Mont. Indep. Living Project, Inc. v. City of Helena

• Citation: 479 P.3d 961,403 Mont. 81,2021 MT 14
• Decision Date: 26 January 2021
• Docket Number: DA 20-0247
• Parties: The MONTANA INDEPENDENT LIVING PROJECT, INC., a Montana Non-Profit Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The CITY OF HELENA, and John Does I-XXX, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

403 Mont. 81

479 P.3d 961

2021 MT 14

The MONTANA INDEPENDENT LIVING PROJECT, INC., a Montana Non-Profit Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.The CITY OF HELENA, and John Does I-XXX, Defendant and Appellee.

DA 20-0247

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: December 9, 2020

Decided: January 26, 2021

For Appellant: Michael C. Doggett, Doggett Law Offices, Missoula, Montana

For Appellee: Murry Warhank, Erin Lyndes, Jackson, Murdo & Grant, P.C., Helena, Montana Thomas J. Jodoin, City Attorney, Iryna O'Connor, Deputy City Attorney, Helena, Montana

Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 The Montana Independent Living Project, Inc. ("MILP") appeals the First Judicial District Court's dismissal of its claim that the City of Helena retaliated against it when the City lowered the priority of MILP's request for funding as a direct result of an unrelated discrimination complaint MILP had filed against the City. The District Court concluded that § 49-2-301, MCA, does not provide a cause of action to non-human entities and dismissed MILP as a plaintiff for lack of standing. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND¹

¶2 MILP is a state- and federal-funded non-profit corporation and center for independent living that advocates for people with disabilities in Montana. MILP requested funds from the City in 2014 to purchase a van to transport people with disabilities when City services were not available. The Helena Area Transportation Advisory Committee ("HATAC"), an informal committee of stakeholders that provides non-binding recommendations regarding transportation services to the City, advised the City that it ranked MILP's request as its first priority for funding.

¶3 On February 17, 2015, MILP and its Chief Executive Officer Robert Maffit filed a complaint ("Initial Complaint") with the Montana Human Rights Bureau ("HRB") alleging the City's public transit system had discriminated against people with disabilities by segregating them from others in a new series of bus routes. In a subsequent meeting to establish the City's Transit Development Plan, the City Commission ranked a fixed-route bus line project ahead of MILP's van request, departing from its typical practice of following the HATAC's recommendations. Despite the subordinate ranking, the Montana Department of Transportation funded MILP's request. MILP then voluntarily dismissed its Initial Complaint and filed a new complaint with the HRB. The new complaint ("Retaliation Complaint") alleged that the City violated § 49-2-301, MCA, when, as a direct consequence of MILP's Initial Complaint, it retaliated against MILP by not prioritizing its request for funding.

¶4 As part of its own investigation, MILP filed an open records request with the City, resulting in the discovery of e-mails and other communications it alleges show animus and discriminatory behavior toward MILP and Maffit. MILP claims "[t]he e-mails and the City's other actions showed that the City engaged in a coordinated effort to discredit MILP and the HATAC." The HRB in its decision, however, found no reasonable cause to believe the City had retaliated against either MILP or Maffit. The HRB further concluded that, as a corporation, MILP did not have standing to file a retaliation complaint under § 49-2-301, MCA.

¶5 MILP and Maffit then brought an action in the District Court. The amended complaint alleged retaliation and sought a judicial determination that the HRB's decision was unlawful, incorrect, and an abuse of discretion. MILP moved for partial summary judgment regarding non-human entities’ ability to file retaliation complaints under the Montana Human Rights Act ("MHRA"). The City moved to dismiss MILP as a plaintiff and the retaliation count for failure to state a claim. The District Court granted the City's motion to dismiss on November 18, 2019; it concluded that § 49-2-301, MCA, does not allow non-human entities to sue for retaliation and MILP thus had no standing.

¶6 MILP petitioned this Court for supervisory control of the District Court's ruling, which we denied. See Maffit v. Mont. First Judicial Dist. Ct. , OP 20-0201, 400 Mont. 556 (Apr. 14, 2020). Maffit then voluntarily dismissed his complaint, and the District Court issued its final Judgment. MILP appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 "We review de novo a district court's ruling on a M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." Hein v. Sott , 2015 MT 196, ¶ 7, 380 Mont. 85, 353 P.3d 494 (citation omitted). "The correct interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo." Bates v. Neva , 2014 MT 336, ¶ 9, 377 Mont. 350, 339 P.3d 1265 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

¶8 May a non-human entity file a complaint for retaliation under the Montana Human Rights Act, § 49-2-301, MCA ?

