Molina-Parrales v. Shared Hosp. Servs. Corp.

• Decision Date: 17 January 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:12–cv–00947.
• Citation: 992 F.Supp.2d 841
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
• Parties: Karla MOLINA–PARRALES, Plaintiff, v. SHARED HOSPITAL SERVICES CORPORATION, Defendant.

992 F.Supp.2d 841

Karla MOLINA–PARRALES, Plaintiff,

v.SHARED HOSPITAL SERVICES CORPORATION, Defendant.

Case No. 3:12–cv–00947.

United States District Court,

M.D. Tennessee,

Nashville Division.

Jan. 17, 2014.

Nina H. Parsley, Michael D. Ponce & Associates, Goodlettsville, TN, for Plaintiff.

Matthew C. Lonergan, Connor M. Blair, James Craig Oliver, John P. Rodgers, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Nashville, TN, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

WILLIAM J. HAYNES, JR., Chief Judge.

Plaintiff, Karla Molina–Parrales, filed this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn.Code Ann. § 4–21–101 et seq. (“THRA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12300 (“ADA”), the Tennessee Disability Act, Tenn.Code Ann. § 8–50–103 (“TDA”) against the Defendant, Shared Hospital Services Corporation (“SHS”), her former employer. Plaintiff also asserts a Tennessee common law claim for retaliatory discharge. In essence, Plaintiff alleges discrimination based on her disability status, race and national origin as well as a victim of a hostile work environment and retaliation. A Case Management Order was entered and the parties proceeded with discovery.

Before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 16), contending, in sum: (1) that Plaintiff was not disabled under federal or state law; (2) that Plaintiff was not discriminated against because of any disability; (3) that Plaintiff was not discriminated against because of her national origin or race; (4) that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on her hostile work environment claim; (5) that the Defendant did not retaliate against Plaintiff for submitting a worker's compensation claim; (6) that Defendant has articulated legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for Plaintiff's termination and (7) that Plaintiff's proof cannot prove those reasons to be a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.

A. Findings of Fact¹

Plaintiff, Karla Molina–Parrales who is of Nicaraguan origin, identifies herself as Hispanic. In January 2010, SHS hired Plaintiff as a production worker in its laundry department. (Docket Entry No. 20, Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at ¶ 2). In that position, Plaintiff fed clean towels into a folding machine. Id. During her employment and at the time of her termination, Plaintiff reported to Ofelia Morales. (Docket Entry No. 21–1, Plaintiff's Deposition at 46). At the time of Plaintiff's termination, Morales's supervisor was Mark Beasley. (Docket Entry No. 23–1, Morales Deposition 15). Plaintiff's job did not require her to lift or push or pull more than 10 pounds, but on June 22, 2010, Plaintiff had difficulty moving a heavy cart and injured her back. (Docket Entry No. 22 at ¶ 12 and Docket Entry No. 21–1, Plaintiff's Deposition at 52–53 and 56–57). Beasley provided the written authorization for Plaintiff to see a physician whose diagnosis was a lumbar strain. Id.; Docket Entry No. 20, Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at ¶¶ 12 and 14.

Plaintiff's lumbar strain required temporary restrictions on her work activity, namely, no lifting over 10 pounds; no pushing/pulling over 10 pounds of force; no bending more than 10 times per hour; and no squatting, kneeling, or climbing stairs or ladders. Id. These restrictions precluded performance of Plaintiff's regular job. Id. at ¶ 15. SHS accommodated Plaintiff's work restrictions detailed in her doctor's notes. Plaintiff was assigned light duty work that she continued until her termination. Id. at ¶¶ 17, 37, and 38. On June 23, 2010, Plaintiff filed a worker's compensation claim that Harley Baker, a SHS employee, processed. Id. at ¶ 16 and Docket Entry No. 15–4, at 2).

Prior to her injury, Plaintiff had leave issues. On June 6, 2010, Plaintiff received an oral warning for a late arrival without a prior telephone call. (Docket Entry No. 22–1, Beasley Deposition 95). Plaintiff received another oral warning on July 6, 2010. (Docket Entry No. 22–1 at 123) On July 21, 2010, Plaintiff received a written warning for “no call, no show” on July 17 and 19, 2010. (Docket Entry No. 20, Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts at ¶ 30; Docket Entry No. 22–1, Beasley Deposition 123.) The July 21st warning stated:

Employee must communicate with her supervisor EACH Day she will not be able to work

