Monroe v. Sigler, 43978

• Decision Date: 17 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 43978,43978
• Parties: MONROE et al. v. SIGLER et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 23

353 S.E.2d 23

256 Ga. 759

MONROE et al. v. SIGLER et al.

No. 43978.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 17, 1987.

Reconsideration Denied March 11, 1987.

Robert N. Dokson, George R. Neuhauser, Nall, Miller, Owens, Hocutt & Howard, Atlanta, for Harvey Monroe et al.

Benjamin S. Williams, Bennett, Williams & Henry, Atlanta, for Susan Sigler et al.

MARSHALL, Chief Justice.

Sigler brought suit against the Monroes for malicious prosecution. The trial court denied the Monroes' motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals granted their interlocutory appeal, then dismissed it as improvidently granted. We granted certiorari to consider whether a judicial determination of probable cause made in the course of a criminal prosecution can establish, as a matter of law and for purposes of summary judgment, the existence of probable cause in a civil action for malicious prosecution.

1. "The overriding question in actions for malicious prosecution is not whether the plaintiff was guilty, but whether the defendant had reasonable cause to so believe--whether the circumstances were such as to create in the mind a reasonable belief that there was probable cause for the prosecution.... This burden is not carried in any reasonable sense unless the plaintiff [Sigler] shows that under the facts as they appeared to the prosecutor at the time of the prosecution, that the defendant [the Monroes] could have had no reasonable grounds for believing the plaintiff to be guilty of the charge brought." Fisher v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, 175 Ga.App. 542, 545, 333 S.E.2d 877 (1985). "Lack of probable cause shall exist when the circumstances are such as to satisfy a reasonable man that the accuser had no ground for proceeding but his desire to injure the accused." OCGA § 51-7-43.

2. At an ex-parte hearing, Monroe related the events of the occurrence to a magistrate. The magistrate issued a warrant for Sigler's arrest, finding that probable cause existed to charge Sigler with the crime of simple battery. A second magistrate held a preliminary hearing six days later, at which Sigler appeared and gave testimony. This magistrate bound Sigler over for trial, also finding that probable cause existed for the issuance of the arrest warrant.

3. The judicial determinations of the magistrates were based on probable cause. Each found the existence of that factum, the absence of which is an essential element of an action for malicious prosecution. "The action of a magistrate in binding over the accused on a criminal warrant is prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence of probable cause for such prosecution." Darnell v. Shirley, 31 Ga.App. 764(7), 122 S.E. 252 (1924). See also Coxon v. Lady Jane Shop, 169 Ga.App. 959(1), 315 S.E.2d 681 (1984).

While some jurisdictions have held such commitment to be conclusive evidence of probable cause, ¹ we are reluctant so to hold, as a preliminary hearing is substantially less formal than a trial, and the accused often are not represented by counsel (in this case Sigler was unrepresented).

4. At trial, Sigler's counsel moved for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the state's case. Having heard all the evidence that the solicitor had to present, the trial court was called upon to examine the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction. In denying the motion, the court found the evidence sufficient to authorize a jury to determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That quantum of evidence is substantially greater than mere probable cause.

Such being the case, does the trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal constitute a binding determination of the existence of probable cause? We answer in the affirmative.

5. A criminal defendant is precluded from bringing a subsequent action of malicious prosecution unless the prosecution has terminated in his favor. Ayala v. Sherrer, 234 Ga. 112, 214 S.E.2d 548 (1975). Conviction by a jury is conclusive of probable cause, if the conviction is not procured by fraud. See Davis v. Gilbert, 67 Ga.App. 277, 19 S.E.2d 920 (1942). A finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is of logical necessity contrary to an hypothesis of lack of probable cause.

6. The standard employed in the trial judge's ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal is thrice removed, it might be said, from probable cause--as "beyond a reasonable doubt" is more than "clear and convincing evidence," which is more than "preponderance of the evidence," which, in turn, is more than mere "probable cause."

When...