Mobil Oil Corp. v. Matagorda County Drainage Dist. No. 3

Decision Date12 April 1979
Docket NumberNo. 1302,1302
Citation580 S.W.2d 634
PartiesMOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Appellant, v. MATAGORDA COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT NO. 3, et al., Appellees.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals
OPINION

NYE, Chief Justice.

This is a summary judgment case. Appellant, Mobil Oil Corporation brought suit in the district court of Matagorda County, Texas, against defendants, Matagorda County Drainage District No. 3, the Commissioners Court of Matagorda County, and the members of the Commissioners Court, attacking an order of the Commissioners Court which annexed to the Drainage District certain submerged lands in the Gulf of Mexico covered by an oil, gas and mineral lease owned by Mobil. The Attorney General intervened on behalf of the State of Texas because the constitutionality of Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 8176b-1 (1971) had been called into question. The defendants filed a collective motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss, and Mobil filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the defendants' motions and denied Mobil's motion. Mobil appeals to this Court.

Mobil's petition alleged that on April 15, 1974, the Commissioners Court passed an order annexing certain territory to be included within the Drainage District. Included in such annexed territory was an area in the Gulf of Mexico upon which Mobil owned an oil, gas and mineral lease located about eight miles from the shore, completely inundated by the Gulf waters. Mobil alleged, in essence, that the Commissioners Court order was invalid because: 1) the Commissioners Court had no legal authority or power to annex territory in the Gulf of Mexico for the benefit of the Drainage District; 2) that if the statutes of Texas should be construed to authorize such action, such were unconstitutional; 3) that because Mobil's lease received no benefit from being in the Drainage District, any tax levied would be unconstitutional under both the Texas and the United States Constitutions; and 4) that the order of the Commissioners Court was arbitrary, and not supported by substantial evidence or by any evidence.

The Drainage District and the Commissioners Court each answered by a general denial and, collectively, filed a motion for summary judgment alleging, in essence, the following five grounds in support of their motion:

1) The Drainage District's territory and boundaries were duly extended to incorporate the area in question which is a part of the County of Matagorda, Texas, pursuant to valid legislative authority; that the Legislature had the power to tax the land affected in the interest of general welfare and authorized the Drainage District, acting through the Commissioners Court to provide for such taxation; and that the actions of the Commissioners Court were conclusive as to all judgments it made which were within the scope of the duties and powers so delegated and which are conclusive on either or direct or collateral attack.

2) Mobil's suit is a collateral attack on the judgment of the Commissioners Court and on such an attack, the judgments and actions of the Commissioners Court are conclusive.

3) Neither the facts alleged nor the undisputed facts entitle Mobil to relief whether the attack on the Commissioners Court judgment is a direct or collateral attack.

4) There are no factual disputes or issues of facts which would entitle Mobil to relief.

5) Under no circumstances here present is a Court entitled to supersede the legislative activities or judicial actions of the Commissioners Court here involved.

Attached to their motion were minutes of the Commissioners Court annexing the territory in question and an affidavit of the then County Judge, the Honorable Bert Huebner, which described the territory annexed, mentioned considerations of the Commissioners Court in annexing the territory, and stated that taxation in the territory so annexed "is strictly on an ad valorem basis for the general purpose of the district, . . . no formal benefit allocation is made or attempted;" that Mobil did not appear at the hearing on the proposal to extend the district and took no action by quo warranto or by certiorari in any district court to challenge the Commissioners Court action, nor did it seek rehearing by the Commissioners Court; and that of nineteen taxpayers in the offshore area, Mobil was the only taxpayer to refuse to pay the tax assessed.

Mobil's reply to the defendants' motion alleged, in addition to the allegations of its petition, that it was entitled to summary judgment on the basis that: 1) its oil and gas lease is in the Gulf, eight miles from shore and under sixty feet of water; 2) the oil and gas lease cannot be drained and the Commissioners Court finding that it was feasible and practical to drain it is incorrect, contrary to physical facts, unsupported by substantial evidence and is wholly arbitrary; and 3) that all of the other findings of the Commissioners Court are also unsupported by evidence. In support of its motion, Mobil filed affidavits of C. D. Akers, senior production foreman of Mobil, and J. R. Lemons, a tax agent employed by Mobil.

The trial court held a hearing to consider the respective motions. At the conclusion, the judge entered an order granting the defendants' motion, denying Mobil's motion, and holding Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 8176b-1 (1971) to be constitutional.

Appellant's points of error on appeal, when grouped, involve three major contentions- : 1) the Commissioners Court had no authority to enter the order of April 12, 1974 (annexation order); 2) the Court acted arbitrarily in each finding it was required to make; and 3) the taxation of Mobil's property violates its constitutional rights of equal protection and due process. Before addressing these points, we must first consider appellee's contention which, in effect, is that there can be no attack on the order of the Commissioners Court in this case because ". . . the judgment of the Commissioners Court rendered . . . is final." See Tex.Water Code Ann., § 56.082 (1972).

