Money v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 18 June 1910
• Citation: 59 Wash. 120,109 P. 307
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: MONEY et ux. v. SEATTLE, R. & S. RY. CO.

109 P. 307

59 Wash. 120

MONEY et ux. v. SEATTLE, R. & S. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 18, 1910

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; J. T. Ronald Judge.

Action by Earl Money and wife against the Seattle, Renton & Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Morris B. Sachs, for appellant.

William Wray and W. R. Bell, for respondents.

GOSE J.

This is an action brought by the plaintiffs as husband and wife, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the wife while alighting from one of the defendant's street cars. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs. Defendant has appealed.

The facts relied upon by the respondents to support the judgment are: That the wife became a passenger on one of the appellant's street cars; that the car stopped at the intersection of Second avenue south and Washington street in the city of Seattle, in response to her notification to the conductor that she desired to leave the car at that point and that, while she was in the act of alighting, the car suddenly and without warning started, throwing her to the ground, and causing the injuries complained of. At the trial of the case, the respondent offered herself as a witness, and was clear and emphatic in her statement that she sought to alight from the car at the point stated while it was standing, and that while stepping from it, it suddenly started and threw her upon the pavement. As to the fact of the injury she has abundant support in the evidence, but as to the cause of the injury her testimony is without corroboration. The testimony shows that the car stopped at the intersection of Second avenue and Washington street, at which point the appellant's track crosses the track of the Seattle Electric Company. The appellant contends that the wife stepped from the car while it was in motion and when it was a short distance from the intersecting track. To support this view it offered four witnesses, the conductor, the motorman, and two women who were passengers on the car at the time of the accident. The conductor and one of the women testified that she stepped from the car while it was in motion. The motorman and the other woman testified that the car made only one stop before it crossed the other track.

In denying the motion for a new trial, the learned judge said 'There is a conflict in the testimony. Plaintiff swears positively that the car stopped and that while she was getting off, and before she had time to alight, it started. Defendant's witnesses swear that plaintiff got off before the car stopped. If her testimony is true, the verdict is founded in fact. If the defendant's testimony is true, the verdict is not founded in fact. A former jury have believed the plaintiff's testimony. The trial judge before whom it was tried, though granting a new trial, did not grant the same on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The jury in this case have placed more weight upon the testimony of the plaintiff than upon that of the defendant's witnesses. The probative sufficiency of the plaintiff's testimony is a question for the jury. I am compelled to deny the motion for a new trial.'

The appellant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict, that it was the duty of the trial judge to rule upon that question, and that it was his duty 'to use his judgment, and not to rely upon the judgment of the jury.' It cannot be doubted that the trial court may in proper cases deny a motion for a new trial without assigning any reason for its action, and it is equally clear that it may in the exercise of its discretion, where there is substantial conflict in the testimony, decline to disturb the verdict on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. We think the fair inference from the language of the court is that, considering the evidence in the light of the fact that two juries had found for the respondent, it could not be said that the evidence did not justify the verdict.

In cases of this character the jury is the tribunal designated by the Constitution to determine the facts. The court instructed the jury that it was 'the sole and exclusive judges of the evidence in the case, and of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be attached to the testimony of...