¶9 The MHRA provides broad protection from discrimination. Bates , ¶ 26. The MHRA includes retaliation against an individual as a prohibited discriminatory practice:

It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for a person, educational institution, financial institution, or governmental entity or agency to discharge, expel, blacklist, or otherwise discriminate against an individual because the individual has opposed any practices forbidden under this chapter or because the individual has filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation or proceeding under this chapter.

Section 49-2-301, MCA. "Person" is defined broadly to include "one or more individuals, labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated employees’ associations, employers, employment agencies, organizations, or labor organizations." Section 49-2-101(18), MCA. The MHRA does not define "individual."

¶10 The District Court concluded that § 49-2-301, MCA, does not provide standing to non-human entities to file retaliation claims because the legislature explicitly chose to use the word "individual" instead of "person" in that provision. It disagreed with MILP that this interpretation would lead to an absurd result because "[i]t is consistent with the traditional notion of standing. That is, while an advocacy group may file a discrimination claim on behalf of an individual or persons, an individual, not an organization, must show that illegal retaliation is directed at that individual complainant." MILP argues that the District Court's conclusion is erroneous because it does not comport with the MHRA's broad purpose and legislative history or with federal authority that supports a broad implied right of action for retaliation.

¶11 When engaging in the construction of a statute, we look first to its plain language. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. State , 2009 MT 5, ¶ 20, 348 Mont. 333, 201 P.3d 132 (citations omitted). Language that is clear and unambiguous, using words’ plain and ordinary meanings, requires no further interpretation. Gannett , ¶ 20 (citation omitted); Bates , ¶ 15 (citation omitted). Our role is "simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted." Section 1-2-101, MCA. We also construe statutory language as a whole and in light of its surrounding sections to avoid conflicting interpretations. Mont. Sports Shooting Ass'n v. State , 2008 MT 190, ¶ 11, 344 Mont. 1, 185 P.3d 1003 (citations omitted). We avoid constructions "that render[ ] any section of the statute superfluous or fail[ ] to give effect to all of the words used." Gannett , ¶ 19 ; § 1-2-101, MCA ("Where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.").

¶12 The plain language of § 49-2-301, MCA, clearly and unambiguously prohibits a "person" from retaliating against an "individual" because "the individual has opposed any practices forbidden under this chapter or because the individual has" participated in a human rights matter. (Emphasis added.) By using both "person" and "individual," this provision draws a distinction between the class of actors that potentially could retaliate—any "person"—and the class of discrimination victims against whom retaliation is prohibited—any "individual." See § 1-2-101, MCA ; see also, e.g., Zinvest, LLC v. Gunnersfield Enters. , 2017 MT 284, ¶ 26, 389 Mont. 334, 405 P.3d 1270 (quoting Gregg v. Whitefish City Council , 2004 MT 262, ¶ 38, 323 Mont. 109, 99 P.3d 151 ) ("Different language is to be given different construction."); accord Densley v. Dep't of Ret. Sys. , 162 Wash.2d 210, 219, 173 P.3d 885, 889 (2007) (citations omitted) ("When the legislature uses two different terms in the same statute, courts presume the legislature intends the terms to have different meanings."). Because "person" includes both "individuals" and non-human entities under the MHRA, § 49-2-101(18), MCA, a construction that included non-human entities in a definition of "individual" would be redundant and impermissibly render that term superfluous. Bates , ¶ 18 ; see Formicove, Inc. v. Burlington N., Inc. , 207 Mont. 189, 194, 673 P.2d 469, 471 (1983) (citation omitted) ("We must assume that the legislature does not perform idle acts."). Applying the MHRA's explicit definition to the plain language of the retaliation statute, the term "individual" undoubtedly has a different and more limited meaning than the term "person." Giving effect to all of the statute's words, we conclude that the more limited meaning clearly and unambiguously excludes non-human entities.

¶13 MILP argues that because § 49-2-501(1), MCA, allows a "person" aggrieved by a discriminatory practice to file a complaint under the MHRA, use of the word "individual" in § 49-2-301, MCA, is irrelevant. But MILP misreads the operative language of § 49-2-501(1), MCA. Title 49, Chapter 2, Part 5, MCA, provides the "Enforcement" mechanisms for illegal discrimination: "[a] person claiming to be aggrieved by any...