Monroe v. Alternatives in Motion, 01-05-01187-CV.

• Decision Date: 22 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 01-05-01188-CV.,No. 01-05-01187-CV.,01-05-01187-CV.,01-05-01188-CV.
• Citation: 234 S.W.3d 56
• Parties: James MONROE, Jr., James Monroe, Sr., and Shana Monroe, Appellants, v. ALTERNATIVES IN MOTION, Corey Williams, and Angela Williams, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

234 S.W.3d 56

James MONROE, Jr., James Monroe, Sr., and Shana Monroe, Appellants, v. ALTERNATIVES IN MOTION, Corey Williams, and Angela Williams, Appellees.

No. 01-05-01187-CV.

No. 01-05-01188-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

February 22, 2007.

Shawn Casey, Shawn Casey & Associates, Sybil Jane Carr, Houston, TX, for Appellants.

Lester R. Buzbee, III, Humble, TX, for Appellees.

Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices JENNINGS and BLAND.

OPINION

JANE BLAND Justice.

Appellant James Monroe, Jr. ("James Jr."), together with James Monroe, Sr. ("James Sr.") and Shana Monroe (James Sr. and Shana will be known collectively as the "Monroes") appeal the trial court's order terminating the parental rights of James Jr., and appointing appellee Alternatives in Motion ("AIM") as the sole managing conservator of J.A.M.J., a minor child.¹ In three issues, James Jr. and the Monroes contend (1) the trial court erred in failing to appoint the Monroes as joint managing conservators of J.A.M.J. in accordance with James Jr.'s designation in his affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in not granting conservatorship rights to the Monroes, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying the request for a trial by jury. We conclude that (1) the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court's presumed finding that James Jr.'s affidavit of relinquishment was voluntarily executed, (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying conservatorship rights to the Monroes, and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a trial by jury. We therefore affirm.

Background

Jaculynn Rochelle Jackson and James Jr. are the biological parents of J.A.M.J. While Jaculynn was pregnant with J.A.M.J., she decided to present her for adoption. Jaculynn contacted AIM, an adoption agency, and executed an affidavit of status naming James Jr. as the father of J.A.M.J. Ronald Landry, an employee of AIM, attempted to contact James Jr. on several occasions but the Monroes—James Jr.'s parents and the paternal grandparents of J.A.M.J.—refused to allow James Jr. to speak with Landry because James Jr. was only seventeen at the time. AIM filed this lawsuit in September 2003, seeking to terminate the parent-child relationships between Jaculynn, James Jr., and J.A.M.J., and to have AIM appointed sole managing conservator of J.A.M.J.

J.A.M.J. was born on November 24, 2003. Shortly thereafter, Jaculynn executed an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, designating AIM as managing conservator of J.A.M.J. On November 26, 2003, AIM placed J.A.M.J. with appellees Corey and Angela Williams (the "Williams"), the prospective adoptive parents chosen by Jaculynn and pre-approved by AIM. The Williams live in North Dakota.

After J.A.M.J. was born, the trial court issued sanctions to force James Jr. to submit to a paternity test. DNA testing confirmed James Jr.'s paternity in December 2004. In June 2005, the Monroes intervened in this lawsuit, seeking to be appointed joint managing conservators of J.A.M.J. The Williams intervened in this suit as well, seeking to adopt J.A.M.J. In October 2005, James Jr. executed an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, naming the Monroes as managing conservators and prospective adoptive parents. The trial court held a bench trial in November 2005. At the conclusion of the trial, the court terminated the parental rights of both Jaculynn and James Jr., and appointed AIM as the sole managing conservator of J.A.M.J.

Relinquishment of Parental Rights

In their first issue, James Jr. and the Monroes contend that the trial court erred in failing to appoint the Monroes as joint managing conservators of J.A.M.J. in accordance with James Jr.'s managing conservator designation in his affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights. Specifically, James Jr. and the Monroes contend that James Jr. was fraudulently induced to execute the affidavit because the trial court did not comply with James Jr.'s managing conservator designation. AIM and the Williams respond that a designation of a managing conservator in an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights does not bind a trial court, and the best interest of the child is determinative with regard to the appointment of conservators.

