Monroe v. Fallick
| Decision Date | 17 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. A-1-CA-35475,A-1-CA-35475 |
| Parties | JANET R. MONROE F/K/A JANET FALLICK, Petitioner-Appellee, v. GREGG FALLICK, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Keleher & McLeod, P.A.
Thomas C. Bird
Albuquerque, NM
Romero & Constant, P.C.
Margaret Y. Romero
Gina T. Constant
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
Gregg Fallick
Albuquerque, NM
Pro Se Appellant.
{1} The opinion filed December 10, 2018, is hereby withdrawn and this opinion is filed in its stead. Gregg Fallick (Husband) appeals the district court's orders: (1) granting partial summary judgment in Janet Monroe's (Wife) favor, thereby enforcing the parties' prenuptial agreement; (2) denying Husband's quantum meruit claim for unpaid legal services he allegedly provided to Wife during their marriage; (3) granting Wife's motion for attorney fees; and (4) denying Husband's motion for sanctions. Unpersuaded, we affirm.
{2} A day before their marriage, the parties signed a prenuptial agreement indicating that all of their respective property would be classified as separate property. The prenuptial agreement indicated that the parties could only modify it in writing and that any discussions regarding such modifications "shall not be binding, and shall be considered as discussions only, unless and until they are reduced to a writing." The parties represented that they had read the agreement in its entirety, that each understood its legal consequences, and that they entered into it voluntarily and "free from duress, fraud, undue influence, coercion, or misrepresentation of any kind."
{3} After approximately seven years, Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. Shortly after, the district court entered a decree of divorce, but specifically reserved jurisdiction to determine the economic issues in post-divorce proceedings. Litigation continued for several years, mainly focused on the enforcement of the prenuptial agreement, Husband's quantum meruit claim, and a discovery squabble stemming from Wife's response to an interrogatory that led to Husband filing a motion to compel.
{4} During the course of such proceedings, Wife filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking an order that the parties' prenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable. Husband responded with a number of defenses asserting that the prenuptial agreement was unenforceable, none of which were presented in his response to Wife's petition for dissolution of marriage. The district court granted Wife's motion, finding that the agreement was clear, unambiguous, and subject to interpretation as written. However, the district court did not address many of the defenses raised by Husband in his response, except for a claim of fraud in the inducement. The parties then proceeded to trial exclusively on Husband's quantum meruit claim for attorney fees. After the trial, the district court dismissed Husband's claim and entered detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district court never ruled on Husband's motion to compel.
{5} Husband appealed the orders enforcing the prenuptial agreement and dismissing his quantum meruit claim. While that appeal was pending, the district court entered a separate order awarding Wife attorney fees and costs. Husband also appealed that order, which this Court consolidated with the first appeal.
{6} On appeal, Husband raises a multitude of alleged errors by the district court, which we have narrowed down into four categories for review, whether the district court erred by: (1) granting Wife's motion for partial summary judgment regarding the parties' prenuptial agreement; (2) denying Husband's quantum meruit claim; (3) failing to sanction Wife based on her response to an interrogatory; and (4) awarding Wife attorney fees and costs.
{7} As previously noted, the district court granted Wife's motion for partial summary judgment and enforced the parties' prenuptial agreement as written. In his brief, Husband fails to identify the applicable appellate standard of review. See Rule 12-318(A)(4) NMRA. As a result, he fails to articulate his arguments according to the applicable standard of review, leaving it to this Court to decipher the district court's perceived error in granting partial summary judgment.
