Molinas v. Commissioner of Correction

• Decision Date: 27 December 1994
• Docket Number: No. 14963,14963
• Citation: 231 Conn. 514,652 A.2d 481
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Jeremias MOLINAS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

Page 481

652 A.2d 481

231 Conn. 514

Jeremias MOLINAS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

No. 14963.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 2, 1994.

Decided Dec. 27, 1994.

Edward T. Ricciardi, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was John A. Connelly, State's Atty., for appellant (respondent).

Christopher C. Sheehan, Deputy Asst. Public Defender, for appellee (petitioner).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether a criminal defendant who is now indigent waived the right to challenge the constitutionality of his incarceration by having previously agreed to a sentence that includes a "committed fine" as part of a bargained-for guilty plea. The petitioner, Jeremias Molinas, filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleging, inter alia, that he was incarcerated solely because of his inability to pay a criminal fine, in violation of his rights to due process and equal protection. ¹ The habeas court granted the petition, ordering the petitioner released on parole and remitting the balance of the fine. ² The respondent, the commissioner of correction (commissioner), appealed from the judgment of the habeas court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We affirm.

The record discloses the following undisputed facts. In 1989, the petitioner pleaded guilty, as part of a plea bargain agreement with the state, to one count of possession of narcotics with intent to distribute in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278(a). ³ The trial court sentenced the petitioner to twelve years imprisonment, execution suspended after seven years, five years probation and a $20,000 fine. ⁴ As part of the sentence, the trial court stated that the "defendant shall stand committed for payment of that fine." Upon defense counsel's inquiry, the court confirmed that it had ordered a "committed fine." ⁵

On March 23, 1993, the petitioner was paroled from his prison term, effective August 1, 1993. The petitioner remained incarcerated, however, because he had not paid the fine. ⁶

The petitioner subsequently filed this petition for habeas corpus challenging his continued incarceration. Following a full hearing on the habeas petition, the habeas court found that "the petitioner's failure to pay the fine results from his financial inability to do so rather than from a willful disregard of his duty to pay." In response to the commissioner's argument that the petitioner had waived any right to relief by agreeing to the "committed fine" when he entered the guilty plea, the court found that "[t]he transcripts of the petitioner's plea canvass and sentencing hearing are devoid of any mention that failure to pay the fine would extend the length of the petitioner's imprisonment. Nor does the record disclose that the petitioner was so advised of this possibility by his counsel. There was no discussion by the trial court with the petitioner that an indigent person cannot be incarcerated solely because he is unable to pay a fine nor that the petitioner was willing to give up that right in order to participate in the plea agreement. Also, his counsel made no reference, on the record, to off the record discussions with the petitioner regarding this waiver." ⁷ The habeas court held, therefore, that the petitioner had not waived his right to challenge his incarceration for his nonwillful failure to pay the fine. Accordingly, the court ordered the petitioner released. In addition, the court remitted the balance of the fine.

The commissioner challenges the validity of the judgment of the habeas court on three grounds. First, as a legal matter, the commissioner argues that the court improperly concluded that the petitioner, by agreeing to a plea bargain that included a "committed fine" as part of the sentence, did not thereby waive whatever constitutional protections might apply to him because of his indigency. Second, as a factual matter, the commissioner argues that the habeas court improperly found the petitioner to be indigent. Third, as a remedial matter, the commissioner claims that even if the habeas court properly determined that the petitioner was entitled to be released, the court abused its discretion in remitting the entire outstanding balance of the fine. We disagree with each of these contentions.

I

In order to assess the commissioner's claim that the petitioner should be held to have waived his right to challenge the validity of his incarceration on the ground of indigency, it is important to review the underlying constitutional right on which the petitioner relies. In a series of cases evolving out of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 590-91, 100 L.Ed. 891, reh. denied, 351 U.S. 958, 76 S.Ct. 844, 100 L.Ed. 1480 (1956) (right of indigent criminal defendant to trial transcript at public expense), the United States Supreme Court has articulated constitutional principles that protect criminal defendants from being punished on account of their indigency. In Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 2022, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), the court held that "an indigent criminal defendant may not be imprisoned in default of payment of a fine beyond the maximum authorized by the statute regulating the substantive offense." The following term, the court held that " 'the same constitutional defect condemned in Williams also inheres in jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate payment of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a jail term and whether or not the jail term of the indigent extends beyond the maximum term that may be imposed on a person willing and able to pay a fine.' " Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398, 91 S.Ct. 668, 671, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971), quoting Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509, 90 S.Ct. 2232, 2233, 26 L.Ed.2d 773 (1970) (White, J., concurring). Even more significantly, in the context of a probation revocation hearing instigated because of the probationer's failure to pay a fine, the court subsequently held that "if the probationer has made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and yet cannot do so through no fault of his [or her] own, it is fundamentally unfair to revoke probation automatically without considering whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are available." Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-69, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 2070-71, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983). ⁸

Our own statutes and case law incorporate the same principles. "The impact of indigency on a criminal defendant's liability to pay a fine is codified in Practice Book [§§ 929, 931 and 932]." State v. Johnson, 228 Conn. 59, 61, 634 A.2d 293 (1993). These sections provide that "[n]o person shall be incarcerated as a result of his failure to pay a fine unless the judicial authority first inquires as to his ability to pay the fine." Practice Book § 929. Further, "[t]he judicial authority may, upon a finding that the defendant is able to pay the fine and that his nonpayment is wilful, order the defendant incarcerated for nonpayment of the fine." Practice Book § 931. Finally, "[a] defendant incarcerated under Sec. 931, for wilful nonpayment of a fine, shall be released when he pays the fine or when he is otherwise discharged according to law." Practice Book § 932. ⁹ These sections are "rooted in the constitutional principle that the state may not 'subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely by reason of their indigency.' Williams v. Illinois, [supra, 399 U.S. at 242, 90 S.Ct. at 2022]; see also Bearden v. Georgia, [supra, 461 U.S. at 664, 103 S.Ct. at 2068]; Moscone v. Manson, 185 Conn. 124, 130, 440 A.2d 848 (1981); State v. Zakrzewski, 26 Conn.App. 716, 718, 603 A.2d 432 (1992)." State v. Johnson, supra at 61, 634 A.2d 293.

In the circumstances of this case, unless the petitioner had effectively waived his rights, these constitutional principles required the petitioner's release from incarceration. The petitioner faced a situation analytically indistinguishable from that confronting the probationer in Bearden. Although the petitioner was never released from incarceration prior to the habeas proceedings, the parole board's decision to grant parole conferred upon the petitioner a significant liberty interest. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2601, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) ("the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty"). The testimony at the habeas proceedings indicated, and the habeas court found, that following the board's decision the only barrier to the petitioner's release on parole was his failure to pay the fine and that this failure resulted solely from the petitioner's indigency. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized, prior to Bearden, in a decision relating to a committed fine imposed upon an indigent defendant, "[i]f, under the sentence imposed, the defendant, because of [his or] her financial inability to pay a fine, will be imprisoned longer than someone who had the ability to pay the fine, then the sentence is invalid...." (Citations omitted.) United States v. Estrada de Castillo, 549 F.2d 583, 584 (9th Cir.1976).

II

The commissioner does not dispute the habeas court's characterization of the underlying constitutional principles that govern the incarceration of indigent defendants. His principal contention is that, by accepting a plea bargain that included a "committed fine," the petitioner definitively waived any constitutional right that he might otherwise have had to invoke indigency as a ground for his nonpayment of the fine. We are unpersuaded.

The principles that govern the waiver of a constitutional right are well established. For a waiver of a constitutional right to be effective, it...