Mobilepark West Homeowners Assn. v. Escondido Mobilepark West

• Decision Date: 24 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. D019470,D019470
• Citation: 35 Cal.App.4th 32,41 Cal.Rptr.2d 393
• Parties: MOBILEPARK WEST HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, v. ESCONDIDO MOBILEPARK WEST et al., Defendants and Appellants; City of Escondido, Intervener and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 393

41 Cal.Rptr.2d 393

35 Cal.App.4th 32

MOBILEPARK WEST HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, v. ESCONDIDO MOBILEPARK WEST et al., Defendants and Appellants City of Escondido, Intervener and Respondent.

No. D019470.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

May 24, 1995.

Rehearing Denied June 21, 1995.

Review Denied Aug. 10, 1995.

Swanson and Dowdall, Swanson and Gieser, Jim P. Mahacek, Santa Ana, Davis & Schroeder, G. Gervaise Davis, III, Scott Schroeder, Monterey, Horvitz & Levy, David M. Axelrad and Richard L. Hasen, Encino, for defendants and appellants.

David R. Chapman, City Atty., Jeffrey Epp, Asst. City Atty., Endeman, Lincoln, Turek & Heater, Donald R. Lincoln, James C. Allen and Linda B. Reich, San Diego, for plaintiff in intervention and respondent.

HUFFMAN, Associate Justice.

The trial court granted a judgment on the pleadings, declaring certain ordinances of the City of Escondido (the City) to be facially valid, in the City's complaint in intervention in an underlying action between plaintiff Mobilepark West Homeowners Association (the residents) against their landlord, Escondido Mobilepark West and Charles E. Jacobson (the owners). The owners have appealed this judgment on the pleadings, contending that the ordinances (Nos. 91-19 & 88-50), which the City characterizes as clarification and implementation of a voter initiative measure establishing rent control in the City (commonly known as Proposition K, section 29-101 et seq. of the City Municipal Code), were actually invalid legislative amendments of the initiative measure. (Elec.Code, ¹ former § 4013, now renumbered to § 9217.) The owners also contend the ordinances invaded an area preempted by state law. (Civ.Code, § 798.17.)

We agree with the owners that ordinance No. 91-19 was an improper legislative amendment of Proposition K and is thus facially invalid. ² We further agree with the owners that as to existing homeowners, ordinance No. 91-19 is preempted by Civil Code section 798.17 (covering the field of setting conditions on the right of a park owner and existing homeowners to enter into rent control-exempt leases) and is therefore facially invalid on that basis also. We reverse the judgment with directions to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the owners on the facial invalidity issues. ³

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In June 1988, the City's voters passed Proposition K, an initiative ordinance establishing mobilehome park space rent review for the City. The initiative defines numerous terms it uses, including "tenant" as "a person who has a tenancy in a mobilehome park."

It establishes a mobilehome park rental review board (Rent Review Board), which has the duty of hearing rent increase applications and approving or disapproving rent increases. The initiative sets base rents as of a certain date and establishes procedures for park owners to apply for rent increases.

After the initiative was passed, disputes arose among owners and residents as to whether the residents or prospective residents could be required to sign long-term leases (12 months or over). Such long-term leases are exempt from rent control pursuant to Civil Code section 798.17, subdivision (a), which has been in effect in various forms since 1985.

A series of events, set out in legislative history materials submitted here, then took place with respect to whether park owners could require prospective homeowners to sign long-term leases that would be exempt from rent control. ⁴ In August 1988, the City council passed ordinance No. 88-50, with the stated intention of clarifying that under Proposition K, a park owner could not require either an existing or prospective homeowner to sign a long-term lease which would be exempt from rent control. In 1990, the Legislature amended Civil Code section 798.17 with Senate Bill 2009 ((1990) Cal.Stats., ch. 1046), which appeared to permit owners to require prospective homeowners to sign long-term leases that would be exempt from rent control. In response, the City council repealed ordinance No. 88-50. However, due to unforeseen problems that arose regarding preemption, the Legislature in 1991 repealed Senate Bill 2009 by further amending Civil Code section 798.17, with the purpose of reinstating the state law as it existed before Senate Bill 2009 was enacted. Language accompanying the measure which repealed Senate Bill 2009 stated that it was being repealed because it had inadvertently preempted local ordinances which gave certain protections to prospective homeowners. (1991, Cal.Stats., ch. 24, § 3, Rep. to Sen. Com. on Judiciary, "Mobilehome Parks--Repeal of S.B. 2009, 1990;" Rep. to Sen.Rules Com.; Rep. to Assem. Com. on Housing & Community Development.)

