Molinar v. Schweizer

Decision Date11 May 2001
Docket NumberNo. 22091.,22091.
Citation95 Haw. 331,22 P.3d 978
PartiesMarian MOLINAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Niklaus R. SCHWEIZER, Defendant-Appellee, and Does 1-20, Defendants.
CourtHawaii Supreme Court

Magali V. Sunderland (of Trecker & Fritz), on the briefs, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellant.

Kevin P.H. Sumida and Anthony L. Wong (of Matsui Chung Sumida & Tsuchiyama), on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendant-appellee.

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, RAMIL, and ACOBA, JJ.

Opinion of the Court by MOON, C.J.

Plaintiff-appellant Marian Molinar appeals the First Circuit Court's November 5, 1998 final amended judgment awarding her a total of $55,054.09, which includes an award of prejudgment interest, in a slip-and-fall case against defendant-appellee Nicklaus Schweizer. Specifically, Molinar claims that the trial court erred by: (1) concluding that she was not a prevailing party at trial, following the parties' involvement in the Court-Annexed Arbitration Program (CAAP); (2) awarding Schweizer, and not Molinar, trial costs as the prevailing party; and (3) denying her motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned rulings. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the amended judgment of the trial court.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 17, 1993, Molinar was visiting her daughter, who rented a room in Schweizer's home. Molinar slipped on a rug that was on a wooden floor in a common area of the home and broke her hip. Molinar filed a complaint against Schweizer on September 28, 1994, alleging that Schweizer breached his duty to appropriately secure the rug to the floor. Molinar sought compensation for medical and rehabilitation expenses, lost wages and reduction of future earnings capacity, emotional distress, and punitive damages. The case was subsequently assigned to the CAAP.1 On June 3, 1996, the arbitrator issued a decision, awarding total damages of $121,171.79, but attributing 45% contributory liability to Molinar. The arbitration award specified $41,171.79 in special damages and $80,000 in general damages. In addition to the above, the arbitrator awarded $3,093.45 in costs to Molinar. The award did not contain prejudgment interest. After reduction for Molinar's contributory liability, the total arbitration award to Molinar, excluding costs, was $66,644.48. Pursuant to Hawai`i Arbitration Rules (HAR) Rule 22, Schweizer "appealed" the arbitration award to the circuit court on June 14, 1996 and requested a trial de novo.

Prior to trial, Schweizer apparently made a settlement offer of $10,000, although this offer was subsequently withdrawn and was not part Schweizer's January 5, 1998 settlement conference statement. Molinar's settlement conference statement of the same date indicates that Schweizer had rejected her last offer to settle for $250,000 in November, 1997, and had made no further counteroffers. In her statement, Molinar explained that she had incurred medical and rehabilitative expenses of $42,813.79, valued her lost wages and diminished earnings capacity for the period 1993-2002 at $96,380,2 and indicated that she was seeking unspecified damages for past pain and suffering, future pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life.

Trial began on February 20, 1998, and the jury returned its special verdict on February 25, 1998, finding total damages in the amount of $77,268.90 and attributing 50% liability to Molinar. Judgment in favor of Molinar in the amount of $38,634.45, reflecting a reduction for Molinar's contributory liability, was filed on July 21, 1998. A series of post-trial motions commenced on July 10, 1998, which are the subject of this appeal.

On July 10, 1998, Schweizer filed a motion requesting that his trial costs be paid by Molinar because Schweizer was the "prevailing party" in the trial pursuant to HAR Rule 25. At the time of Schweizer's motion, HAR Rule 25 (1995)3 stated as follows:

The prevailing party in the trial de novo; costs.
(A) The "Prevailing Party" in a trial de novo is the party who (1) appealed and improved upon the arbitration award by 30% or more, or (2) did not appeal and the appealing party failed to improve upon the arbitration award by 30% or more. For the purpose of this rule, "improve" or "improved" means to increase the award for a plaintiff or to decrease the award for the defendant.
(B) The "Prevailing Party" under these rules, as defined above, is deemed the prevailing party under any statute or rule of court, and as such is entitled to costs of trial and all other remedies as provided by law.
Schweizer argued that he was the "prevailing party" in the trial under HAR Rule 25(A)(1) because he had secured a 30% reduction in the arbitration award4 and, as the prevailing party, was entitled to trial costs pursuant to HAR Rule 25(B).