Leaving a Voice Mail Message is unacceptable

She must speak to Mark

Id. On August 6, 2010, Plaintiff received a fourth warning that was her third oral warning for a “no call, no show” on August 5, 2010. (Docket Entry No. 20, Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at ¶ 30; Docket Entry No. 21–1, Parrales Deposition, Exhibit 6 thereto). Plaintiff signed the warningnotices and did not dispute the violations. (Docket Entry No. 20, Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at ¶ 35). Plaintiff testified that she provided doctor notes and understood that a voicemail was sufficient. (Docket Entry No. 21–1, Plaintiff's Deposition at 74, 79–80). Between January 12, 2010 to May 31, 2010, Plaintiff was absent from work 32 days. (Docket Entry No. 20, Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at ¶ 11). Plaintiff missed 23 days in July and August, 2010. Id. at ¶ 21. There were times when Plaintiff properly reported her leave. Id. at ¶ 26, 28.

Under SHS's policies, employees who seek scheduled leave must provide 48 hour advance notice to their supervisors. Id. at ¶ 24. Any employee who will miss work unexpectedly or will be late for work must telephone and directly speak to his or her supervisor at least one hour prior to the start of the employee's shift. Id. SHS policy is that “leaving a message on voicemail was not acceptable” and that “even with a doctor's note excusing an employee to be off work, employees are expected to call in each day they are absent.” Id. ¶¶ 26 and 27. Although Plaintiff asserts that a voicemail was sufficient to “notify” ² a supervisor citing Morales's deposition, Morales testified that if the office personnel did not answer a telephone call that an employee could leave a voice message, but the employee still had to call his or her supervisor. (Docket Entry No. 23–1 Morales Deposition at 25–27). Morales gave Plaintiff her cell telephone number for that purpose. Id.

As to the circumstances of Plaintiff's termination, on August 18, 2010, Dr. Glattes, Plaintiff's physician, provided SHS with an “Assessment/Plan” that Plaintiff “can return to work full duty 8/19. She is at maximum medical improvement. She may not tolerate her work, this will be up to her.” (Docket Entry No. 21–1, Plaintiff's Deposition at 185). On a “Work Comp Status Sheet” filed with SHS, Dr. Glattes checked off the “return to full duty” option. (Docket Entry No. 15–4, at 8). Plaintiff cites Dr. Glattes's notation that “She may not tolerate her work” as a restriction (Docket Entry No. 20, Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at ¶ 36), but SHS cites Dr. Glattes's statement that Plaintiff “is at maximum medical improvement” and his release of Plaintiff without work restrictions. Id.

On September 14, 2010, Plaintiff telephoned SHS's office less than one hour before her shift began to state that she would be absent from work. Id. at ¶ 39. On that day, Plaintiff saw a physician who noted under the section marked “A/P” for assessment and plan that she had a “left foot nodule” that required evaluation by podiatry, and that her rectal bleeding was “resolved for now.” (Docket Entry No. 24–1, Deposition at 44).

On September 15, 2010, Plaintiff telephoned SHS less than one hour before her shift started to state that she would be absent from work. (Docket Entry No. 20, Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at ¶ 41). The medical provider who treated Plaintiff on September 14th faxed SHS a note dated September 14th that Plaintiff was medically released to return to work on September 15, 2010. Id. at ¶ 40. On September 16, 2010, Plaintiff returned to work, but told her supervisor that for medical reasons, she was unable to work through September 20th. Id. at ¶ 45. Plaintiff provided another doctor note dated September 17, 2010, that would excuse her from work on September 17th (Docket Entry No. 22–1, Beasley Deposition at Exhibit 5). Plaintiff then sent the same September 17th note with additional handwritten entries that excused Plaintiff from work from September 15th through 20th. Id., at Exhibit 6. Plaintiff's physician testified that he may have authorized his secretary to add the additional dates to the September 17th note, but lacks a specific recollection. (Docket Entry No. 24–1 at 15, 20 and 25).

On September 20, 2010, SHS terminated Plaintiff's employment, citing an altered doctor's note, an unexcused absence without a doctor's note, and Plaintiff's violation of SHS's call-in rules after previous warnings. (Docket Entry No. 20, Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at ¶¶ 38 and 51). According to Plaintiff, Beasley accused her of obtaining a medical note from a nurse at the physician's office. Beasley assumed that Plaintiff was related to the nurse because both Plaintiff and the nurse spoke Spanish. (Docket Entry No. 21–1, Deposition 146).

On June 24, 2011, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Docket Entry No. 20, Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at ¶ 72). According to Plaintiff, Hispanics were treated differently and she cites a higher production quota than other non-Hispanic employees. (Docket Entry No. 21–1, Deposition 141–42). Plaintiff was told that she could not speak Spanish...