Mobile, J. & K.C.R. Co. v. State
| Decision Date | 11 June 1906 |
| Citation | 89 Miss. 724,41 So. 259 |
| Parties | MOBILE, JACKSON & KANSAS CITY RAILROAD COMPANY v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, ET AL |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
FROM the chancery court of Pontotoc county, HON. JOHN QUITMAN ROBINS, Chancellor.
The State of Mississippi and the railroad commission of the state of Mississippi, the appellees, were complainants in the court below; the railroad company, the appellant, was defendant there. From a final decree in favor of the complainant perpetuating an injunction, the defendant appealed to the supreme court.
The injunction restrained the railroad company, appellant, from abandoning an old depot site in the town of Pontotoc and that part of the line of the former Gulf & Chicago Railroad Company which led from the proposed new main line of appellant to the old site.
When the Gulf & Chicago Railroad Company's line was originally built into Pontotoc the citizens of the town, by private subscription, contributed $ 5,500 in cash and furnished a right of way and depot site to said company, with the understanding and agreement that the depot would be located at one of two designated points in the town, and it was located upon one of them, and there remained until after the consolidation of the company and another, and the absorption of them by the appellant company. The old depot house having burned, the appellant attempted to abandon its site and a part of the track of the old company, the Gulf & Chicago, and to locate a new depot some distance westward from the old site, and without the business part of the town, when this suit was begun in order to enjoin the abandonment.
The chancery court at first dissolved the injunction, and an appeal to the supreme court was prosecuted by complainants from the decree dissolving it. The case is reported State of Mississippi, et al., v. Mobile, etc., R. R Co., 86 Miss. 172 (S.C., 38 So. 732). The supreme court reversed the decree of the chancery court, re-established the injunction and remanded the cause for further proceedings.
After the case was returned to the chancery court a hearing was had upon the facts of the case, and that court found that a valid and binding contract was entered into between the citizens of the town and the old railroad company, the Gulf & Chicago and that the citizens had never consented to an abandonment by appellant; that the proposed change of line of railroad and depot site would be detrimental to the interest of the town and its citizens, and that there are no insurmountable obstacles to prevent the extension of the old line of railroad southward from the old depot site so as to connect with appellant's line.
Pending the present appeal, the legislature passed what was claimed to be a special act, known as the Stegall bill (Laws 1906, ch. 143, p. 150), which purported to ratify, confirm and make lawful the said abandonment by appellant of the old line and the depot site and the location by it of a new line and its relocation of the depot.
Decree affirmed.
McIntosh & Rich, George W. May, and Mayes & Longstreet, for appellants.
J. M. Thomas, W. M. Cox, and R. V. Fletcher, assistant attorney-general, for appellees.
The briefs of counsel in this case were lost or mislaid, and the reporter has been unable to find them; hence no synopsis of them is given.
Argued orally by Edward Mayes, and J. C. Rich, for appellant, and by J. M. Thomas, W. M. Cox, and R. V. Fletcher, assistant attorney-general, for appellees.
OPINION
The former opinion in this case expressly held that the consolidation was conditioned upon broadening and standardizing the then existing narrow-gauge railroad, and making it a part of the main line of railroad operated by the consolidated corporation. Whether the statements in the petition for consolidation "that the railroads were in no way parallel and competing," were "jurisdictional facts upon the existence of which depended the power of the corporation to consolidate," we say nothing in this opinion. If that is too broad a statement, it certainly must be true, as held in the former opinion, that compliance with the statements in that petition as to broadening and standardizing the narrow-gauge railroad and making it a part of the main line of railroad were conditions upon compliance with which alone the consolidation was consented to by the railroad commission. If, therefore, these conditions were not complied with, the consolidation was of no effect. As held in the former opinion, if there had been no consolidation, these two railroads would have been parallel and competing lines between which no consolidation was permissible under our laws, and, as held in the former opinion, an "express grant of power by the legislature" for the two companies to consolidate would have been void, as being in contravention of the general statutory inhibition against consolidation of purchase of competing lines of railroads, which cannot, without violating section 87 of the constitution, be suspended "for the benefit of any individual or private corporation or association." Y. & M. V. Ry. Co. v. South. R. R. Co., 83 Miss. 746 (S.C., 36 So. 74).
Annotated Code 1892, § 3587, requires the consent of the railroad commission to a consolidation, and, as held in the former opinion, Laws 1898, ch. 80, p. 95, forbids the consolidation of parallel or competing railroads, and permitted the consolidation of other railroads only with the approval of the railroad commission. The appellants recognized this law as binding, and consequently, in their petition, stated that the railroads were "in no way parallel or competing lines," and expressly pledged themselves to broaden and standardize the then existing narrow-gauge railroad, and to make it a part of the main line operated by the consolidated corporation. It is nothing short of inequitable on the part of appellant, having gotten the consent of the railroad commission to consolidate upon these express conditions, to violate the conditions, and refuse to broaden and standardize the entire narrow-gauge road, and make it a part of the main line of said railroad corporation; and it is upon this ground,...
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