Monical v. Marion Cnty.
| Docket Number | 6:18-cv-103-YY |
| Decision Date | 05 July 2023 |
| Parties | BRADLEY W. MONICAL, Plaintiff, v. MARION COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
United States Magistrate Judge Youlee Yim You issued Findings and Recommendation in this case on September 12, 2022 and March 10, 2023. Judge You recommended that this Court grant the motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and deny as futile Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. Judge You also issued a nondispositive Order on December 19, 2022, denying Plaintiff's motion for sanctions.
Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a magistrate judge to “hear and decide” all referred pretrial matters that are “not dispositive of a party's claim or defense.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). For dispositive matters when the parties have not consented to the magistrate judge's jurisdiction, Rule 72 allows the magistrate judge only to “enter a recommended disposition, including, if appropriate, proposed findings of fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P 72(b)(1). When a party timely objects to a magistrate judge's findings and recommendations concerning a dispositive motion, the district judge must make a de novo determination of those portions of the magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations to which an objection has been made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed.R.Civ.P 72(b)(3).
When a party timely objects to a magistrate judge's determination of a nondispositive matter, however, the district judge may reject that determination only when the magistrate judge's order is either clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). This means the Court will review the magistrate judge's factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. See Bisig v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 940 F.3d 205, 219 (6th Cir. 2019) ( ; Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Peters' Bakery, 301 F.R.D. 482, 484 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (same).
“[R]eview under the clearly erroneous standard is significantly deferential, requiring a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Sec. Farms v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 124 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 1997). “The reviewing court may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the deciding court.” Grimes v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991). “And an order is contrary to the law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” Bisig, 940 F.3d at 219 (cleaned up); Perez v. City of Fresno, 519 F.Supp.3d 718, 722 (E.D. Cal. 2021).
Plaintiff filed objections to both Findings and Recommendations and to Judge You's nondispositive Order. Plaintiff filed new evidence in support of his objections. The Court exercises its discretion and considers Plaintiff's new evidence.[1] See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 935 (9th Cir. 2004) (); Brown v. Roe, 279 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2002) ( the Fourth Circuit's requirement that a district court must consider new arguments raised in objections to a magistrate judge's findings and recommendation); accord United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2000) ().
The Ninth Circuit has “describe[d] the procedure that [it] believes will best achieve the purposes of the exhaustion doctrine in PLRA cases, consistent with the Federal Rules.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014). Recognizing that “the exhaustion question in PLRA cases should be decided as early as feasible,” id., the Ninth Circuit explained:
If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56. If material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied, and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts.
Id. at 1166. In such circumstances, where “summary judgment is not appropriate, the district judge may decide disputed questions of fact in a preliminary proceeding.” Id. at 1168. Thus, “[i]f a motion for summary judgment is denied, disputed factual questions relevant to exhaustion should be decided by the judge, in the same manner a judge rather than a jury decides disputed factual questions relevant to jurisdiction and venue.” Id. at 1170-71.
The Court has considered de novo both Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff's objections and attached evidence, and the responses by Keefe Commissary Network LLC (Keefe) and the Marion County Defendants (Marion County and the individual defendants employed by the county). The Court agrees with Judge You that Plaintiff's filings, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, create disputed issues of fact regarding administrative exhaustion. Thus, as instructed by the procedure described in Albino, the Court denies Defendants' motions for summary judgment on the grounds of exhaustion.
That, however, does not end the exhaustion analysis because Judge You held an evidentiary hearing to determine the facts and resolve exhaustion in a preliminary proceeding. Although Judge You expressed her opinion as recommending granting summary judgment on exhaustion, the Court construes her opinion as a recommended findings of fact and conclusion of law to dismiss for failure to exhaust. See, e.g., Grant v. Rios, 2022 WL 14856591, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17812745 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2022) ().
After carefully evaluating the evidence from the hearing, Judge You concluded that it is not credible that Plaintiff submitted any grievance for his claims relating to access to the law library, conditions of confinement relating to exercise and the shower, an alleged assault by correctional officers and failure to protect, and inadequate medical care after a slip-and-fall accident. Judge You also found that an administrative remedy for these complaints was effectively available to Plaintiff. Thus, Judge You recommended that the Court dismiss these claims for failure to exhaust. The Court has considered these claims de novo and agrees with and adopts Judge You's analysis. The Court adds that with respect to Plaintiff's grievance regarding the alleged assault, had Plaintiff filed the grievance along with the other grievance he filed the day before he was transferred, the Marion County Jail (Jail) would have deemed the grievance terminated upon Plaintiff's custodial transfer based on the policy in effect at the time. But then the failure to exhaust would not have been Plaintiff's fault, and exhaustion likely would not have been effectively available to him. The problem is that he did not submit any grievance at all.
Plaintiff's fifth claim, alleging violations of his rights under the First Amendment, has two separate grounds. The first is based on an alleged overcharge of postage prepaid envelopes in the commissary. The second is based on an order restricting him from contacting his children. For the first, Plaintiff argues that exhaustion should be excused because it was not effectively available. Before Judge You, Plaintiff provided a “combined declaration” that was largely unhelpful and his own testimony. Judge You found Plaintiff's testimony that deputies would not provide grievance forms for certain types of complaints not to be credible.
With Plaintiff's objections, however, he provides the Declaration of Robert Davis, who attests that he was housed with Plaintiff in Jail and that Mr. Davis personally witnessed Plaintiff requesting grievance forms on several occasions and the deputies refusing to provide the requested grievance forms, including a grievance form relating to envelopes and postage. ECF 233 at 44-49. Mr. Davis also states that he, too, requested grievance forms on more than one occasion and was refused. Id. In light of this new evidence, the Court declines to adopt the conclusion that the Jail's grievance procedure was effectively available for all types of complaints, including for this particular alleged grievance. See, e.g., Albina, 747 F.3d at 1173 (). Thus, the Court declines to dismiss this claim for failure to exhaust.
Judge You, however, also considered this claim on the merits. Judge You discussed that prisoners do not have a right to purchase items from the commissary or to have items offered to them at a reasonable price. See ECF 205 at 27 (citing cases). The Court agrees and adopts this portion of the Findings and Recommendation. “Inflated...
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