Monica Lopez v. Ohio Department of Human Services, 93-LW-2334
| Decision Date | 11 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | 4-93-6,93-LW-2334 |
| Parties | MONICA LOPEZ, APPELLANT-APPELLEE v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, APPELLEE-APPELLANT CASE |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Administrative Appeal from Common Pleas Court.
MS REBECCA FIST, Reg. #: FIS31/0040467, Assistant Attorney General, Health & Human Services Section, 30 East Broad Street, 15th Floor, Columbus, OH 43266-0410, For Appellant.
MS PAMELA WEANER, Reg. #: 0058593, Attorney at Law, 416 Wayne Avenue, Defiance, OH 43512, For Appellee.
Appellant, the Ohio Department of Human Services ("ODHS"), appeals from a judgment in the Defiance County Court of Common Pleas which reversed an administrative agency's decision reducing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits ("ADC") of appellee, Monica Lopez ("Monica"). Because of the issue raised in this appeal, this case is transferred from the accelerated calendar to the regular calendar.
The facts, as stipulated, are as follows. Monica resides with her minor daughter from a prior relationship, Christina Lopez ("Christina"); Monica's boyfriend, Roberto Martinez ("Roberto"); and Monica and Roberto's minor daughter, Stephanie Martinez ("Stephanie"). Christina is a recipient of ADC benefits.
During part of the year, Roberto is employed in seasonal work. During that time, he and Stephanie are excluded from Christina's ADC assistance group. During the part of the year that Roberto is unemployed, he receives unemployment compensation. Effective January 1992, the Defiance County Department of Human Services determined that Roberto and Stephanie should be included in Christina's ADC assistance group and that Christina's ADC benefits should be reduced when Roberto is receiving unemployment compensation.
Monica appealed the decision of the Defiance County Department of Human Services and a state welfare hearing was held. The state hearing officer determined that the reduction in the ADC benefits was proper. Monica filed an administrative appeal, which appeal was overruled. Monica then appealed that decision to the Defiance County Court of Common Pleas. The Defiance County Court of Common Pleas disagreed with the administrative agency and department of human services and determined that there was no evidence in the record to support theadministrative agency's determination and such decision of the agency was, therefore, contrary to law. It is from this entry of judgment that ODHS asserts the following assignment of error.
This appeal essentially centers on whether a half-sibling can be included in a child's ADC assistance group if there are no facts presented that the half-sibling is dependent, other than the fact that the half-sibling's father receives unemployment compensation. ODHS argues that the administrative agency's interpretation should be adhered to, which finds that a half-sibling should be included in an assistance group for another child when the half-sibling's parent receives unemployment compensation. Monica argues that ODHS's interpretation of the federal and state statutes relating to ADC benefits is inconsistent with the language of these statutes and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Before examining the statutes involved, we must note that, although we are reviewing a decision of the trial court involving the decision of an administrative agency, we do not apply an "abuse of discretion" standard as this matter's only issue involves a question of law. Thus, we are permitted to apply our own determination as to the application and interpretation of the law involved. See In Re Raymundo (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 262.
Moreover, since we are called upon to review an interpretation of the law, we must give effect to the language as intended by Congress and the Ohio legislature, as that intention is implemented by and through the respective agency. See Sullivan v. Everhart (1990), 494 U.S. 83, and Jones Metal Products Co. v. Walker (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 173. Likewise, if the statute is ambiguous, the agency's interpretation of the statute is also given due deference. Sullivan, supra; Jones Metal Products, supra. This is because the agency, which has the day to day responsibility of implementing the intention of Congress has acquired "substantial expertise" by such implementation of the statute. Jones Metal Products, supra.
Thus, necessary to this appeal is a recitation of the relevant portions of the federal law which implements ADC benefits for recipients in each state. Section 602(a) (38), Title 42, U.S.Code, mandates the persons to be included in a child's assistance group in order that a determination can be made as to the amount of benefits a child should receive.
Our first determination under this statute is whether Stephanie is a "sister" of Christina, pursuant to Section 602(a)(38)(B). Section 206.10(a)(1)(vii)(B), Title 45, C.F.R., provides some insight into this determination.
Therefore, as Christina is related by blood to Stephanie, Christina is a "sister" of Stephanie.
Our next determination is whether Stephanie meets the conditions of Sections 606(a) or 607(a), Title 42, U.S.Code, and therefore, falls into Christina's assistance group. For purposes of this appeal, the relevant provision is Section 607(a), Title 42, U.S.Code, as it pertains directly to unemployment compensation, which states:
(a) 'Dependent child' defined. The term 'dependent child' shall, notwithstanding section *** (42 USCS §606(a)), include a needy child who meets the requirements of *** (42 USCS S 606(a) (2)), who has been deprived of parental supports or care by reason of the unemployment (as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) of the parent who is the principal earner, and who is living with any of the relatives specified in section *** (42 USCS § 606(a)91)J in a place of residence maintained by one or moreof such relatives as his (or their) own home.
Thus, if a child is deprived of her parent's support or care "by reason of" the parent's unemployment, the child is a dependent child and must be included in the [half] sibling's assistance group.
ODHS argues that if Stephanie's father is unemployed, that fact alone is sufficient to conclude that she is a dependent child. Monica argues that since Stephanie is not deprived of Roberto's support or care "by reason of" his unemployment because Roberto receives unemployment compensation which supports and cares for Stephanie, Stephanie should not be deemed a "dependent" child, pursuant to Section 602(a) (38), Title 42, U.S.Code. We agree with the agency's interpretation of the statute on this matter.
In Orris v. Sullivan (C.A.9, 1992), 974 F.2d 109, a similar situation was presented to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. A woman and her two daughters lived with a man and the man and woman had a son in Hawaii. The man was injured at work and began receiving workers' compensation benefits. After the man began receiving workers' compensation benefits, the Hawaii Department of Human Services discontinued the woman's AFDC benefits because the workers' compensation benefits received by the man exceeded the group's standard of need. A question was presented whether the man and the son should be included in the woman and daughters' ADC family filing unit.
Applying this statute to the facts, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Father's injury constituted a 'physical incapacity' as defined by 45 C.F.R. §233.90(c)(1)(iv), and this incapacity resulted in Son being labelled a 'deprived' child under 42 U.S.C. s 606(a)(1). As a deprived child who was under the age of eighteen and a blood-related sibling of Orris' two daughters, Son had to be included in the Orris household family filing unit as a 'dependent' child for purposes of 42 U.S.C. s 606(a)(1) and (2)...
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