Moerschell v. City of Eagle Lake
Decision Date | 11 November 1921 |
Docket Number | (No. 8081.)<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL> |
Citation | 236 S.W. 996 |
Parties | MOERSCHELL v. CITY OF EAGLE LAKE et al. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Colorado County; M. Kennon, Judge.
Suit by the City of Eagle Lake against C. B. Barbe, receiver of the Lakeside Sugar Refining Company, who was later dismissed and Jacob W. Moerschell substituted as party defendant, wherein the Eagle Lake Independent School District intervened. Judgment for plaintiff and intervener, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Grobe & Miller, of Columbus, for appellant.
Emanuel Roos, of Eagle Lake, and Wurzbach, Wirtz & Weinert, of Seguin, for appellees.
The statement thus given has been taken from the brief for the appellees filed in this court. The total amount for which the tax lien was so established and foreclosed was $2,049, with 6 per cent. per annum interest thereon from the date of the decree, $538.20 of which was adjudged to be for the benefit of the intervener, the Eagle Lake independent school district. Findings of fact in substantial accord with the preceding statement and conclusions of law were filed by the trial judge at the request of appellant, to the former of which no exceptions have been presented.
In this court, however, the judgment so rendered against him below is assailed by appellant as having been erroneous upon the law of the case for a number of reasons; the main ones being:
(1) That the power to maintain this suit lay in the trustees of the Eagle Lake independent school district, the intervener, and not in the plaintiff, city of Eagle Lake, for the reason that the city was without authority either to levy or collect any of the taxes recovered for after the abolishment of the old municipal school district and the creation of the intervener as its successor.
(2) That the city ordinance of September 3, 1907, whereby the city of Eagle Lake extended its corporate limits for school purposes only, in which extension appellant's property lay, and article 2883 of the Revised Statutes of Texas, by virtue of which this ordinance was passed, are in contravention of article 11, § 10, of the state Constitution.
(3) That this extension ordinance of September 3, 1907, was shown on its face to have been passed in obedience to a petition signed by a majority of the qualified voters of the entire district as extended, when it should have been upon the petition of a majority of the qualified voters of the added territory only.
(4) That the property involved had passed to appellant free of the tax lien so foreclosed against it by virtue of a receiver's sale of it to his predecessor in title.
(5) That the amount of the school taxes levied and assessed against the property for the years 1912 and 1913 exceeded the rate permitted by law.
(6) That no sufficient election to authorize the levy and assessment of the maintenance tax, interest, penalty, and costs, for the year 1912, recovered for had been held in the entire municipal school district in that the only election for that purpose ever held, the one of May 4, 1912, merely submitted to the voters the question of whether the ad valorem maintenance tax of, and not exceeding, 50 cents on the $100 valuation, which had theretofore, and prior to the extension of the limits of the district for school purposes in 1907, been voted, should be continued or discontinued, whereas the proposal should have been for or against the levy of such a tax.
(7) That the city was without authority to recover the penalties and interest awarded.
(8) That the ordinance under which the boundaries of the city were extended for school purposes only was not sufficiently pleaded.
These several contentions will be disposed of in the order given.
1. In so far as concerns the maintenance tax, the special act of the Legislature creating the Eagle Lake independent school district, which did not become effective as establishing the successor of the old municipal district until it had been ratified by vote of the inhabitants of the territory affected, expressly provided for its collection by the tax collector of the city; section 7 thereof being as follows:
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Dacus v. Parker
...359. The election was valid, id. at 359–60, for the ballot still described the character and purpose of the measure. See also Moerschell, 236 S.W. at 998, 1000 (upholding proposition about “continu[ing] or discontin[uing]” a tax even though the election arguably concerned a new tax). And in......
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First Baptist Church v. City of Fort Worth
...a suit by the city to enforce the collection of said taxes by suit. The Galveston Court of Civil Appeals held in Moerschell v. City of Eagle Lake, 236 S. W. 996 (writ denied) that neither Const. art. 11, § 10, nor article 7, § 3, prohibit an incorporated city or town from the assessment and......
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Dacus v. Parker
...at 359. The election was valid, id. at 359-60, for the ballot still described the character and purposeof the measure. See also Moerschell, 236 S.W. at 998, 1000 (upholding proposition about "continu[ing] or discontin[uing]" a tax even though the election arguably concerned a new tax). And ......
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City of Van Alstyne v. State ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of Anna Independent School Dist.
...for school purposes only into territory of an adjoining common school district has been many times sustained. Moerschell v. City of Eagle Lake, Tex.Civ.App., 236 S.W. 996; City of Eagle Lake v. Lakeside Sugar Refining Co., Tex.Civ.App., 144 S.W. 709; Poteet v. Bridges, Tex.Civ.App., 248 S.W......