Monnett v. Turpie

• Decision Date: 03 November 1892
• Citation: 32 N.E. 328,132 Ind. 482,133 Ind. 424
• Parties: MONNETT et al. v. TURPIE et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

132 Ind. 482

133 Ind. 424

32 N.E. 328

MONNETT et al.

v.TURPIE et al.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Nov. 3, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Carroll county; C. R. Pollard, Judge.

Action by Cordelia P. Monnett and another against James H. Turpie and another to cancel certain deeds fraudulently obtained by defendants from plaintiffs' ancestor, who was a person of unsound mind. From an order and judgment refusing a jury trial, plaintiffs appealed. Affirmed.

E. P. Hammond, W. B. Austin, and M. F. Chilcote, for appellants. W. E. Uhl, for appellees.

Miller, J.

The action of the court in refusing to grant the appellants a trial by jury is the only question involved in this appeal. The complaint consisted of three paragraphs. The first paragraph shows that on and prior to January 5, 1881, Thomas Monnett was the owner of several distinct tracts of land in Carroll and White counties, Ind., and in Prairie county, in the state of Arkansas; that he was, and for a long time prior thereto had been, a person of unsound mind, of which the defendants had notice; that on that day, with full knowledge that he was of unsound mind, the defendants, James H. Turpie and William Turpie, fraudulently and without consideration induced him to convey to them, by certain instruments of writing purporting to be warranty deeds, all said real estate; that on the 23d day of June, 1881, the said Thomas Monnett was, on inquest duly had, declared to be a person of unsound mind, and incapable of managing his own estate, and a guardian of his person and estate appointed; that on the 4th day of April, 1883, the guardian demanded a reconveyance of all said lands to the said ward, at the same time tendering them for execution a conveyance to that effect; that they refused, and still refuse, to execute the same. Subsequently Thomas Monnett died, and by supplemental complaint his heirs were substituted as plaintiffs. The prayer for relief is: “Wherefore the plaintiff prays the court for a judgment disaffirming the said deeds to said defendants, James H. Turpie and William Turpie, and canceling the same, and that the title to said lands by the decree of the court be revested in the plaintiff, freed and discharged from all claims of the said defendants, and each of them, and for such other relief as may be equitable and just.” The other paragraphs of complaint, in so far as they affect the question involved, do not differ from the first. The appellants, after the inquest of lunacy and disaffirmance of the conveyance, had their election to pursue either one of two courses: (1) To treat the conveyance as having been avoided by the disaffirmance, and, if out of possession, sue in ejectment, or to quiet title. Brown v. Freed, 43 Ind. 253;Freed v. Brown, 55 Ind. 310;Nichol v. Thomas, 53 Ind. 42;Long v. Williams, 74 Ind. 115. (2) Proceed in equity to have the conveyances canceled and the title revested in the grantor, (1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 110;) in which case, the chancery court having jurisdiction of an essential part of the case, the whole is drawn into equity, (Towns v. Smith, 115 Ind. 480, 16 N. E. Rep. 811; Quarl v. Abbett, 102 Ind. 233, 1 N. E. Rep. 476; Lake v. Lake, 99 Ind. 339.) To determine which of these courses the appellants elected to pursue is to determine their right to a trial by jury. If the complaint is an action to quiet title, as provided by our Code, (section 1070,) the action was triable by jury, and the court erred in refusing,upon appellants' motion, to submit the cause to a jury for trial. Puterbaugh v. Puterbaugh, (Ind. Sup.) 30 N. E. Rep. 519; Trittipo v. Morgan, 99 Ind. 269;Johnson v. Taylor, 106 Ind. 89, 5 N. E. Rep. 732; Kitts v. Willson, 106 Ind. 147, 5 N. E. Rep. 400. If, on the contrary, the action was for the cancellation of the deeds, it was one that, prior to the 18th day of June, 1852, would have fallen within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court of equity, and was triable by the court. Section 1064, Rev. St. 1881. The nature of the action must be determined from the general character and scope of the pleading, disregarding isolated and detached allegations not essential to the support of its main theory. Bank v. Root, 107 Ind. 224, 8 N. E. Rep. 105; Cottrell v...