Monier v. Chamberlain

• Decision Date: 23 September 1966
• Docket Number: No. 39799,39799
• Citation: 221 N.E.2d 410,18 A.L.R.3d 471,35 Ill.2d 351
• Parties: , 18 A.L.R.3d 471 Roger L. MONIER, Appellee, v. Vernon CHAMBERLAIN. Appeal of Eugene H. RENNICK, Jr., et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 410

221 N.E.2d 410

35 Ill.2d 351, 18 A.L.R.3d 471

Roger L. MONIER, Appellee, v. Vernon CHAMBERLAIN Appeal of Eugene H. RENNICK, Jr., et al.

No. 39799.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 23, 1966.

Davis, Morgan & Witherell, Peoria, for appellants.

O. B. Pace, Jr., and Peter J. Paolucci, Lacon, for appellee.

UNDERWOOD, Justice.

This action was originally brought by plaintiff, Roger Monier, to recover damages for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident allegedly caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by defendant, Vernon Chamberlain. Defendant's answer to the complaint was filed by Eugene H. Rennick, Jr., attorney for Chamberlain retained by Country Mutual Insurance Company, Chamberlain's liability insurer, and also the liability insurer of the plaintiff.

Subsequently, two motions supported by affidavit were filed by plaintiff requesting that Chamberlain and Country Mutual be ordered to produce various documents, reports, memoranda and statements for plaintiff's inspection and copying. An answer in opposition to the motions was filed, and after a hearing thereon, an order was entered directing production of the requested material. Following their refusal to comply, attorney Rennick and Country Mutual were found to be in contempt of court and each fined $50.

Appellants Rennick and Country Mutual then sought direct review in this court of the contempt order, but since no proper jurisdictional basis appeared, the cause was transferred to the Appellate Court for the Third Judicial District. Monier v. Chamberlain, 31 Ill.2d 400, 202 N.E.2d 15.

The appellate court (66 Ill.App.2d 472, 213 N.E.2d 425) upheld the production order in part and reversed in part, and the cause was remanded to the circuit court with directions to modify the production order accordingly, and allow appellants to purge themselves of contempt by compliance therewith. The appellate court then granted a certificate of importance conferring jurisdiction upon this court. See our Rule 32(2), Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 110, par. 101.32(2).

The production order entered by the circuit court under our Rule 17 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 110, par. 101.17) requires the appellants to produce the following materials:

'1. A copy and contents of the automobile insurance policy No. A 434284 in force between the Country Mutual Insurance Company and the Defendant, Vernon Chamberlain, on March 20, 1960.

'2. All medical reports, hospital records, letters of correspondence from or to all physicians, surgeons, psychologists, psychiatrists, hospitals, clinics, or other medical personnel concerning the health, physical and mental condition of Roger L. Monier from March 20, 1960, up to the date of employment of counsel for the Defendant.

'3. All statements made by the Plaintiff or members of his family relative to the subject of litigation, whether signed or unsigned.

'4. All memoranda made by personnel of the Country Mutual Insurance Company of conversations with the Plaintiff and members of his family relative to the matter of litigation.

'5. All written statements of witnesses, whether signed or unsigned, obtained by agents, employees or other personnel of the Country Mutual Insurance Company obtained prior to the employment of Eugene Rennick, Attorney at Law, Toulon, Illinois, or Robt. A. Barnes, Attorney at Law, Lacon, Illinois, attorneys for the Defendant in the cause.

'6. All reports, photographs and statements obtained by agents, employees, investigators, adjusters or other personnel of the Country Mutual Insurance Company relative to or growing out of the transaction complained of on March 20, 1960, which were obtained prior to the employment of Eugene Rennick, Attorney at Law, Toulon, Illinois, and Robert A. Barnes, Attorney at Law, Lacon, Illinois, Attorneys for the Defendant in this cause.

'7. All medical reports or memoranda concerning the health and physical or mental condition of the Plaintiff, Roger L. Monier, as it existed prior to the occurrence complained of.'

