Mola v. Reiley
Decision Date | 10 April 1968 |
Docket Number | No. L--713,L--713 |
Citation | 100 N.J.Super. 343,241 A.2d 861 |
Parties | Henry J. MOLA and Eileen Mola, Plaintiffs, v. Clyde REILEY, individually and as The Building Inspector of the Borough of Mountain Lakes and The Borough of Mountain Lakes, a municipal corporation of the State of New Jersey, Defendants. |
Court | New Jersey Superior Court |
Daniel E. Isles, Orange, for plaintiffs (Querques & Isles, Orange, attorneys).
Reginald Stanton, Morristown, for defendants (Jeffers & Dillon, Morristown, attorneys).
Plaintiffs move for a summary judgment on their complaint in lieu of prerogative writs seeking Mandamus to compel defendant Building Inspector of the Borough of Mountain Lakes to issue a building permit for the installation of a 5,000-gallon steel gasoline tank and pump in and on plaintiffs' premises, following his refusal to issue such a permit.
The single question is whether an owner is entitled as a matter of right to a building permit for an accessory use prior to any undertaking of the primary use to which the use sought is said to be accessory. The problem does not appear to have been considered heretofore in New Jersey.
The salutary purposes of summary judgment should be noted at the outset. Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74, 110 A.2d 24, 27 (1954).
Considerations limiting the granting of summary judgment are equally important:
'The standards of decision governing the grant or denial of a summary judgment emphasize that a party opposing a motion is not to be denied a trial unless the moving party sustains the burden of showing clearly the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. At the same time, the standards are to be applied with discriminating care so as not to defeat a summary judgment if the movant is justly entitled to one.
Thus it is the movant's burden to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact, 6 Moore's Federal Practice, par. 56.15(3). The phrasing of our rule, R.R. 4:58--3, slightly different from Federal Rule 56(c), underscores this in the requirement that the absence of undisputed material facts must appear 'palpably.' All inferences of doubt are drawn against the movant in favor of the opponent of the motion. The papers supporting the motion are closely scrutinized and the opposing papers indulgently treated, Templeton v. Borough of Glen Rock, 11 N.J.Super. 1, 4, 77 A.2d 487 (App.Div. 1950). * * *.' Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, supra, at pages 74--75, 110 A.2d, at page 27.
Plaintiffs bottom their purported right to the gasoline tank and pump upon their admitted right to use the premises for 'garaging and/or servicing of motor vehicles,' a use permitted by section 5.1.4 of the zoning ordinance of the Borough of Mountain Lakes. That a primary use in the nature of the Business of garaging or servicing of motor vehicles or both is intended by that section is clear.
There appears to be no controversy with respect to certain of the facts. Plaintiffs are the owners of parcels of vacant land in the Borough of Mountain Lakes, located within a zoning district known as Business Zone B. No proof is offered by plaintiffs on this motion as to the actual use of the land. The affidavit of defendant building inspector, which, in addition to being uncontroverted, must be 'indulgently treated,' Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, supra, clearly reflects that the land is presently being used by plaintiffs, or one of them, not for any permitted use, but rather, in contravention of the zoning ordinance. He states:
1
As noted above, the inquiry is whether under any circumstances a building permit can be compelled for an accessory use prior to any undertaking of the primary use. A resolution of the matter starts with a determination as to the nature of an accessory use. An accessory use has been defined as one 'customarily incidental to the principal use of a building,' Zahn v. Newark Board of Adjustment, 45 N.J.Super. 516, 522, 133 A.2d 358, 361 (App.Div. 1957). See also State v. Mair, 39 N.J.Super. 18, 23, 120 A.2d 487 (App.Div. 1956). This typical definition was expanded in Borough of Chatham v. Donaldson, 69 N.J.Super. 277, 282, 174 A.2d 213 (App.Div. 1961), and Borough of Northvale v. Blundo, 85 N.J.Super. 56, 60, 203 A.2d 721 (App.Div. 1964), to include the explanation that 'the (accessory) use be 'so...
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