Moncada v. Chater, 94-55110
Decision Date | 08 June 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 94-55110,94-55110 |
Citation | 60 F.3d 521 |
Parties | , Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 14695B, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5531, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9436 Epigmenio MONCADA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Henry N. Ernecoff, Ernecoff & Roche, San Diego, CA, for plaintiff-appellant.
Michael R. Power, Asst. Regional Counsel, San Francisco, CA, for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.
Before: WALLACE, Chief Judge, KOZINSKI and RYMER, Circuit Judges.
The memorandum disposition filed June 12, 1995, is redesignated as a per curiam opinion.
Moncada appeals the district court's summary judgment affirming the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) denying Moncada's application for disability insurance benefits. The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g). We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We affirm.
The district court's summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir.1992). We must affirm if we determine that substantial evidence supports the findings of the administrative law judge (ALJ) and that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir.1989). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance--it is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Id. We look at the record as a whole. Id. Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the decision of the ALJ must be upheld. Id.
Moncada first argues that the ALJ erred by concluding that Moncada's impairment did not make him disabled within the meaning of section 1.05(C) of the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (1994). That section provides that a person is disabled if he has a herniated nucleus pulposus
The Secretary does not deny that Moncada had a herniated nucleus pulposus. However, the ALJ specifically determined that Moncada "does not have any impairment or combination of impairments" that would make him disabled under Subpart P, Appendix 1 of the relevant regulation. That finding is supported by substantial evidence. Dr. Kurland, one of Moncada's treating physicians, reported that in December 1988 Moncada "will probably do fairly well if he is able to do a lighter type of work activity." In addition, examinations by Dr. Anand, in February and November of 1991, show that while Moncada may have had pain in his lower back resulting in some numbness in his legs, his hips, knees, and ankles had a "normal range of motion." Furthermore, Moncada was "not participating in any vocational rehabilitation program" between the February and November examinations. The ALJ could credit these reports. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-42 (9th Cir.1995) ( ). The medical evidence here supports the determination that Moncada was not disabled under the relevant regulation.
Moncada next argues that the ALJ's credibility determinations relating to Moncada's claims of excessive pain are not supported by substantial evidence.
Once a claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying impairment which is reasonably likely to be the cause of some pain, the ALJ may not discredit a claimant's testimony of pain ... solely because the degree of pain alleged ... is not supported by objective medical evidence.... [T]he ALJ cannot reject testimony of pain without making findings sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant's testimony. Factors that the adjudicator may consider when making such credibility determinations include the claimant's daily activities, inconsistencies in testimony, effectiveness or adverse side effects of any pain medication, and relevant character evidence.
Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749-50 (9th Cir.1995) (Orteza ) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The ALJ gave specific reasons for discrediting Moncada's testimony of excessive pain. Among those reasons were that Dr. Anand believed that Moncada could do sedentary work, that Moncada said that he uses pain medication infrequently, and that Moncada's testimony about his daily living activities were much more limited than those reported in a disability report completed by him prior to his testimony. These specific reasons for rejecting Moncada's claims of excessive pain were valid. See id. (examination of initial disability application for inconsistencies with testimony, reliance on doctor report, and fact that no prescription pain medication was used by claimant were sufficient to support ALJ's discrediting complaints of pain).
Moncada next argues that the ALJ...
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Issue topics
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