Mollman v. Union Electric Light & Power Co.

• Decision Date: 04 January 1921
• Docket Number: No. 16278.,16278.
• Citation: 227 S.W. 264,206 Mo. App. 253
• Parties: MOLLNAN v. UNION ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER CO.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

227 S.W. 264

206 Mo. App. 253

MOLLNAN v. UNION ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER CO.

No. 16278.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

January 4, 1921.

Rehearing Denied February 4, 1921.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Wilson A. Taylor, Judge.

Action by Margaret Mollman against the Union Electric Light & Power Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Jourdan, Rassieur & Pierce and Chauncey H. Clarke, all of St. Louis, for appellant. John C. Robertson, of St. Louis, for respondent.

NIPPER, C.

This is an action for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff, and caused by trespass by a "meter reader" who was at the time an employé of defendant and in the discharge of his duties as such. Plaintiff recovered judgment in the sum of $500, and defendant appeals, urging two assignments of error as grounds for reversal: First, that the court erred in not directing a verdict for defendant; second, that the court erred in giving instruction No. 1 for plaintiff.

The facts are brief. In the forenoon of March 8, 1917, between 10 o'clock a. m. and noon on that day, the defendant's "meter reader," a young man about 17 years of age, went upon the premises known as 4147 Pleasant street, St. Louis, for the purpose of reading the meter that had been placed in this house under and by virtue of the terms of a written contract which had been entered into prior to this date, between plaintiff's husband and the defendant. It is provided by the terms of this contract:

"That the duly authorized agents of the company shall have free access to the meters and service at all reasonable times, and for any and all purposes incident to this agreement and may also have access at all reasonable times to the premises for the purpose of examining the consumer's connected load. The employés of the company may, upon failure of the consumer to comply with any of the rules of the company, remove its meters and service and discontinue the supply."

The husband was not at home at the time. There was also a daughter living at this home, but she was employed and was not present. At the time of the alleged trespass, plaintiff was in the kitchen of her home, standing near the sewing machine preparing to do some sewing. The meter was located in this kitchen. With plaintiff in the kitchen were two small children, one eight and the other four years of age. Plaintiff stated that at this time the "meter reader" opened the kitchen door, which was fastened, or as she described it, "burst right into the door" without knocking or announcing his presence in any manner. At the time he did this she states that she exclaimed: "My God! Why didn't you knock?" That the meter reader stepped over to the meter and announced: "Union Electric." Plaintiff was about three feet away from the door at this time. She did not know the man, and had no knowledge of his presence about the premises until he pushed the door open, rushed in, and made the announcement as heretofore stated. Plaintiff became greatly frightened, fainted, and fell over on the sewing machine, where she was later discovered by some neighbors who were brought in at the solicitation of one of the little children. It was something like one hour before plaintiff regained consciousness. She was then confined to her bed for about seven weeks, under the treatment and care of a physician, and at the time of the trial, several months later, was still in a nervous condition.

Tho meter reader testified at the trial of this case that there was some one in the back yard hanging out clothes when he arrived on these premises, and stated that he was advised by such person in the rear to go on into the kitchen and read the meter. Plaintiff testified, in rebuttal, that no one was at home that day except those heretofore mentioned, nor was any one in the back yard hanging out any clothes at any time during that day.

Defendant earnestly insists that, by virtue of the terms of the contract above referred to, defendant would not be liable because it would have a right to enter these premises at all reasonable times for the purpose of reading the meter, and that the time of the day at which its agent entered the premises was a reasonable time. We are cited to numerous authorities to sustain this contention. It is unnecessary to enumerate in detail all the authorities cited by defendant in this connection, but the two cases upon which it seems to rely mainly are Hitchcock v. Essex & Hudson Gas Co., 71 N. J. Law, 565, 61 Atl. 397, and Bradley v. Sobolewsky, 91 Conn. 492, 99 Atl. 1067, 2 A. L. R. 1387.

In Hitchcock v. Essex & Hudson Gas Co., supra, the agent of the gas company had applied for permission to enter plaintiff's home for the purpose of removing a meter. Certain bills were unpaid, and defendant claimed the right to enter the premises by virtue of the terms of a contract similar to this one. The agent was refused admission in the and in the afternoon he came to the house again and forced an entrance into the cellar door for the purpose of removing the meter. The court, in that case, makes use of the following language:

"It must be noticed that at a reasonable time the defendant's agent applied to the person in charge of the plaintiff's house for permission to do the very things authorized by the plaintiff —to have free access to the meter and remove the same; that such permission being refused, he subsequently, at a reasonable time, exercised the authority thus given, without using any more force than was necessary and without causing in the slightest degree any personal disturbance."

In this case, defendant's agent neither knocked, requested permission to enter, nor announced his intention of entering, nor can it be said that he caused no disturbance by entering. We do not think there is anything said in the case above cited to warrant the conclusion that defendant's agent was justified in entering this house in the manner in which he did. It is neither controlling nor persuasive authority for the conduct of defendant's agent in the case at bar.

In Bradley v. Sobolewsky, supra, plaintiff had sued for damages resulting from being bitten by a dog, while on the premises of defendant. He had been directed to go to certain premises by his employer for the purpose of making some examination in connection with fixtures placed there by his employer. By mistake he had gone upon the wrong premises. This case is not at all similar to the present case, and adds nothing to a proper...