Montague v. State
Decision Date | 31 May 1948 |
Docket Number | 4500 |
Citation | 211 S.W.2d 879,213 Ark. 575 |
Parties | Montague v. State |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied June 28, 1948.
Appeal from Craighead Circuit Court, Jonesboro District; Zal B Harrison, Judge.
Affirmed.
Wils Davis, Eugene Sloan and Arthur L. Adams, for appellant.
Guy E. Williams, Attorney General, and Oscar E Ellis, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
OPINION
Appellant, Walter Montague, was charged with murder in the first degree by shooting a Negro, Ralph Donaldson, with a thirty-eight calibre pistol and killing him. He was convicted of murder in the second degree and his punishment assessed at twenty-one years in the State Penitentiary. From the judgment is this appeal.
For reversal, appellant has set out in his motion for a new trial thirteen assignments of alleged errors, which he has grouped in the following propositions:
Before considering these "propositions," which we shall presently do in their inverse order, we examine assignments 1, 2, 3, and 11, which, in effect, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant admitted that he killed the deceased, but claimed that he did so in his necessary self-defense.
Appellant's victim, Ralph Donaldson, at the time he was killed, was 28 years of age, had been married about 7 years, and had one child about four weeks old. He was of slender build and weighed about 140 pounds. His wife testified that on September 21, 1947, at about 7:15 p. m., Gladys and Byrnis Montague, sister and brother of appellant, drove to the home of the deceased and asked for him. Ralph had worked until 12 o'clock the preceding night, had gone to bed at 2:30 that afternoon and was still in bed. He got up, put on a khaki shirt and trousers, and after Gladys told him appellant wanted to see him at his office, Ralph went off in the car with them. His wife never saw him again until she viewed his body at Gregg's Mortuary. The deceased had worked for appellant since his marriage, or for about 7 years, but had quit working for him approximately two days before he was killed.
W. E. Robbins, a police officer, testified that he, in company with Officer Cole, went to appellant's office a few minutes after the shooting:
Officer Cole corroborated Robbins' testimony.
Gladys Montague testified (appellant's brief): and "
While appellant did not, in oral arguments or in his brief, seriously argue that the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdict, we have carefully examined it all and find it amply warranted the jury's action. It would serve no purpose to detail more of the testimony.
No complaint is made by appellant as to any of the instructions.
We come now to consider the three grouped propositions, supra.
The record reflects that Mr. Spencer, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in opening the argument for the State used this language, over the objections and exceptions of appellant:
Mr. Hale, Prosecuting Attorney, who closed the argument for the State, used the following language:
At this point, the record discloses:
We are unable to say that the above language used by State's counsel was not warranted on the facts or that it was prejudicial to appellant's rights. Some of the statements were but expressions of counsel's opinion and others were supported by the facts. It is undisputed in this case that appellant had killed two men (including Ralph Donaldson) and shot a third. In fact, appellant himself so testified.
In these circumstances, we think the trial jury, possessing all the qualifications required under our statutes (§§ 8312 and 8314, Pope's Digest), that is "electors of good character, of approved integrity, sound judgment and reasonable information," could not have been misled,...
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...the general reputation of the deceased and that inquiry should not be permitted concerning specific acts or conduct. Montague v. State, 213 Ark. 575, 211 S.W.2d 879 (1948). Even when directed toward a defendant, rather than to the deceased as in this case, evidence of prior similar offenses......
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