Mohammed v. D. 1050 W. Rankin, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 December 2014
• Docket Number: NO. 01–13–00977–CV,01–13–00977–CV
• Citation: 464 S.W.3d 737
• Parties: Taj Mohammed, Appellant v. D. 1050 W. Rankin, Inc., Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

464 S.W.3d 737

Taj Mohammed, Appellant

v.D. 1050 W. Rankin, Inc., Appellee

NO. 01–13–00977–CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Opinion issued December 23, 2014

Rehearing Overruled March 26, 2015

James Ivy Wiedemer, Houston, for Appellant.

Benjamin Allen, Casey Todd Wallace, Johnson, Trent, West & Taylor, LLP, Houston, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle.

OPINION

Jane Bland, Justice

In this eviction case, Taj Mohammed appeals the county court's order determining that he had no right to continue to occupy a convenience store property. Mohammed leased the premises from D. 1050 W. Rankin, Inc. The justice court initially heard the case, ultimately ruling in Mohammed's favor. Rankin appealed to the county court at law, which reversed the justice court ruling. On appeal to this court, Mohammed contends that (1) the justice court that heard the eviction action lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, thus any judgment stemming from the proceeding is void; (2) Rankin did not timely appeal the justice court decision against Rankin to the county court, thus the county court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal; and (3) as to the merits, he properly exercised a lease option for an additional term before receiving Rankin's notice to vacate the premises, contrary to the county court's findings. Because the justice and county courts had jurisdiction over the case and the evidence supports the county court's findings in favor of Rankin, we affirm.

Background

In June 2001, Mohammed entered into a commercial lease with Bryant Management to house his convenience store, Quick Food Mart, in a north Houston shopping center. The lease term was four years and seven months. Soon after, Rankin became Mohammed's landlord when it purchased the shopping center from Bryant. The lease required monthly rental payments of $1,200, steadily increasing to $1,800 per month by the end of the first term.

The lease provided two extension options. The first five-year option contemplated monthly rent of $2,000 for the first two years and $2,200 for the remaining three years. The rent for the second five-year option would be set based on “market rents of similar properties in the location at that time.”

At the end of December 2005, the first term of the lease expired. Mohammed continued to pay $1,800 per month in rent and occupied the premises at that monthly rental amount until April 2013, when Rankin notified Mohammed that it was terminating his lease in thirty days. When Mohammed refused to vacate the premises, Rankin pursued his eviction.

Course of Proceedings

Rankin brought a forcible detainer suit in justice court seeking to evict Mohammed from the property. In an order dated June 18, 2013, the justice court ruled for Rankin. Mohammed moved for reconsideration in the justice court, arguing that the court had indicated at a hearing that Mohammed had the superior right of possession. On June 27, the justice court modified its judgment, this time finding in favor of Mohammed. Mohammed served Rankin with notice of the June 27 order on July 3. Rankin filed its appeal bond on July 5, by posting it by certified mail to the justice court.

In the county court, Mohammed moved to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction on the ground that the justice court and the county court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide immediate possession. He also contended that Rankin failed to timely appeal the justice court's second order.

The county court denied both motions. Upon trial de novo, it found that Mohammed had failed to exercise either lease option, either verbally or in writing, and was a month-to-month tenant; consequently, it rendered judgment in favor of Rankin.

Discussion

I. Justice Court Jurisdiction

The only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to immediate possession of real property. Morris v. Am. Home Mortg. Serv., Inc., 360 S.W.3d 32, 34 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 746 (2011, repealed 2013), and Villalon v. Bank One, 176 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) ). Neither a justice court nor a county court has jurisdiction to determine a right to possession if resolution of that right in turn depends upon the resolution of a title dispute. Id. at 34–35 (citing Mitchell v. Armstrong Capital Corp., 911 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied) ). In defining a landlord-tenant relationship, however, a justice court can determine which party has a superior right to immediate possession without impinging on any right granted in the title to the property. Id. at 34 (citing Villalon, 176 S.W.3d at 71 ).