{8} "Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Koenig v. Perez, 1986-NMSC-066, ¶ 6, 104 N.M. 664, 726 P.2d 341. When employing this standard of review, "we step into the shoes of the district court as if we were ruling on the motion in the first instance." State v. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist., #89, 2018-NMSC-029, ¶ 16, ___ P.3d ___. (omission, internal quotation marks, and citationomitted) "The movant need only to make a prima facie showing that he [or she] is entitled to summary judgment." Roth v. Thompson, 1992-NMSC-011, ¶ 17, 113 N.M. 331, 825 P.2d 1241. Once the movant makes this showing, "the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to demonstrate the existence of specific evidentiary facts [that] would require trial on the merits." Id. "A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must make an affirmative showing by affidavit or other admissible evidence that there is a genuine issue of material fact once a prima facie showing is made by the movant." Associated Home & RV Sales, Inc. v. Bank of Belen, 2013-NMCA-018, ¶ 29, 294 P.3d 1276 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate where the facts are not in dispute and only the legal effect of those facts remain to be determined. See Gardner-Zemke Co. v. State, 1990-NMSC-034, ¶ 11, 109 N.M. 729, 790 P.2d 1010.
{9} Because Husband does not specifically attack the facts establishing the existence of the prenuptial agreement, we proceed from the standpoint that Wife met her burden of making a prima facie factual showing that she was entitled to summary judgment. With the burden now shifting to Husband, we construe his argument to be that the district court erred in determining that there was no issue of material fact that the prenuptial agreement was unambiguous.
{10} We begin our analysis by interpreting the prenuptial agreement as a contract. See Lebeck v. Lebeck, 1994-NMCA-103, ¶ 18, 118 N.M. 367, 881 P.2d 727. "It is black letter law that, absent an ambiguity, a court is bound to interpret and enforce a contract's clear language and cannot create a new agreement for the parties." Ponder v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2000-NMSC-033, ¶ 11, 129 N.M. 698, 12 P.3d 960 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court will determine, as a matter of law, whether a contract is ambiguous. Sierra Blanca Sales Co. v. Newco Indus., Inc., 1972-NMCA-153, ¶ 11, 84 N.M. 524, 505 P.2d 867. "A contract is ambiguous only if it is reasonably susceptible to different constructions." Kirkpatrick v. Introspect Healthcare Corp., 1992-NMSC-070, ¶ 14, 114 N.M. 706, 845 P.2d 800.
{11} The district court concluded that "[t]he [p]renuptial [a]greement is clear and unambiguous and is therefore subject to interpretation as written." Husband argues that the district court erred because it based its interpretation of the prenuptial agreement on the four corners of the contract. Husband relies exclusively on Mark V, Inc. v. Mellekas, 1993-NMSC-001, 114 N.M. 778, 845 P.2d 1232, in making this assertion. Mark V held that a court might look to extrinsic evidence outside of the four corners of a contract "in order to decide whether the meaning of a term or expression contained in the agreement is actually unclear." Id. ¶ 11. Further,"[C]ourts are now allowed to consider extrinsic evidence in determining whether an ambiguity exists in the first instance[.]" Ponder, 2000-NMSC-033, ¶ 13.
{12} Husband does not identify what word or expression of the prenuptial agreement lacked clarity or what extrinsic evidence the district court should have considered in determining whether it was ambiguous. See C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 1991-NMSC-070, ¶ 15, 112 N.M. 504, 817 P.2d 238 (). Indeed, Husband conceded during his deposition that there was no ambiguity in the prenuptial agreement as written. Husband's argument appears to suggest that we should consider, in our interpretation of the contract, his contentions that the parties intended the prenuptial agreement to protect Wife from possible claims by Husband's previous wife and that the parties would eventually void the prenuptial agreement without any evidence of when this was to occur and what effect it was to have on the parties and the division of their property. However, during the seven years of marriage there is no evidence that the parties took any steps to void the prenuptial agreement, even after Husband's dispute with his previous wife concluded, and we do not see how Husband's hypothetical contention would change the meaning of a term or expression within the prenuptial agreement as itwas written, particularly given Husband's concession that it is unambiguous. We conclude that Husband has failed to meet his burden. We agree with the district court that the prenuptial agreement is unambiguous and must be enforced...
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