Mohamad v. Rajoub
Citation | 634 F.3d 604 |
Decision Date | 18 March 2011 |
Docket Number | 09–7158.,Nos. 09–7109,s. 09–7109 |
Parties | Asid MOHAMAD, Individually and for the Estate of Azzam Rahim, et al., Appellantsv.Jibril RAJOUB, et al., Appellees. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:08–cv–01800).Robert J. Tolchin argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellants.Laura G. Ferguson argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief was Kevin G. Mosley. Richard A. Hibey and Mark J. Rochon entered appearances.Before: GINSBURG, TATEL and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.GINSBURG, Circuit Judge:
The sons and widow of Azzam Rahim sued the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization for damages on behalf of Rahim's estate. The plaintiffs alleged the defendants tortured and killed Rahim in violation of both the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, note § 2(a), and federal common law. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding only a natural person is amenable to suit under the TVPA and the Rahims had no cause of action under federal common law. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
Because the district court dismissed this case on the basis of the complaint alone, we assume for the purpose of this appeal that the allegations therein are in all respects true. Meijer, Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 533 F.3d 857, 865–66 (D.C.Cir.2008). According to the complaint, Azzam Rahim, a Palestinian born and raised in the West Bank, became a citizen of the United States after moving here in the 1970s. The events in suit took place when Rahim visited the West Bank in 1995. While he was sitting in a coffee shop, some two to four men, who identified themselves as security police, forced him into an unmarked car. They took Rahim to a prison in Jericho, where he was tortured and eventually killed. In 1996 the U.S. Department of State issued a report on human rights practices in the West Bank since Israel had transferred certain responsibilities over the area to the Palestinian Authority. The report stated that Rahim had “died in the custody of PA intelligence officers in Jericho.”
The Rahims initially filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. In 2007 that court entered a default against the defendants, neither of which had answered the complaint.* After the defendants moved to vacate the entry of default and to dismiss the Rahims' complaint for, among other reasons, lack of personal jurisdiction in that district, the court granted the Rahims' motion to transfer the case to the District Court for the District of Columbia, where the defendants renewed their motions to vacate the entry of default and to dismiss the Rahims' complaint.
Granting the defendants' motions, the district court set aside the entry of default and dismissed the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), holding the plaintiffs have no cause of action under either the TVPA or federal common law. Mohamad v. Rajoub, 664 F.Supp.2d 20, 22–24 (D.D.C.2009). The Rahims now appeal.
The plaintiffs present three issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion in vacating the entry of default, see Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 835 (D.C.Cir.1980), and, if not, whether the Rahims have a cause of action under (2) the TVPA or (3) federal common law. We review the latter two issues de novo. See Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1216 (D.C.Cir.2006).
First, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the default entered against the defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), which rule permits a district court to “set aside an entry of default for good cause.” See also Jackson, 636 F.2d at 836 (). In exercising its discretion, the district court is supposed to consider “whether (1) the default was willful, (2) a set-aside would prejudice plaintiff, and (3) the alleged defense was meritorious.” Keegel v. Key West & Caribbean Trading Co., 627 F.2d 372, 373 (D.C.Cir.1980). In this case, the district court did not say why it granted the defendants' motion to vacate but, as it happens, we need not remand the case because the Rahims' only argument against setting aside the default is that the defendants presented no “meritorious defense” to this action.
As the defendants note, “allegations are meritorious if they contain even a hint of a suggestion which, proven at trial, would constitute a complete defense.” Id. at 374 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The defendants far surpassed this standard, as will be seen in what follows.
The TVPA was enacted in 1992 in order to create “a civil action for recovery of damages from an individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.” Pub.L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, note). The relevant provision of the TVPA states:
(a) Liability.—An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation—
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual's legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.
28 U.S.C. § 1350, note § 2(a). The defendants argue the district court properly dismissed the Rahims' claim under the TVPA because this provision does not create a cause of action against an organization, as opposed to a natural person.
We begin our inquiry, as always, with the text of the statute. Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068, 1072 (D.C.Cir.2009). The Rahims claim the Palestinian Authority and the PLO are amenable to suit under the TVPA because the word “individual,” in referring to the perpetrator of torture or of extrajudicial killing, includes organizations. The Rahims' authority for this proposition is limited to the observation that the term “individual” is “consistently viewed in the law as including corporations.” Sinaltrainal v. Coca–Cola Co., 256 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1359 (S.D.Fla.2003) (, )aff'd in relevant part, 578 F.3d 1252, 1264 n. 13 (11th Cir.2009); see also Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir.2008) ( ); United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir.2000) ( ). The defendants, for their part, argue “individual” should be understood in its ordinary sense, meaning only a natural person. See, e.g., In re North (Gadd Fee Application), 12 F.3d 252, 254–55 (D.C.Cir.1994) ( ).
We agree with the defendants. Because the Congress did not define the term “individual” in the TVPA, we give the word its ordinary meaning, Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187, 115 S.Ct. 788, 130 L.Ed.2d 682 (1995), which typically encompasses only natural persons and not corporations or other organizations, North, 12 F.3d at 254 () (citation omitted); cf. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 n. 13, 118 S.Ct. 2091, 141 L.Ed.2d 393 (1998) ( ). Notably, the Dictionary Act, which provides guidance in “determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,” strongly implies the word individual does not comprise organizations because it defines “person” to include “corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, ... as well as individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1; see also Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1126–27 (9th Cir.2010) ( ).
The Rahims nonetheless argue the term “individual” is at least ambiguous, wherefore the court should look to the purpose of the TVPA, which supports liability for organizations. Quoting Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir.1995), they reason that because the Congress enacted the TVPA in order “to codify the cause of action” recognized by the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and to “extend that cause of action to plaintiffs who are U.S. citizens,” and because the ATS permits a plaintiff to sue an organization, the TVPA must do also. See Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1263 (). But see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir.2010) ( ).**
We reject the Rahims' argument because the structure of the TVPA confirms what the plain text of the statute shows: The Congress used the word “individual” to denote only natural persons. The liability provision of the statute uses the word “individual” five times in the same sentence—four times to refer to the victim of torture or extrajudicial killing, which could be only a natural person, and once to the perpetrator of the torture or killing. § 1350, note § 2(a). The Rahims advance no cogent reason, and we see none, to think the term “individual” has a different meaning when referring to the victim as opposed to the perpetrator. See Bowoto, 621 F.3d at 1127 (); Comm'r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250, 116...
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