Molinar responded by filing a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing that the jury's determination of contributory negligence and the jury's specific award for lost wages were unsupported by the evidence. Molinar requested that the trial court increase the damages by $127,013.55 and sought prejudgment interest in the amount of $84,204.85. Molinar also filed her own motion for costs in the amount of $20,055.13 pursuant to Hawai`i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 54(d) (1996),5 alleging that she was the prevailing party in the lawsuit.

On August 31, 1998, the trial court ruled that the express language of HAR Rule 25(B) superseded HRCP Rule 54(d), and that, therefore, Schweizer was the prevailing party under both HAR Rule 25 and HRCP Rule 54(d). Of the $9,960.10 amount requested, the court awarded costs of $9,198.00 to Schweizer. In its order, the court granted those costs that were allowable pursuant to HRS § 607-96 and, taking note of its responsibility in the exercise of its discretion to "sparingly" consider costs not specifically allowed in the statute, declined to grant costs attributable to interstate travel associated with a deposition taken in Arizona. The court's order ended with the statement that "[t]he court finds that the equities do not merit any other adjustment to the costs requested... ."

Thereafter, on October 29, 1998, the trial court denied Molinar's motions for JNOV and for costs, but awarded her prejudgment interest of $16,419.64, resulting in a total recovery of $55,054.09.

Molinar then filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's prevailing party determination and the subsequent award of costs to Schweizer. Molinar argued that the amount of the prejudgment interest should be added to the jury award when determining the prevailing party issue. Molinar contended that, by including the prejudgment interest, she would be the prevailing party under HAR Rule 25(A) because her total trial award of $55,054.09 would not represent a reduction of 30% of the original $66,644.48 arbitration award, and that, therefore, she, not Schweizer, was entitled to costs. On November 2, 1998, the court denied Molinar's motion for reconsideration. The court entered a final amended judgment as to all matters on November 5, 1998. Molinar timely appealed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Determination of Prevailing Party

Our determination of who is the prevailing party involves interpretation of the HAR and the HRCP, both of which are rules promulgated by the court. "When interpreting rules promulgated by the court, principles of statutory construction apply." Price v. Obayashi Hawaii Corp., 81 Hawai`i 171, 176, 914 P.2d 1364, 1369 (1996) (citing State v. Lau, 78 Hawai'i 54, 58, 890 P.2d 291, 295 (1995)). "Interpretation of a statute is a question of law which we review de novo." Price, 81 Hawai`i at 176,914 P.2d at 1369 (citation omitted). Consequently, we interpret the HAR and the HRCP de novo.

B. Award of Costs

"Generally, taxation of costs is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Canalez v. Bob's Appliance, 89 Hawai`i 292, 300, 972 P.2d 295, 303 (1999) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

The trial court abuses its discretion if it bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Stated differently, an abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court has clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.

Id. at 299, 972 P.2d at 302 (internal citations, quotations marks, and brackets omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Molinar raises four primary arguments. First, Molinar contends that, in making its prevailing party determination, the trial court erred by failing to include the amount of prejudgment interest when comparing the trial de novo recovery with the arbitration award. Second, Molinar argues that the trial court's determination of Schweizer as the exclusive prevailing party is erroneous because she contends that there can be more than one prevailing party. Molinar submits that, because she received a favorable jury award of damages, she, too, is a prevailing party and, thus, entitled to costs. Third, Molinar argues that the award of costs to Schweizer is an impermissible penalty against her that is contrary to the purposes of the CAAP. Finally, Molinar urges that awarding costs against her is unconstitutional. We reject each of these arguments.

A. Molinar's Contention That Prejudgment Interest Should Be Included in the Trial De Novo Amount to Determine the Prevailing Party

Molinar claims that the trial court erred in rejecting her argument that the total amount of her amended final judgment, including prejudgment interest, should be used in determining who is the prevailing party under HAR Rule 25(A). We disagree.

According to Molinar, in order to determine the prevailing party under HAR Rule 25(A), the trial court should have compared her $66,644.48 arbitration award (which does not include prejudgment interest) with her post-trial final amended judgment award of $55,054.09 (which includes...

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