The insurance policy was produced and Country Mutual filed a sworn response indicating that it did not possess a statement of the plaintiff. Appellants refused to produce the remaining materials, contending that the order does not specify the materials requested with sufficient particularity and that, in any event, much of the material sought is exempted from disclosure under our Rule 19--5(1) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965 chap. 110, par. 101.19--5(1)). The appellate court was of the opinion that paragraph 5 lacked the specificity required by Rule 17 and reversed the trial court on that point, but upheld the remainder of the circuit court's production order. Since there is no cross appeal, we do not consider the propriety of the appellate court's ruling concerning paragraph 5 of the order.

The first question we turn to is whether the order sufficiently designates the material required to be produced so as to enable the appellants to reasonably comply therewith, i.e., to enable them to determine, upon a search of their files, what materials are properly contemplated by the order. Rule 17 provides:

'A party may at any time move for an order directing any other party or person to produce specified documents, relating to the merits of the matter in litigation, for inspection and to be copied or reproduced, or produce for inspection or to be photographed objects or tangible things relative to the merits of the said matter, or permit access to real estate for the purpose of making surface or subsurface inspections or surveys or photographs, or disclose information calculated to lead to the discovery of the whereabouts of any of the items. On the hearing the court may make any order that may be just. If the party or person claims that the item is not in his possession or control or that he does not have information calculated to lead to discovery of its whereabouts, he may be ordered to submit to examination in open court or by deposition regarding the same.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 110, par. 101.17.

While appellants maintain that each document sought must be specifically designated, and that if it is not known whether a particular document exists and is in the possession of appellants, plaintiff must by discovery deposition (Rule 19--4(1), Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 110, par. 101.19--4(1)) and interrogatory (Rule 19--11, Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 110, par. 101.19--11) ascertain these facts before proceeding for discovery under Rule 17, it is apparent to us that the rule does not so contemplate. That discovery procedures were designed to be flexible and adaptable to the infinite variety of cases and circumstances appearing in the trial courts is clear from the language of the rule: 'A party may at any time move for an order' of production, and the court may 'make any order that may be just.' Provisions permitting greater flexibility or conferring wider discretion would be difficult to formulate, and it is, in our judgment, clear that resort to interrogatories and discovery depositions is not a necessary condition precedent to a motion for discovery of material, possession of which has not been therefore definitely established in the party from whom production is sought. No other conclusion is compatible with the concluding provision of Rule 17 that in those instances where the party from whom production is requested denies possession or control, 'he may be ordered to submit to examination in open court or by deposition regarding the same.'

The rule provides for discovery of 'specified' material, and the degree of specificity required is the subject of vigorous argument. Basically, the question is whether each document or individual item must be particularly described and identified by the moving party, or whether it is sufficient to request production of such material by groups or categories of similar items. The specificity requirement of the rule is there for two purposes: to provide a reasonable description of the items requested, enabling those from whom discovery is sought to know what is being demanded of them, and to aid the trial court in ascertaining whether the requested material is exempted or privileged from discovery. What will suffice as a reasonable description may well vary from case to case depending on the circumstances of each, but we believe that designation by category ordinarily is sufficient for these purposes. (See United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n (D.C.N.Y.), 7 F.R.D. 256, and the annotation appearing in 8 A.L.R.2d 1134, pp. 1148 et seq. where conflicting decisions of Federal and State courts on this point are collected.) No instance in the portions of the order now being reviewed is pointed out to us, nor do we believe there are any, in which the description of the requested material is so inadequate as to leave defendant with any real uncertainty regarding what is and what is not included. Requiring minute particularization of each document sought might well unduly lengthen the discovery process by enabling the parties to engage in dilatory practices. Concerning the portions of the order before us, we believe that the categorical designations appearing in each paragraph thereof are sufficient for the purposes sought to be achieved by the specificity requirement of Rule 17, and that each of the enumerated categories calls for the production of documents which 'relating to the merits of the matter in litigation', as contemplated by the rule and intimated as proper on the carlier appeal herein. (Monier v. Chamberlain, 31 Ill.2d 400 at page 404, 202 N.E.2d 15.) As we said in Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority, 8 Ill.2d 37, 41, 132 N.E.2d 532, 535, discovery before trial 'presupposes a range of relevance and materiality which includes not only what is admissible at the trial, but also that which leads to what is admissible at the trial.' See also People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill.2d 231, 236--237, 145 N.E.2d 588,...