Mongeon v. Shellcraft Industries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 July 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 83-372.
• Citation: 590 F. Supp. 956
• Parties: Patricia MONGEON v. SHELLCRAFT INDUSTRIES, INC. SHELLCRAFT INDUSTRIES, INC. v. Patricia MONGEON.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Vermont

590 F. Supp. 956

Patricia MONGEON v. SHELLCRAFT INDUSTRIES, INC.

SHELLCRAFT INDUSTRIES, INC. v. Patricia MONGEON.

Civ. A. No. 83-372.

United States District Court, D. Vermont.

July 23, 1984.

Michael Sirotkin, Mickenberg, Dunn, Sirotkin & Kupersmith, Burlington, Vt., for plaintiff.

Dennis Pearson, Gravel, Shea & Wright, Burlington, Vt., for defendant.

COFFRIN, Chief Judge.

In this action plaintiff claims that her former employer, Shellcraft Industries, Inc., is liable for sex discrimination in violation of state and federal statutes. Plaintiff also alleges that her former employer is liable for breach of contract and in tort law for the same and related acts. Defendant allegedly hired a permanent replacement for plaintiff shortly before plaintiff began an approximately two month leave of absence to bear a child, thus allegedly discriminating against plaintiff in comparison with male workers suffering temporary disability. Defendant has moved to dismiss counts V and VI of the complaint, the contract and tort claims, on the ground that the court should refuse to exercise pendent jurisdiction over those claims. Defendant has also moved to dismiss Count VI for failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, the court dismisses Counts III, IV, V and VI for lack of pendent jurisdiction,¹ and we need not consider defendant's motion to dismiss Count VI for failure to state a claim.

The Complaint

Plaintiff's statutory sex discrimination claims comprise four counts of her complaint. Counts I and II allege that defendant's actions constituted unlawful employment practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Specifically, it is alleged that defendant first discriminated against her on the basis of sex and then on the basis of her having protested defendant's sex discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a). Counts III and IV make virtually identical allegations of fact in violation of Vermont's Fair Employment Practices Act, 21 V.S.A. §§ 495(a)(1), (a)(5). Count V alleges a tort of intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress. Count VI alleges breach of plaintiff's employment contract by discharge without good cause. Plaintiff has requested a jury trial which she is entitled to on the state law claims but not on the federal claims. See Lincoln v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, 697 F.2d 928 (11th Cir.1983) (relief under Title VII is equitable in nature so no right to jury trial); Flores v. Local 25, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, 407 F.Supp. 218 (E.D.N.Y.1976). She has requested an award of back pay, and legal damages for future loss of income, emotional distress and bodily harm. Plaintiff has also requested attorney's fees.

Plaintiff's complaint states that she was hired as defendant's office manager/bookkeeper in December 1979. She became pregnant in the summer of 1981. She allegedly lost her job in 1982 because her employer refused to treat her absence for bearing the child as a temporary disability, and instead hired a permanent replacement. In December, 1982 plaintiff filed a complaint with the Civil Rights Division of the Vermont Office of Attorney General. She received a "Notice of Right to Sue" from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in July, 1983.

Discussion

The jurisdictional question before the court is one that has divided federal district courts for several years but has apparently only once reached a federal appeals court. The question is whether federal courts should exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims sharing a common nucleus of fact with federal civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

We believe the answers of various courts have been inconsistent in large part because of apparent confusion as to the appropriate test for pendent jurisdiction as well as its application. Most, if not all, of the courts which have opted in favor of exercising pendent jurisdiction on Title VII cases have relied on the test outlined in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc., 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1983); Frykberg v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 557 F.Supp. 517 (W.D.N.C.1983); Guyette v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 518 F.Supp. 521 (D.N.J. 1981); but cf. James v. KID Broadcasting Corp., 559 F.Supp. 1153 (D.Idaho 1983) (applying Gibbs test in Title VII case to deny pendent jurisdiction as discretionary matter); Parah v. Haveg Industries, No. 78-126 (D.Vt.1979).

