Monroe v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:09 cv 411 |
| Parties | MICHAEL MONROE, Plaintiff v. SISTERS OF SAINT FRANCIS HEALTH SERVICES, INC. dba St. Margaret Mercy, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 38] filed by the defendant, Sisters of Saint Francis Health Services, Inc., on January 13, 2012. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.
The plaintiff, Michael Monroe, was employed by the defendant, St. Margaret Mercy, for approximately five years before he was terminated on April 7, 2008. At the time he was terminated, he was a Hoosier Assurance Plan (HAP) case manager. As a HAP case manager, Monroe was responsible for completing progress notes for each patient session. It was St. Margaret Mercy's policy for the progress notes to be completed the same day as the patient session. Monroe also was responsible for completing 90% of all reassessments of HAP patients every six months. A HAPreassessment entailed documenting the basic condition of the patient, and it could be completed either by phone or in person. The hospital was required to conduct 180-day reassessments to maintain HAP funding from the state.
Monroe was diagnosed with cerebral palsy at birth and had multiple surgeries and a rod implanted in his leg. As a result, Monroe walked with a limp and experienced various symptoms. On December 5, 2007, Monroe slipped in St. Margaret Mercy's parking lot and was injured. Monroe went to the emergency room the next day, and he called the office supervisor, Wanda Hurt, to inform her that he had injured himself. He reported that he did not expect to be out long. The following Monday, Monroe remained unable to walk and called Linda Thompson, the Director of Behavioral Health, to tell her about his injury. Thompson told Monroe he should see his personal physician for his injury. Neither Thompson nor Hurt told Monroe to file a worker's compensation claim or instructed him to request FMLA leave at that time. On December 11, 2007, Monroe went into the office and signed an Employee Status Change form stating he would be on leave until December 17, 2007. The leave was approved retroactive to the first day he missed work, December 6, 2007.
St. Margaret Mercy sent its employees to Working Well for injuries covered by worker's compensation benefits. Monroe doesnot recall whether he first went to Working Well to fill out his Worker's Compensation Worksheet on December 11 or 17. Monroe does recall that he received treatment from Working Well on December 17, 2007. Because Monroe was in pain, his leave was extended through December 26, 2007.
When Monroe returned from leave, he requested intermittent FMLA leave for physical therapy. Monroe complains that Fidel Martinez, Manager of Psychiatric Therapy Services and Monroe's direct manager, instructed him not to schedule his physical therapy or doctor appointments during the day. Monroe was permitted leave for physical therapy and doctor appointments on December 26 and 27, 2007, and January 4, 16, and 18, 2008.
Prior to his termination, Monroe received the highest marks on his performance reviews. His reviews reflected excellence in a number of categories including progress notes. Monroe never had been admonished for any deficiencies in preparing progress notes and conducting HAP reassessments prior to his leave. Two weeks after Monroe returned from leave, he received a notice for unsatisfactory work performance. The notice explained that there had been significant delays in HAP enrollment data being entered into the CSDS system and set forth future expectations that all HAP enrollments should be documented on the day of the patient's appointment, all documentation resulting from HAP enrollmentinterviews should be provided to the OPBH supervisor by the end of the following business day for entry into the CSDS system, all 180 day reassessments should be completed on time, and all up-dates should be completed immediately as changes occurred with the patient. The notice also warned Monroe about completing his 180 day reassessments on time.
Following this notice, Monroe engaged in a series of behaviors that violated St. Margaret Mercy's policies. On January 23, 2008, a patient complained that Monroe told her to "get her fucking head out of her fucking ass." Monroe did not receive any discipline as a result of the patient's complaint. On January 25, 2008, Hurt encountered Monroe slouched in a patient chair in his office with his hood pulled over his head and his eyes closed. Monroe and Hurt had a conversation, and then Hurt left the room. Hurt returned to find Monroe in the same position. More than an hour later, Sharon Hughes, a non-supervisory employee, entered the room and found Monroe in the same position with his eyes closed. Shortly after, Martinez entered the room and saw Monroe with his eyes closed and asked if he was sleeping. Martinez told Monroe that sleeping at work was a terminable offense and that he would investigate further. St. Margaret Mercy's employee handbook states that "sleeping or appearing to be sleeping during work shift" is "considered serious enough towarrant immediate discharge." St. Margaret Mercy previously terminated three employees for sleeping or appearing to sleep at work.
Monroe did not work the weekend of January 26-27, 2008, and began a second leave of absence on January 28, 2008, after it was discovered that his hip was broken. Monroe did not return to work until April 7, 2008.
During Monroe's second leave of absence, Donna Ruebensam filled in. Hurt and Thompson testified at their depositions that Ruebensam reported to Hurt that Monroe's patient files were missing progress notes. Ruebensam does not recall whether she reported that his files were missing progress notes. St. Margaret Mercy conducted an investigation into the status of progress notes for all of the staff members in the Outpatient Behavioral Health Department because of the potential for a fraud claim by Medicaid. Medicaid requires progress notes to support the billing for an appointment and may pursue fraud charges in the absence of such documentation. Hurt and Hughes inspected Monroe's patient files. The inspection was not overseen or verified by Martinez. It was discovered that 299 patient progress notes were missing from Monroe's files dating back to November 22, 2006. The audit also revealed that two other employees were not in 100% compliance, however, the employeesalready had ended their employment with the hospital. St. Margaret Mercy reimbursed Medicaid $10,000 for charges associated with the files missing progress notes.
Monroe returned to work on April 7, 2008, and received a notice of discharge. Monroe's notice stated that he was terminated for "professional incompetence" and "sleeping or appearing to be sleeping during work shift." The notice specifically stated that 299 progress notes were missing from Monroe's patient files and that Monroe completed only three HAP reassessments of 63 due by the end of January 2008.
Monroe filed a complaint with this court on December 11, 2009, alleging that St. Margaret Mercy interfered with his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), retaliated against him for taking FMLA leave, and retaliated against him for applying for worker's compensation. St. Margaret Mercy now moves for summary judgment on all claims.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper only if it is demonstrated that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, __ F.3d __, 2012 WL 1848084, *6(7th Cir. May 22, 2012); Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009). The burden is upon the moving party to establish that no material facts are in genuine dispute, and any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Company, 398 U.S. 144, 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1610, 26 L.Ed.2d 142, 155 (1970); Stephens, 569 F.3d at 786. A fact is material if it is outcome determinative under applicable law. There must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 212 (1986); Stephens, 569 F.3d at 786; Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008). However, summary judgment may be entered against the non-moving party if it is unable to "establish the existence of an essential element to [the party's case, and on which [that party] will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . ." Kidwell, 2012 WL 184084 at *6 (citing Benuzzi v. Bd. of Educ., 647 F.3d 652, 662 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2548).
Summary judgment is inappropriate for determination of claims in which issues of intent, good faith, and other subjective feelings play dominant roles. Ashman v. Barrows, 438 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2006). Upon review, the court does not evaluate the weight of the evidence, judge the credibility of wit-nesses, or determine the ultimate truth of the matter; rather, the court will determine whether there exists a genuine issue of triable fact. Wheeler, 539 F.3d at 634 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must determine whether the evidence presented by the party opposed to the summary judgment is such that a reasonable jury might find in favor of that party after a trial.
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