Once Senate Bill 2009 and its amendments to Civil Code section 798.17 were repealed, the City adopted on May 15, 1991, as an urgency matter, ordinance No. 91-19, which essentially reenacted ordinance No. 88-50. The declaration of urgency for the ordinance stated that it was intended to deal with hardships on purchasers and prospective purchasers, as well as sellers, of mobilehomes, because certain park owners were informing prospective mobilehome purchasers that they must sign a long-term lease as a condition of the park owner's approval of the sale, resulting in denial of the benefits of the rent protection initiative.

Ordinance No. 91-19 first defines the term "tenant" as "not only a person who has an existing tenancy in a mobile home park but also a person who has purchased or is in the process of purchasing or otherwise acquiring a mobilehome that will remain at that particular park." Section 2 of the ordinance then sets forth a procedure for dealing with leases for periods of more than 12 months (exempt from rent control) in the following manner: Subdivision (a) requires submission of a long-term lease to the Rent Review Board for review to determine if it complies with the terms of the rent protection ordinance (Proposition K), before it is offered to any tenant. Subdivision (b) then requires that before any long-term lease (in excess of 12 months) is executed by the tenant, the owner must "(1) offer the tenant the option of a rental agreement for a term of 12 months or less, (2) provide the tenant with a copy of the Rent Protection Ordinance, and (3) inform the tenant both orally and in writing that if the tenant signs a lease or rental agreement with a term in excess of 12 months which has been reviewed and approved by the Board in accordance with the provisions of the Rent Protection ordinance, the lease or rental agreement may not be subject to the terms and protections of the Rent Protection Ordinance." Subdivision (c) then provides that a long-term lease shall not be exempt from Six months after ordinance No. 91-19 went into effect, a number of residents of Mobilepark West sued the owners, alleging, among other things, that they had refused to follow the procedures in the City's rent ordinances, including Nos. 88-50 and 91-19. An amended pleading brought in the residents as the plaintiff. The City filed a complaint in intervention seeking declaratory relief as to the validity of those ordinances. ⁵

Proposition K unless it complies with each and every requirement in Civil Code section 798.17, subdivisions (a) through (c), for exemption from rent control of such leases offered to homeowners.

In the underlying action between the residents and the owners, the owners filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings, arguing that ordinances Nos. 88-50 and 91-19 were preempted by Civil Code section 798.17 and were void as illegal amendments of the initiative (pursuant to Elec.Code, § 4013, now § 9217). Ultimately, this motion was denied before trial. However, as the case proceed between the residents and the owners, the residents filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding the validity of Proposition K and these ordinances. A stipulation was reached between the City and the owners, indicating that the court could separately rule on the facial validity of these ordinances. The trial court then issued a judgment on behalf of the City only on its complaint in intervention against the owners, declaring ordinances Nos. 88-50 and 91-19 facially valid. The matter then proceeded to trial on the action by the residents against the owners, resulting in a verdict in favor of the residents. (See fn. 3, ante.) The owners separately appealed the judgment in favor of the City. Judicial notice has been requested and granted of legislative history materials as to Civil Code section 798.17, ballot arguments as to Proposition K, and the disposition of the related actions. (Evid.Code, §§ 452, 459; fn. 5, ante.)

DISCUSSION

We first address the owners' claims that ordinance No. 91-19 is an improper amendment to Prop. K, an initiative ordinance, because it was enacted by the City council rather than by the voters. (§ 9217.) We then discuss the preemption issue with regard to existing homeowners only, as the owners in their reply brief have abandoned any arguments on appeal regarding preemption with regard to prospective homeowners. Along the way, we will discuss the collateral estoppel claims as necessary.

Generally, the law to be considered and applied by the reviewing court is the law in effect at the time of its decision. (Gregory v. City of San Juan Capistrano, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 78, 191 Cal.Rptr. 47.) It is a judicial function to interpret the language of the ordinance, and this record is adequate for determining that legal issue. (Ibid.) To determine the facial validity of the challenged ordinances, we need address our attention only to the version now in effect, No. 91-19.

I Amendment of Initiative Measure

Section 9217, reenacting without substantive change former section 4013, sets forth the rules for determining the effective date of an initiative measure or a municipal ordinance proposed by initiative. In...