The Gibbs test can be divided into two parts. The first is whether a common nucleus of fact exists between the federal and state law claims such that they may be considered a single "case" for purposes of satisfying Article III of the Constitution. The second part is an analysis of several factors intended to guide the court in an essentially discretionary judgment as to whether exercising pendent jurisdiction would serve the interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness to the parties and comity. The Gibbs test is thus clearly case-specific since the considerations for exercising discretion will vary depending on the particular type of claims at issue. It is therefore not surprising that in applying the Gibbs test the courts have come to varying results.

The courts which have denied pendent jurisdiction in Title VII cases have usually relied on a different test. See, e.g., Frye v. Pioneer Logging Machinery, Inc., 555 F.Supp. 730 (D.S.C.1983); Bennett v. Southern Marine Management Co., 531 F.Supp. 115 (M.D.Fla.1982); Lim v. The International Institute of Metropolitan Detroit, Inc., 510 F.Supp. 722 (E.D.Mich. 1981). These courts have applied the rule expressed in Owen Equipment and Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978), which added a third element to the test for pendent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held in Kroger that

a finding that federal and non-federal claims arise from a "common nucleus of operative fact," the test of Gibbs, does not end the inquiry into whether a federal court has power to hear the non-federal claims along with the federal ones. Beyond this constitutional minimum, there must be an examination of the posture in which the non-federal claim is asserted and of the specific statute that confers jurisdiction over the federal claim, in order to determine whether "Congress in that statute has ... expressly or by implication negated the exercise of jurisdiction over the particular non-federal claim.

437 U.S. at 373, 98 S.Ct. at 2402 (quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976).

The courts have applied this additional test in Title VII cases by noting principally that Congress intended such cases "to be in every way expedited," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5), and that joinder of state law claims would conflict with that goal. Specifically, delay might be caused by necessary discovery and proof regarding damages available under state law but not under Title VII, since Title VII provides only for equitable relief. Conflict with Congressional intent has also been inferred from the absence of a right to a jury trial under Title VII and the limitation of Title VII remedies to equitable relief. Consequently, these courts have decided in effect that state law claims in which there is a right to jury trial and legal damages may never be joined to federal claims under Title VII.

There being no question as to a common nucleus of facts, we conclude that we must attempt to address Congressional intent in this case. It is possible to debate that conclusion by distinguishing Kroger and related Supreme Court decisions as bearing only on questions of so-called "pendant party jurisdiction," since they have involved joinder of additional parties rather than merely additional claims against present parties. See Kroger (non-diverse third party defendant); Aldinger (county not liable in Section 1983 action under the then-existing rule of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)); Zahn v. International Paper, 414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973) (potential class members failing to meet amount in controversy requirement individually). The language of Kroger was broad, however, and spoke of "claims" rather than only "parties." And recent commentators have agreed that the test for pendent jurisdiction must now be "three-tiered" in light of Kroger. Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case": Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 Calif.L.Rev. 1401, 1402 n. 4 (1983); Note, A Closer Look at Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Toward A Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1935 (1982).

The language of the jurisdictional grant itself, that federal district courts "shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter," does not expressly indicate congressional intent. Nor have we found any language in the available legislative history that specifically addresses the question of pendent jurisdiction.² The immediate question is therefore what Congress might have implicitly intended with respect to exercising pendent jurisdiction in Title VII cases. We begin by identifying the principal characteristics of private actions under Title VII.

The statute requires that Title VII claims be initially referred to a state or local agency responsible for handling similar complaints under state or local law, if such laws and agencies exist. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). Such an agency may then act as it sees fit in granting or seeking relief on an employee's behalf. A complaint may not be formally filed with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) until sixty days after a state or local proceeding has been commenced or until such a proceeding terminates, whichever is earlier. A complaint must be filed with the EEOC within either...