Monk v. State
| Decision Date | 30 September 1912 |
| Citation | 150 S.W. 133,105 Ark. 12 |
| Parties | MONK v. STATE |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, First Division; Robert J. Lea Judge; affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Appellant pro se.
Hal. L Norwood, Attorney General, and Wm. H. Rector, Assistant, for appellee.
The grand jury of Pulaski County returned an indictment against the defendant, Clifton Monk, and one Davis, containing two counts, charging, respectively, the crimes of burglary and grand larceny. The charge is that they burglariously entered the dwelling house in the city of Little Rock of one E. G. Marlin with the intent to steal the latter's property, and that they did steal a watch and a fob of the value of $ 25, the property of E. G. Marlin. The defendant was tried separately, and the jury convicted him of burglary under the first count and of petty larceny under the second count.
The proof tended to show that Davis entered the house of Marlin in the night time, and that while in the house he stole a watch and fob; that Davis and the defendant were acting together in the commission of the burglary, and that defendant stood watch at the gate while Davis entered the house. The proof also tended to show that Davis gave the watch and fob to defendant.
The evidence is sufficient, we think, to sustain the finding of the jury. The proof adduced by the State tended to establish the value of the watch and fob in excess of the sum of $ 10, but the jury gave defendant the benefit of all doubts on that point and convicted him of petit larceny. The circumstances, however, warranted the inference that the house was entered by Davis with intent to commit grand larceny, and therefore warranted the conviction of burglary, even though it turned out that the property he took was of less than $ 10 in value. Harvick v. State, 49 Ark. 514, 6 S.W. 19.
It is insisted, however, that, according to the undisputed evidence, the watch and fob were the property of Marlin's wife, and that there was a variance between the allegations and the proof on that point. Mrs. Marlin testified that her husband purchased the watch and fob and gave them to her; that she gave them to him for safe-keeping, and that he had not returned them to her, but that when the articles were stolen they were under the pillow of the bed occupied by them both. Marlin testified that the watch and fob belonged to his wife, but that she had turned them over to him for safekeeping, and that he had not returned them to her at the time the larceny was committed. We are of the opinion that the proof justified the finding that the property was in the exclusive possession of Marlin, and this was sufficient for the ownership to be laid in him.
There is another question not raised by counsel which has, however given us some concern, and that is whether the defendant could be, under this indictment, convicted of petit larceny. The statute provides that burglary and grand larceny may be charged in one indictment. Kirby's Digest, § 2231. It does not provide that petit larceny may be joined in an indictment for burglary, and it is worthy of notice that in other subdivisions of the same section, providing for the joining of larceny with other offenses, it is not restricted to grand larceny but to the crime of larceny generally. Prior to the year 1901 there was no authority for joining burglary and larceny in the same indictment, and this court held that they could not be joined. Crook v. State, 59 Ark. 326, 27 S.W. 229. But the General Assembly of that year amended the statute so as to allow burglary and grand larceny to be charged in the same indictment. From an early day it has been held that, "upon an indictment for a felony, the accused may be convicted of a misdemeanor, where both offenses belong to the same generic class, where the commission of the higher may involve the commission of the lower offense, and where the indictment for...
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Caton v. State
...submitting to the jury the question of authenticity of the writing and its connection with the defendants, as was done in Monk v. State, 105 Ark. 12, 150 S.W. 133. Admissibility of this incriminating bit of evidence cannot be sustained upon the theory that the entries were made by an accomp......
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McCoy v. State
...334 (1952); Bailey v. State, 215 Ark. 53, 219 S.W.2d 424 (1949); Moreland v. State, 125 Ark. 24, 188 S.W. 1 (1916); Monk v. State, 105 Ark. 12, 150 S.W. 133 (1912); State v. Nichols, 38 Ark. 550 (1882); Guest v. State, 19 Ark. 405 (1858); Strawn v. State, 14 Ark. 549 (1854). In Gaskin v. St......
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Hoover v. State, CR-77-187
...that proof that actual ownership or title is in another is not a fatal variance. Cook v. State, 80 Ark. 495, 97 S.W. 683; Monk v. State, 105 Ark. 12, 150 S.W. 133; Houpt v. State, 157 Ark. 171, 247 S.W. 770. Subsequent to our decision in Von Tonglin, we held that it is not error to allege o......
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Clayton v. State
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