The Texas Supreme Court has held that the natural right between parents and their children is one of constitutional dimensions. See Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex.1985); In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 846 (Tex.1980); Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex.1976). Therefore, termination proceedings must be strictly scrutinized in favor of the parent. In re V.R.W., 41 S.W.3d 183, 190 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.), overruled on other grounds, In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 267 n. 39 (Tex.2002); see also G.M., 596 S.W.2d at 846; Cawley v. Allums, 518 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex.1975).

Family Code section 161.001 authorizes a trial court to terminate a parent-child relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has executed an unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights, and termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(K), (2) (Vernon Supp.2006). A parent may designate a competent person, authorized agency, or licensed child-placing agency to serve as managing conservator of the child in an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights. Id. § 153.374(a) (Vernon 2002). "The person or agency designated to serve as managing conservator shall be appointed managing conservator unless the court finds that the appointment would not be in the best interest of the child." Id. § 153.374(b); In re D.R.L.M., 84 S.W.3d 281, 300 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied) (holding that trial court is not obligated to comply with appointment of managing conservator in affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights if trial court finds that appointment would not be in best interest of child), superseded by statute on other grounds, TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 263.405(i) (Vernon Supp.2006). "Section 153.374 clearly provides that in appointing a managing conservator in such cases, the trial court need not comply with the parent's designation of a managing conservator if the designation is not in the [child's] best interest." Dep't of Family & Protective Servs. v. Alternatives in Motion, 210 S.W.3d 794, 803 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. filed). "A direct or collateral attack on an order terminating parental rights based on an unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights or affidavit of waiver of interest in a child is limited to issues relating to fraud, duress, or coercion in the execution of the affidavit." TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 161.211 (Vernon 2002).

Implicit in the Family Code is the requirement that an affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights must be voluntarily executed. Williams v. Williams, 150 S.W.3d 436, 447 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. denied); V.R.W., 41 S.W.3d at 192; Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 759 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied); Neal v. Tex. Dep't of Human Servs., 814 S.W.2d 216, 218-19 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied). Moreover, because an affidavit of relinquishment waives a constitutional right, it must be made voluntarily, knowingly, intelligently, and with full awareness of its legal consequences. V.R.W., 41 S.W.3d at 192; Vela, 17 S.W.3d at 759. The proponent of the affidavit has the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the affidavit was executed according to the terms of section 161.103 of the Family Code. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.103 (Vernon Supp.2006); V.R.W., 41 S.W.3d at 192-93; Vela, 17 S.W.3d at 758. An affidavit of relinquishment in proper form is prima facie evidence of its validity. V.R.W., 41 S.W.3d at 190. Once the proponent has met that burden, the burden then shifts to the affiant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the affidavit was executed as a result of fraud, duress, or coercion. Id. at 193; Vela, 17 S.W.3d at 758; see also TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 161.211(c). An involuntarily executed affidavit is a complete defense to a termination decree. V.R.W., 41 S.W.3d at 193; Vela, 17 S.W.3d at 759; Neal, 814 S.W.2d at 219.

Because James Jr. and the Monroes had the burden at trial to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that James Jr. did not voluntarily execute the affidavit of relinquishment, they must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence conclusively established all vital facts in support of their claim. See Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989). After the termination trial, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it stated, "The Court finds from clear and convincing evidence that JAMES MONROE, JR. signed a relinquishment of parental rights to JAMES MONROE, SR. and SHANA MONROE." In making this finding, the trial court necessarily determined that James Jr.'s affidavit was voluntarily executed. See D.R.L.M., 84 S.W.3d at 297. We therefore interpret James Jr. and the Monroes' appellate attack on the affidavit as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's presumed voluntariness finding. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 299 (omitted elements are presumed in support of judgment); D.R.L.M., 84 S.W.3d at 297-98.

In a legal sufficiency challenge by a party with the burden of proof at trial, we examine the entire record to determine if the proposition contrary to the finding is established as a matter of law. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005); Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 690. Only if the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law will we sustain the issue. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827; Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 690.

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