child of an adopting parent and not of the biological parents....

The trial court was persuaded that Code § 64.1-5.1 places adopted children on the same footing as natural children. In addition, the trial court was persuaded that since the word "issue" defines a class, then, by operation of Code § 64.1-71.1, adopted children were automatically placed in that class regardless of the common law meaning of the word "issue." In our view, a different result is dictated by settled principles governing the construction of wills as well as by principles governing the construction of statutes that are in derogation of the common law.

Our analysis begins with an examination of the common law meaning of the word "issue." Since the infancy of the legal system in this Commonwealth the word "issue" has meant "heirs of the body" and has been distinguished from seemingly similar words such as "children." See Smith v. Chapman, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 240, 290 (1807). At least since 1935 this Court has stated explicitly that the word "issue" does not include adopted children. In Munday v. Munday's Ex'rs, 164 Va. 145, 148-50, 178 S.E. 917, 918-19 (1935), we wrote as follows on that precise question: "Issue is ordinarily defined as descendants of a common ancestor.... To bring an adopted child within the accepted definition of the word 'issue' would certainly place upon the term a very strained construction.... Our conclusion is that under our statute 'issue' means natural descendants of a common ancestor." (Citations omitted.) Over the years we have reiterated what was said in Munday. See Vicars v. Mullins, 227 Va. 432, 437, 318 S.E.2d 377, 379 (1984); Langhorne v. Langhorne, 212 Va. 577, 578, 186 S.E.2d 50, 51, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 946, 92 S.Ct. 2046, 32 L.Ed.2d 333 (1972); Fletcher v. Flanary, 185 Va. 409, 415, 38 S.E.2d 433, 435 (1946). As a matter of common law then, it is plain that in Virginia the word "issue" does not include adopted children.

Given the common law meaning of the word "issue," any statute enacted to change that meaning would necessarily be in derogation of the common law. Two important rules of construction come into play where a statute is in derogation of the common law. First, "[t]he common law is not to be considered as altered or changed by statute unless the legislative intent be plainly manifested." Hannabass v. Ryan, 164 Va. 519, 525, 180 S.E. 416, 418 (1935). Second, "[s]tatutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed and not to be enlarged in their operation by construction beyond their express terms." C. & O. Railway v. Kinzer, 206 Va. 175, 181, 142 S.E.2d 514, 518 (1965).

Further, since this case involves the construction of a will, at least one other important rule of construction applies. We stated the rule in Driskill v. Carwile, 145 Va. 116, 120, 133 S.E. 773, 774 (1926), where we wrote that "words having a definite legal significance are to be understood as used in their definite legal sense...."

Absent the statute relied upon by Glover, the rule set forth in Driskill would make this an "open and shut" case. We would give "issue" its definite legal meaning and simply conclude that "issue" does not include adopted children and, therefore, Glover cannot take under the will.

However, because the statute is in effect we must determine its impact upon the construction of the will. At the threshold of the statutory analysis, it is significant to us that the statute does not state specifically that the word "issue," when used in a will or trust, includes adopted children. Thus, it could be argued that the statute, on its face, does not make it "plainly manifest" that the General Assembly intended the change in the common law that is urged by Glover. This point is made even more persuasive when one considers that other states have made precisely such a change in their law. For example, in 1947, Maryland enacted the following provision: "The term 'child,' 'heir,' 'issue,' 'descendant' or an equivalent in a deed, grant, will or other written instrument shall be held to include any adopted person, unless the contrary plainly appears by the terms thereof...." Maryland Code Art. 16, § 78(c).

Moreover, the terms of the applicable statute itself do not lead to the conclusion advanced by Glover. There are two things that must occur before Code § 64.1-71.1 operates to bring adopted children into the application of will and trust language. There must exist a class gift; and a contrary intent must not appear on the face of the will or trust.

More specifically, the first part of the statute says, in part, that "adopted persons and persons born out of wedlock are included in class gift terminology and terms of relationship in accordance with rules for determining relationships for purposes of intestate succession...." There is no dispute in this case that a gift to "issue" is a class gift. But Glover argues that the rules on determining relationships help establish that adopted children are included in the word "issue." According to Glover, since the rules set forth in Code § 64.1-5.1 say that an adopted child is the child of the adopting parent, it is plain that the General Assembly intended to put adopted children on the same footing as natural children. Glover argues from that proposition that "issue" now includes adopted children.

An almost identical argument was made and rejected in Munday, 164 Va. 145, 178 S.E. 917. In that case, a provision of the adoption statute provided that an adopted child was "to all intents and purposes the child and heir at law of the person so adopting him or her...." Code § 5333 (1930). Based on the language of the adoption statute, the argument was made that it was the intent and purpose of the General Assembly "to put an adopted child on the same plane as a natural child" and that unless an adopted child was included in the meaning of the word "issue" the intent of the General Assembly would be thwarted. Munday, 164 Va. at 148, 178 S.E. at 918. We rejected that argument holding that the word "issue" did not include adopted children. Part of our rationale was that, at the time Code § 5333 was promulgated, the word "issue" had been previously used in other statutes and had always been defined to mean natural descendants.

By the same token, when Code § 64.1-71.1 went into effect in 1978, the word "issue" had a specific meaning that had always been applied. Thus, here, as in Munday, the fact that another statute, in this case Code § 64.1-5.1, sought to put adopted children on the same plane as natural children could not thereby alter the meaning of the word "issue."

Further, Code § 64.1-71.1 is qualified by the phrase "unless a contrary intent shall appear on the face of the will or trust." Counsel for Glover conceded at oral argument that Code § 64.1-71.1, by its terms, permitted the description of a class that excluded adopted children. The provision sets forth no guidelines for...