Modoc Gold Mining Co. v. Skiles

• Decision Date: 10 May 1899
• Citation: 13 Colo.App. 293,57 P. 190
• Parties: MODOC GOLD-MIN. CO. v. SKILES.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

57 P. 190

13 Colo.App. 293

MODOC GOLD-MIN. CO. v. SKILES.

Court of Appeals of Colorado

May 10, 1899

Appeal from Lake county court.

Action by Maggie Skiles against the Modoc Gold-Mining Company. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Phelps & Pendery, for appellant.

WILSON J.

This suit was to recover upon a time check alleged to have been issued by the defendant mining company. It was begun in a justice court, and hence there are no written pleadings. The time check was in words and figures as follows:

TIME-CHECK.

No. 63.

Leadville Colo., June 17, 1896.

This is to certify, that DUNCAN McLEAN has worked ______ days for the Modoc Gold-Mining Co. as Topman, at $______ per day ................. $227.50

Deductions:

Deduct for ______ $______.

Deduct for ______ $______. -------

Balance due ............. $227.50

G.P Goodier.

Endorsed Duncan McLean.

The only question relied upon and discussed by counsel for appellant is that the court erred in admitting the time check in evidence over the objection of defendant. It will be observed that the instrument does not show upon its face in what capacity the drawer claimed to act, if at all, for the defendant. It, in any event, devolved upon the plaintiff to show that Goodier was the agent of defendant, authorized to execute such instruments. The only evidence as to the authority of Goodier to act for or bind the company in any manner was that of one witness, who testified substantially that he knew Goodier was connected with the defendant company in some capacity; that he had, to the personal knowledge of the witness, represented the company in various suits and in other matters; and that at various times during nearly two years previous he had stated to witness that he was its manager. It is elementary that the authority of a supposed agent cannot be established by his own declarations or admissions. If the agency is shown by other proof, the declarations of the agent may then be admitted, but not otherwise. In this case it must be confessed that the proof of agency was not very strong nor conclusive, but, applying the liberal rule laid down by our supreme court in similar cases, we think that it was sufficient to make a prima facie case, and to render as competent evidence the declarations of Goodier. In Extension Co. v. Coby, 7 Colo. 300, 3 P. 483, which, like this, was a suit upon a laborer's time...