We recognize the general rule that, although Commissioners Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction in the sense that their powers are limited to those powers expressly or impliedly conferred upon them by the Constitution and statutes, when acting with the sphere of powers so conferred, their judgments are entitled to the same consideration as those of other constitutional courts and may not be collaterally attacked, unless void. Yoakum County v. Gaines County, 139 Tex. 442, 163 S.W.2d 393 (1942); Scott v. Graham, 156 Tex. 97, 292 S.W.2d 324, 327 (1956); 15 Tex.Jur.2d (Counties), § 44 (1959). We are of the opinion that whether this suit be considered a direct or collateral attack, the Commissioners Court order, contrary to appellees' assertion, is not beyond all scrutiny of the appellate courts.

Article 5, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution grants the district courts "appellate jurisdiction and general supervisory control over the County Commissioners Court, with such exceptions and under such regulations as may be prescribed by law." (Emphasis added). Substantially the same language is found in Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1908 (1964). The Legislature has prescribed no exceptions and has only established the procedure for appealing orders of the Commissioners Court in a limited number of situations. While the Legislature has prescribed a method of appealing from the orders of the Commissioners Court establishing a Water Control and Improvement District (Tex.Water Code §§ 51.022-51.025) (1972), the Legislature has never prescribed a procedure for appealing from the orders of the Commissioners Court creating a drainage district 1 or annexing additional territory to a drainage district, (the latter being the situation involved herein). Nor has the Legislature established the method and procedure for invoking the appellate jurisdiction and supervisory control of the district court over the actions of the Commissioners Court by any statutory enactment. Scott v. Graham, 156 Tex. 97, 292 S.W.2d 324, 328 (1956). Certiorari has been suggested as one appropriate method of review. See Scott v. Graham, supra, 156 Tex. 97, 292 S.W.2d at 328, and authorities cited therein.

The supervisory power of the district court over the judgments of a commissioners court can only be invoked when such court acts beyond its jurisdiction or clearly abuses the discretion conferred upon it by law. See Article 5, Section 8 of the Constitution and Article 1908 of the Revised Civil Statutes; Yoakum County v. Gaines County, 139 Tex. 442, 163 S.W.2d 393, 396 (1942); Cook Drilling Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 139 Tex. 80, 161 S.W.2d 1035, 1036 (1942); Tarrant County v. Shannon, 129 Tex. 264, 104 S.W.2d 4, 9 (1937); Stovall v. Shivers, 129 Tex. 256, 103 S.W.2d 363 (1937); Nueces County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Wilson, 304 S.W.2d 281, 286 (Tex.Civ.App. El Paso 1957, writ ref'd n. r. e.). This supervisory jurisdiction can be invoked in a direct attack in the district court when it is alleged that the Commissioners Court order is voidable as being arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence or that the court has acted beyond its jurisdiction. See Live Oak County v. Lower Nueces River Water Sup. Dist., 446 S.W.2d 14, 27 (Tex.Civ.App. Beaumont 1969, writ ref'd n. r. e.). We are of the opinion that Mobil's suit, although over two years elapsed before filing, should be considered a direct attack upon the County Commissioners Court order. See Crawford v. McDonald, 88 Tex. 626, 33 S.W. 325, 327 (1895). Mobil's suit is the first one filed following the Commissioners' hearing. It alleged that the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
10 cases
  • City of El Paso v. Madero Development
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • January 4, 1991
    ...over the person or res; and (3) power to render the particular relief awarded. Mobil Oil Corporation v. Matagorda County Drainage District No. 3, 580 S.W.2d 634 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1979), reversed on other grounds, 597 S.W.2d 910 (Tex.1980). Subject matter jurisdiction exists when......
  • Henry v. Sullivan
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • July 12, 2016
    ...of article 5 of the Constitution... to review same and prevent its enforcement.”); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Matagorda Cnty. Drainage Dist. No. 3, 580 S.W.2d 634, 639 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1979)(“ Mobil I ”) (holding that the district court had jurisdiction under Article V Section 8 over a ......
  • Cameron County Good Government League v. Ramon
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • June 4, 1981
    ...Court, citing, among others, Moncrief v. Tate, 593 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.1980), and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Matagorda County Drainage District No. 3, 580 S.W.2d 634 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1979) rev'd and ren'd, 597 S.W.2d 910 In Moncrief, former civil service employees brought suit against the c......
  • Galveston Cnty. Judge Mark Henry & Cnty. Comm'rs Ryan Dennard v. Sullivan
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • April 5, 2016
    ...5 of the Constitution . . . to review same and prevent its enforcement."); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Matagorda Cnty. Drainage Dist. No. 3, 580 S.W.2d 634, 639 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1979) ("Mobil I") (holding that the district court had jurisdiction under Article V Section 8 over a complai......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT