Monroe v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 96-2862

• Decision Date: 10 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-2862,96-2862
• Citation: 115 F.3d 514
• Parties: 155 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2513 Clay E. MONROE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY and Union Pacific Railroad Company, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 514

115 F.3d 514

155 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2513

Clay E. MONROE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY and Union Pacific Railroad Company, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 96-2862.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Jan. 7, 1997.

Decided June 10, 1997.

Jerome J. Schlichter (argued), Nannette A. Baker, Fairview Heights, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kurt E. Reitz (argued), Mary S. Juen, Thompson Coburn, Belleville, IL, David A. Dick, St. Louis, MO, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before FAIRCHILD, CUMMINGS, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

This case calls upon us to resolve whether the district court properly dismissed Clay Monroe's wrongful discharge claims, which he brought pursuant to the Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA") and Illinois public policy. We agree with the district court that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Monroe's claims as they were preempted by the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"). Thus, we affirm the dismissal of Monroe's action.

I. HISTORY

Clay Monroe worked for thirteen years as a brakeman for the Missouri Pacific Railroad and the Union Pacific Railroad (collectively, "the Railroad"). Monroe was injured at work on July 20, 1992, and his doctor advised him to take a medical leave of absence. In October of that year, the Railroad hired a private investigator to conduct surveillance on Monroe as he had not yet returned to work due to his alleged injuries and physical incapacity. The Railroad's investigators discovered that Monroe was working at his father's business, where he was selling and installing satellite television systems. At one point, the investigators ordered a satellite dish from Monroe while posing as homeowners and then videotaped Monroe while he helped install the dish. In December 1992, Monroe's doctor permitted him to return to work for the Railroad.

The Railroad subsequently commenced a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") hearing regarding the propriety of Monroe's conduct while on medical leave. Evidence at the hearing included the videotape of Monroe installing the satellite system, as well as testimony from a doctor who opined that Monroe could do physical railroad work. This doctor, however, neither spoke with Monroe nor physically examined him. On December 17, 1992, the Railroad discharged Monroe for misrepresenting his physical condition.

Monroe subsequently filed four separate legal proceedings against the Railroad challenging his dismissal: 1) he filed a CBA labor grievance based on his alleged wrongful termination ¹; 2) he brought a civil suit in the Madison County Circuit Court (Illinois) based on the Railroad's private investigation of him, including claims of fraud, conspiracy, and similar torts; 3) he filed another civil suit in the St. Louis Circuit Court (Missouri) pursuant to the FELA, seeking damages for the personal injuries he sustained on July 20, 1992; and 4) he brought the present action.

The case before us involves a three-count complaint that Monroe filed on March 19, 1996 in the Circuit Court of Marion County, Illinois. Count I attempts to state a claim under the FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 55, alleging that the Railroad wrongfully discharged Monroe in an attempt to defeat any personal injury claims Monroe might have against the Railroad under the FELA. Count II asserts that the Railroad's wrongful discharge of Monroe violated Illinois public policy because it attempted to prevent Monroe from fully exercising his right to collect damages for his work-related injuries. Count III claims that the Railroad's alleged misconduct was willful and wanton, and is essentially a prayer for punitive damages.

The Railroad removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois on April 26, 1996, and it filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the federal court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)) and Monroe's failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)). On July 9, 1996, the district court granted the Railroad's motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the RLA preempted Monroe's FELA and Illinois public policy claims.

II. ANALYSIS

We must decide whether the district court correctly found that the RLA preempts Monroe's wrongful discharge claims under the FELA and under Illinois public policy. We review de novo a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for subject matter jurisdiction. Underwood v. Venango River Corp., 995 F.2d 677, 679 (7th Cir.1993), overruled on other grounds, Westbrook v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 35 F.3d 316 (7th Cir.1994).

Whether a federal law preempts another law that establishes a cause of action is a question of congressional intent. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 251-52, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 2243, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994). The arguably preemptive federal law in this case--the RLA-provides a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes, including a mandatory arbitral mechanism for "the prompt and orderly settlement" of two classes of disputes. Id.; see 45 U.S.C. § 151a; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 1413-14, 94 L.Ed.2d 563 (1987). The first class of disputes-major disputes--seeks to create contractual rights; and the second class--minor disputes--seeks to enforce these rights. See Hawaiian Airlines, at 252-54, 114 S.Ct. at 2244. The Railroad contends that this case involves a minor dispute.

Minor disputes grow "out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions," 45 U.S.C. § 151a, and they "involve controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation," Hawaiian Airlines, at 252-54, 114 S.Ct. at 2244 (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 33, 77 S.Ct. 635, 636-37, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957)). All minor disputes must be adjudicated under RLA mechanisms, which include an employer's internal dispute-resolution procedures and an adjustment board established by the unions and the employer. Id.; see 45 U.S.C. § 184. If Monroe's FELA and Illinois public policy claims are "minor disputes," they are, of course, preempted by the RLA.

In Hawaiian Airlines, the Supreme Court addressed the preemption of minor disputes under the RLA. The Court held that not all grievances or employment-related disputes are considered "minor disputes" for RLA preemption purposes. Hawaiian Airlines, at 252-54, 114 S.Ct. at 2244. Rather, " 'grievances,' like disputes over 'the interpretation or application' of CBAs, refers to disagreements over how to give effect to the bargained-for agreement." Id. Hawaiian Airlines ultimately found that the RLA did not preempt the plaintiff's state-law tort actions--which were based on the state's public policy and its whistle-blower statute--because those claims necessitated a purely factual inquiry into the retaliatory motivations of the employer and did not require interpretation of the relevant CBA. Id. at 266, 114 S.Ct. at 2251.

In reaching this conclusion, Hawaiian Airlines embraced the analysis from a prior preemption case, Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). See Hawaiian Airlines, at 262-64, 114 S.Ct. at 2249 ("[W]e conclude that Lingle provides an appropriate framework for addressing pre-emption under the RLA, and we adopt the Lingle standard to resolve claims of RLA pre-emption."). In Lingle, the Court held that the plaintiff's state-law retaliatory discharge claim was not preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") because it turned on "purely factual questions" regarding the employer's motivation behind the discharge and it did not require interpretation of any CBA term. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407, 108 S.Ct. at 1882. In reaching this decision, the Lingle Court recognized that dispute resolution pursuant to a CBA and the adjudication of a separate state-law claim might require different tribunals to address the same set of facts, id. at 408-09, 108 S.Ct. at 1882-83; nonetheless, the Court ruled that a state claim is independent of a CBA for preemption purposes "as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself," id. at 410, 108 S.Ct. at 1883.

We have had the opportunity to decide RLA preemption cases since Hawaiian Airlines adopted the Lingle standard. In Bielicke v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 30 F.3d 877 (7th Cir.1994)--a case strikingly similar to the one before us--we held that the RLA preempted the plaintiffs' FELA claims, which alleged that the railroad wrongfully discharged plaintiffs and improperly abused its investigatory powers in an attempt to discourage plaintiffs from pursuing other FELA actions to recover damages for their job-related personal injuries. ² Significantly, we reasoned that "[o]ne cannot determine whether Terminal Railroad conducted the investigations for legitimate purposes under the collective bargaining agreements or if they abused the investigation procedures allowed by the collective bargaining agreements ... without focusing the case on the collective bargaining agreements themselves." Id. at 878.

More recently, we held that the RLA did not preempt a plaintiff's retaliatory discharge action filed under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. See Westbrook v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 35 F.3d 316 (7th Cir.1994). In Sky Chefs, we found that plaintiff's cause of action was not a minor dispute (and thus not preempted) because it involved "rights and obligations that exist independent of the collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 318 (quoting Hawaiian Airlines, at 258-60, 114 S.Ct. at 2247). In reaching this conclusion, we based our decision solely on the fact that the CBA did not provide the "only source" of plaintiff's rights, and we had no occasion to address whether the...