Monn v. Centurion of Fla., LLC
| Decision Date | 15 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 5:20-cv-266-TKW/MJF |
| Parties | TROY MONN, Plaintiff, v. CENTURION OF FLORIDA, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Troy Monn (“Monn”) initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that three medical professionals at Calhoun Correctional Institution (“Calhoun CI”)-all employees of Centurion of Florida, LLC (“Centurion”)- violated the Eighth Amendment when they failed to treat properly his detached retina. Monn also alleges that Centurion's policy of having its medical personnel screen alleged eye injuries before referring patients to a vision specialist violates the Eighth Amendment.
The facts alleged in Monn's third amended complaint, Doc. 33 fail to state a facially plausible claim against Defendants M. Marlowe and Centurion. The undersigned, therefore recommends that Monn's claims against Defendants M Marlowe and Centurion be dismissed with prejudice, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.[1]
On Thursday, June 22, 2017, Monn was experiencing “pain and severely impaired vision in [his] left eye.”[2] Doc. 33 at 7. Monn's symptoms included “blurriness, darkness, distortion, flashes of light, and a curtain effect blocking part of [his] field of vision.” Id. That same day, Monn signed up for “sick call.” Id.
The next day, on June 23, 2017, sick call was canceled. Id. Monn explained his symptoms to his work supervisor, who stated that Monn's symptoms were indicative of a detached retina. Id. Monn then declared a medical emergency. Doc. 33 at 7. At “medical, ” Monn described his symptoms to Defendant G. Grantham, a nurse at Calhoun CI. Id. at 7-8. Monn also asked whether his symptoms stemmed from a detached retina. Id. at 8. Monn alleges that Grantham did not examine him. Id. Grantham stated that even if Monn had a detached retina, Monn would not be examined by a physician over the weekend. Id. Grantham advised Monn to sign up to visit sick call on Monday, June 26, 2017. Doc. 33 at 8.
Consistent with Grantham's instructions, on June 26, 2017, Monn went to sick call, and he was examined by Defendant M. Marlowe, a nurse at Calhoun CI. Id. Monn described his symptoms to Marlowe and asked whether his symptoms stemmed from a detached retina. Id. Marlowe administered a “cursory vision test using a standard wall chart, ” but she did not write down any of Monn's symptoms. Id.
After the examination, Marlowe asked Monn to sign a referral form so that Monn could see an optometrist to update the prescription lenses in his eyeglasses. Id. at 8-9, 12. The referral was “routine, ” which according to Monn meant that it would take months to schedule an appointment with an optometrist. Doc. 33 at 8. Nine days later, Monn's appointment with the optometrist was scheduled for October 3, 2017. Id. at 9.
On July 13, 2017, Monn had an appointment with Defendant Dr. S. Vilchez, a doctor at Calhoun CI. Id. Although Monn's appointment was unrelated to his left eye, Dr. Vilchez agreed to discuss Monn's vision problems. Id. Monn described his symptoms and asked about a detached retina. Id. Monn alleges that Dr. Vilchez ignored Monn's symptoms and “failed to document clear and compelling signs of [a] detached retina.” Doc. 33 at 9.
On October 12, 2017, Monn was evaluated by an unspecified optometrist. Id. Monn alleges that this optometrist, and later a retina specialist, diagnosed Monn with a detached retina. Id. The retina specialist performed three laser surgeries to repair Monn's detached retina, but the surgeries were unsuccessful. Id. According to Monn, he is now permanently blind in his left eye. Id. at 10.
Monn alleges that his delayed treatment, and therefore his blindness, was caused by Centurion's policy of having alleged eye injuries screened by its medical personnel before patients are referred to a vision specialist. Doc. 33 at 10. According to Monn, this policy is “medically unnecessary.” Id.
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner, the court is required to review his complaint, identify cognizable claims, and dismiss the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the complaint “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b); see Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Carbone v. CNN, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2019). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true and evaluates all reasonable inferences derived from those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1994).
To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, ” rather than the mere possibility that the defendant acted unlawfully. Id. That is, the complaint's factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ().
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. This prohibition governs the “treatment a prisoner receives in prison.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1242 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). Because an inmate “must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs, ” prison officials must provide medical care for inmates, and failure to do so may violate the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). A “prison official's ‘deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of a prisoner constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.'” Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (quotation marks and citations omitted)). But “not every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment” asserts an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. (citation omitted).
“A prisoner bringing a deliberate-indifference claim has a steep hill to climb.” Keohane v. Fla. Dep't of Corr. Sec'y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2020). To state an Eighth-Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that:
Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1220 (11th Cir. 2016); Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009); Rodriguez v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 625 (11th Cir. 2007). This claim includes an objective component-“that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment”- and a subjective component-deliberate indifference. Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000); see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) () (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 303 (1991)).
“Deliberate indifference is not a constitutionalized version of common-law negligence.” Hoffer v. Sec'y, Fla Dep't of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245 (). Instead, an alleged wrongdoer is deliberately indifferent to a plaintiff's serious medical need if the wrongdoer (1) had “subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm, ” (2) disregarded that risk, and (3) acted in a manner “more than mere negligence.” Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004)); Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 2013). Deliberate indifference “is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding a substantial risk of serious harm.” Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted); Nam Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cnty., 871 F.3d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 2017) (...
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