Moffett v. State
| Decision Date | 06 April 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 51841,51841 |
| Citation | 555 S.W.2d 437 |
| Parties | Jesse Edward MOFFETT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery. After finding appellant guilty, the jury assessed his punishment at twelve years.
On March 11, 1974, at 8:30 a. m., the appellant entered a Kroger grocery store in Dallas. After shopping for approximately forty-five minutes he approached the checkout counter and pointed a gun at Vera Parrish, the cashier. Parrish responded to the appellant's demands for money by placing the contents of the cash register and the office drawer in a paper bag. Appellant then left the store.
Appellant's first contention is that the court erred in allowing the State to ask an improper "have your heard" question while cross-examining one of the appellant's character witnesses at the punishment stage of the trial. Specifically, appellant contends that the question constituted an improper assertion of fact. We agree and reverse.
While cross-examining one of appellant's character witnesses, the following occurred:
"Q (By Mr. Kinne, the prosecutor)
Have you heard that on September 18th of 1973, that he robbed a woman by the name of Francis Tindall, at the Globe Cleaners at 2430 North Haskell Avenue with a firearm?
In Brown v. State, 477 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), this Court stated the rule for cross-examining character witnesses:
"The general rule is that, as part of its cross-examination, the State is permitted to ask the character witness if he has heard of a specific act of misconduct. However, the State may not ask whether the witness had personal knowledge of the act, nor may the question be framed so as to imply that the act has actually been committed (footnote omitted). (emphasis added)
In this case the prosecutor's question, through its structure and excessive detail, clearly implied that the act had actually occurred. The question is similar to those held to be improper in Webber v. State, 472 S.W.2d 136 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Pitcock v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 204, 324 S.W.2d 855 (1959); and Wharton v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 326, 248 S.W.2d 739 (1952).
In Webber, the question was, "have you heard that Mr. Webber was expelled from Baylor University, when he was caught shoplifting?" 472 S.W.2d, at 137.
In Pitcock, the questions were, "Have your heard during your discussions there about this boy's reputation, about the trouble that he had concerning a DWI conviction in Stephens County in 1953?" and "Have you heard them discuss the trouble that he was in in 1951 concerning a DWI conviction in Taylor County, Texas?" and "Have you ever heard during these discussions anything concerning the trouble that the defendant was in Wayne Pitcock in 1953 concerning a DWI conviction in Stephens County?" 324 S.W.2d, at 856 ().
In Wharton, the first improper question was, "Have you heard that he is under another indictment for rape in a separate case on a separate woman that occurred eight days after this one?" 248 S.W.2d, at 740 (). The prosecutor then asked two other witnesses virtually the same question, substituting only the phrase, "that happened eight days after (the) one he is being tried for." Id.
The question in this case was, "Have you heard that on September the 18th of 1973, that he robbed a woman by the name of Francis Tindall at the Globe Cleaners at 2403 North Haskell Avenue with a firearm?" (emphasis added)
In each of these cases, including the one before us, the prosecutor properly began his question, "Have you heard," but then clearly implied by his choice of words that the incident in fact took place.
All of these cases, including those relied upon by the dissent, make it clear that the rule should look to the implication of the question rather than to the form alone. The dissenting opinion would expressly elevate form over substance. Yet the correct rule is that the question may not imply fact. The dissenters' "form rule" is a derivative rule of thumb; it is not the underlying rule of law.
As this Court said in Wharton,
"The privilege of cross-examining a character witness should not be utilized as a vehicle to prove that the defendant is a criminal generally, or that he has been guilty of committing another offense." Id., at 740.
See also, Art. 38.29, V.A.C.C.P.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Appellant contends that a question to one of his reputation witnesses implied the commission of an extraneous offense. The record shows the following occurred during cross-examination of the witness at the punishment stage of the trial:
There was no objection that the question was framed to make it a statement of fact that he committed the offense.
That part of the objection that the misconduct referred to was another robbery which "he had not been convicted of" is without merit. There is no requirement that reputation questions relate to final convictions. In McElroy v. State, 528 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), the Court wrote:
In Partida v. State, 506 S.W.2d 209 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), this Court wrote:
In Brown v. State, 477 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), this Court set forth a method for cross-examining a reputation witness:
The purpose of such questions is to test the credibility of the witness' testimony concerning the defendant's reputation. Thus, since reputation is based on hearsay, the State may properly inquire whether the witness has heard hearsay inconsistent with his opinion. Brown v. State, supra. The majority does not distinguish the Brown case from the present case. The question taught in Brown to be proper was ". . . have you heard that the defendant committed a certain act?" That occurred in the present case.
In the context of cross-examination, it is not objectionable that such questions are leading. In Brown, the Court confronted the (Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, the prosecutor properly framed his question in the "have you heard" manner.
This Court has sanctioned reputation questions on cross-examination which had the same thrust as the one in the instant case. In Brown, the prosecutor inquired if the witness had heard that defendant "had threatened to kill his wife," and "had beaten his wife," and "had been convicted of driving while intoxicated." We found no error. Does the majority hold that the inclusion of the date in the question in the present case makes it objectionable?
In Childs v. State, 491 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), we approved inquiries concerning whether the witness had heard that his son, defendant, "had been indicted for robbery and for possession of...
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