Mohammed relies on our court's decision in Mitchell to contend that the justice and county courts exceeded their subject-matter jurisdiction by adjudicating whether he had a right to occupy the premises. 911 S.W.2d at 170–71. In Mitchell, however, we concluded that the justice and county court lacked jurisdiction because the right to possession in that case depended upon the validity of a foreclosure lien in an underlying title dispute. Id. at 171. Here, the question of possession depends upon a landlord-tenant relationship, not on a title dispute. Mitchell thus is factually inapposite. As we and other courts have observed, landlord-tenant disputes about possession squarely fall within the justice court's jurisdiction. See Chinyere v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 440 S.W.3d 80, 83–85 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).¹

The parties here disagree about whether the lease term was month-to-month or instead fell within one of the lease's extension options. In either scenario, possession depends upon their landlord-tenant relationship. We hold that the justice and county courts had subject-matter jurisdiction to determine immediate possession in the forcible detainer suit. See Chinyere, 440 S.W.3d at 84–85.

II. County Court Appellate Jurisdiction

Mohammed challenges the county court's appellate jurisdiction, arguing that the time for filing an appeal had expired because (1) the time ran from the justice court's first judgment, or alternatively, (2) the time ran from the date the justice court signed the modified judgment. Rankin responds that it timely posted its appeal two days after it received notice of the modified judgment against it.

In resolving this procedural challenge, we first determine the governing rules. On April 15, 2013, the Texas Supreme Court adopted new rules for justice court cases, and it repealed the then-existing rules.² The justice court signed its judgment in this case on June 27. The county court appeal of the case remained pending when the new justice court rules became effective on August 31, 2013.

Mohammed observes that Rankin filed its justice court action before the effective date of the new rules and refers us to the now-repealed rules. In its order adopting the new rules, however, the Texas Supreme Court provides that the new rules “govern cases ... pending on August 31, 2013, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a case pending on August 31, 2013, would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the formerly applicable procedure applies.” Id. Because this case has remained pending beyond the effective date of the new rules, we cite the newly-adopted rules and note where they are substantively different in matters relevant to the resolution of this appeal.

A. Modification of the Judgment

In eviction cases, a landlord may appeal a justice court's decision by filing an approved bond with the justice court within five days after the court signs its judgment. Tex.R. Civ. P. 510.9(a) (“A party may appeal a judgment in an eviction case by filing a bond, making a cash deposit, or filing a sworn statement of inability to pay with the justice court within 5 days after the judgment is signed.”).

Characterizing the justice court's June 27 judgment as a judgment “nunc pro tunc,” Mohammed argues that the time period for filing an appeal to the county court began to run on June 18, when the justice court signed its first judgment. Because Rankin prevailed in the June 18 justice court judgment and lost in the June 27 judgment, however, the justice court's judgment was not a “nunc pro tunc” judgment; it was a modified or amended judgment that changed the prevailing party. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 506.1 & 306a ; Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip., Inc. 10 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex.2000). In any event, the appellate timetable restarts even from a judgment nunc pro tunc if the appellate complaint includes a complaint about a matter changed in the later judgment. Amato v. Hernandez, 981 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). Accordingly, we reject Mohommed's contention that Rankin's time for filing an appeal to the county court began to run as of the June 18 judgment.

The new justice court eviction procedure, contained in Rule 510, does not have a specific provision addressing the timetable for an appeal when the justice court modifies its judgment in an eviction case. Generally, under Rule 506, in a justice court case, a party may appeal within 21 days after the judgment is signed or motion for new tried is denied. Tex.R. Civ. P. 506.1(a). This 21–day period mirrors the timetable for an appeal from an original judgment in a non-eviction justice court case. See id.

But the eviction rule's procedure trumps the more general justice court rule when the two conflict. “To the extent of any conflict between Rule 510 [governing evictions] and the rest of Part V [governing justice cases in general], Rule 510 applies.” See Tex. R. Civ. P. 500.3(d). Because the eviction rule provides for an appellate timetable of 5 days, we conclude that the more general rule allowing 21 days for an appeal in a justice court case does not apply; in harmonizing the provisions so as not to conflict, we conclude that the 5–day timeframe applies to an appeal of an...