Mogan v. People
| Decision Date | 14 June 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 20695,20695 |
| Citation | 157 Colo. 395,402 P.2d 928 |
| Parties | James Eugene MOGAN, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
William H. Nelson, Grand Junction, for plaintiff in error.
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Aurel M. Kelly, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error.
On June 25, 1962, an information was filed in the trial court charging plaintiff in error, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, in separate counts with (1) premeditated murder, and (2) aggravated robbery. Through court-appointed counsel defendant entered pleas of not guilty, and not guilty by reason of insanity to each count.
A trial by jury commenced on September 17, 1962. The case was submitted to the jury at 9:03 P.M., on September 19, 1962. At 11:55 P.M., less than three hours after the jury had received the case for deliberation, the court summoned the defendant, counsel and the jury into the court room and inquired of the jury if they were having any difficulty understanding the instructions:
Whereupon the court immediately read to the jury what is commonly known as the 'third degree instruction,' with the preliminary remark as follows:
The instruction thus given has frequently been approved by this court as to form and as proper under appropriate circumstances. In this case, the court had advised neither the district attorney nor defense counsel that this instruction was to be given. It made no inquiry of the jury whether it was in disagreement as to the facts in the case or whether it was deadlocked. The jury had made no request for advice, information or assistance. The court gave the instruction on its own motion, attempting to justify its action on the ground that the form of the instruction had, under similar circumstances, been approved by the Supreme Court. The jury was immediately returned to its jury room for further deliberations.
Defendant's counsel, at his earliest opportunity, preserved his record by protesting the action of the court on the grounds that the jury had been out for less than three hours in a case involving a possible death penalty and had not had sufficient time to go through the evidence and to digest the original instructions (twenty-two in number). The court paid no heed to counsel's protestation and declared an immediate recess.
The jury again retired and at 12:55 A.M., on September 20, 1962, and after fifty-one minutes of additional deliberation, the court was informed that the jury had reached a verdict. The court then, with agreement of counsel, decided to receive the verdict; but when the jury was returned to the court room the court had changed its mind and addressed the jury as follows:
(Emphasis supplied.)
The court then recessed at 1:23 A.M., and the jury recommenced its deliberations the following morning, at 10:00 A.M. Immediately thereafter, the jury requested that the additional instruction be reread. The court thereupon directed that the instruction be typed and delivered to the jury, following which the jury promptly returned verdicts, finding the defendant sane, guilty of aggravated robbery, and guilty of murder in the first degree with the penalty of death. A motion for a new trial was duly filed, heard and overruled, and judgment was entered on the verdicts.
Defendant's arguments in support of his plea for reversal may be summarized under two headings, as follows:
1. That the trial court erred in giving the additional instruction, in view of the fact that the jury had been deliberation less than three hours; that it had had no difficulty in understanding the original instructions; that there had been no indication that the jury was in disagreement as to the facts or that it had been deadlocked, and that the jury had not requested advice, information or assistance.
2. That the trial court erred in refusing to receive the verdicts of the jury when such verdicts were offered.
We will consider briefly the task and duty of this jury during its deliberations. In addition to evaluating the voluminous testimony of expert and lay witnesses, extending over a period of fifteen and onehalf hours, it was required to study many exhibits. For example, defendant's Exhibit 1 had been received in evidence. This was a complete and voluminous file of the Colorado Psychopathic. Hospital, where defendant had been confined on three separate occasions. When this evidence was offered, the court had remarked:
'They [the jury] can't individually read that inside of twenty-four hours. * * * it would take one person about two...
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People v. Hill, 25384
...292 (1971); Lowe v. People, 175 Colo. 491, 488 P.2d 559 (1971); Neito v. People, 160 Colo. 179, 415 P.2d 531 (1966); Mogan v. People, 157 Colo. 395, 402 P.2d 928 (1965); Mills v. People, 146 Colo. 457, 362 P.2d 152 (1961). See also United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1971); Un......
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Ford v. Board of County Com'rs of Saguache County, 81CA0080
...indicates that the trial court responded to the deadlock with caution and patience appropriate to the circumstances. Mogan v. People, 157 Colo. 395, 402 P.2d 928 (1965); Peterson v. Rawalt, 95 Colo. 368, 36 P.2d 465 The County also challenges the jury findings of liability based on the evid......
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People v. Lovato
...People, 146 Colo. 457, 362 P.2d 152 (1961). Neither of the cases cited by the defendant (Nieto v. People, Supra, and Mogan v. People, 157 Colo. 395, 402 P.2d 928 (1965)) are factually similar to this Under directive of the Chief Justice of this court, issued on September 22, 1971, it was or......
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People v. Gonzales
...is given depends on the particular circumstances of the case and rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Mogan v. People, 157 Colo. 395, 402 P.2d 928. In the instant case, the only real issue was whether the circumstantial evidence, which included a palm print on the car door ......