Montague v. State

• Decision Date: 01 February 1968
• Docket Number: No. 137,137
• Citation: 3 Md.App. 66,237 A.2d 816
• Parties: Douglas MONTAGUE v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 66

3 Md.App. 66

237 A.2d 816

Douglas MONTAGUE v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 137.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 1, 1968.

J. Thomas Nissel, Ellicott City, for appellant.

Henry J. Frankel, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Richard J. Kinlein and Cornelius J. Helfrich, State's Atty. and Asst. State's Atty., for Howard County, respectively, Ellicott City, on brief, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH and THOMPSON JJ.

ANDERSON, Judge.

On May 4, 1967, the appellant, Douglas Montague, was convicted of manslaughter by automobile in the Circuit Court for Howard County, Judge James Macgill sitting without a jury. Appellant was sentenced to three years in the Maryland House of Correction.

Appellant's sole contention raised on this appeal is that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction.

On February 4, 1967, at approximately 7:30 a. m., Mr. Lester John Cuffley, Jr., was driving a truck northbound on U. S. Route #1 nearing the intersection with Maryland Route #175, traveling between 40-45 miles per hour, in a 53 mile per hour speed zone. He observed in his rear view mirror a car approaching his rear 'pretty fast' and swerving from the slow to fast lane, riding over the broken line, going back and forth 'like somebody playing with the wheel, pulling it back and forth.' When the vehicle neared him, he observed two occupants, a man driving and a woman passenger. He first though that the car, an Oldsmobile, was going to collide with the rear of his truck, but it awerved away and then back toward the truck causing Cuffley to believe a collision would occur with the side of the truck. The Oldsmobile 'then shot straight away from me like somebody would turn a wheel real fast,' crossed the solid yellow line separating the north and southbound lanes, and struck a Studebaker in the southbound slow lane. Mr. Cuffley stopped his truck and got out. He observed the driver of the Oldsmobile get out from the driver's side, call to the woman passenger, who also got out, and both ran from the scene. The man had covered his face with his hands but removed his hands when about six feet from Mr. Cuffley when calling to his passenger, and he viewed the driver's face for approximately 10-12 seconds.

In court, Mr. Cuffley positively identified the appellant as the driver of the Oldsmobile.

James Thompson testified that he arrived on the scene immediately after the collision and observed a male and female running from the Oldsmobile. As they fled the scene, Mr. Thompson called to the male to stop, when he was twenty-five feet away, but he continued his flight.

Mr. Thompson identified the appellant in court and had also picked him from a lineup at the Waterloo Barracks on the same day as the accident.

Trooper Daniel Earl Stanton testified that he had stopped the appellant at a Transit Truck Stop, south of Laurel on U. S. Route #1, between 6:50 a. m. and 7:10 a. m. on February 4, 1967. Appellant was driving an Oldsmobile, traveling south and weaving in the slow lane. Appellant did not have an operator's license. Trooper Stanton charged him with operating a motor vehicle without a license and informed him that he would have to leave the car there and take a cab or bus home. There was an odor of alcohol noted on appellant's breath, but he was not charged with drunken driving. After the trooper left, the appellant completely disregarded the admonition and continued to operate the vehicle.

The accident investigators established that the point of impact was in the center of the slow southbound lane, approximately eighteen feet from the center line. No skid marks were noted leading up to the point of impact; however, a side skid mark of one hundred and forty feet was observed leading away from the point of impact to the Oldsmobile. The Studebaker had been shoved backwards thirty feet from the point of impact. The Oldsmobile struck the Studebaker on the driver's side at the left door. The force of impact caused the Studebaker to completely reverse its direction of transit.

Paul C. Garner, the operator of the Studebaker, died as a result of multiple traumatic injuries, including a fractured neck sustained in this accident.

Article 27, § 388 of the Annotated Code of Maryland states:

'Every person causing the death of another as the result of the driving, operation or control of an automobile, motor vehicle, * * * or other vehicle in a grossly negligent manner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor to be known as 'manslaughter by automobile' * * *.'

The applicable test discerning whether the standard 'in a grossly negligent manner' of the statute stands violated or not has been established through a succession of cases to be as initially enunciated in State of Maryland v. Chapman, D.C., 101 F.Supp. 335 at 341 (1951), where the court said 'whether the conduct of the defendant, considering all the factors of the case, was such that it amounted to a 'wanton or reckless disregard for human life'.'

This doctrine was also followed in Hughes v. State, 198 Md. 424, 432, 84 A.2d 419 (1951); Duren v. State, 203 Md. 584, 588, 102 A.2d 277 (1954); Thomas v. State, 206 Md. 49, 51, 109 A.2d 909 (1954); Clay v. State, 211 Md. 577, 584, 128 A.2d 634 (1957); Lilly v. State, 212 Md. 436, 442, 129 A.2d 839 (1957); Johnson v. State, 213 Md. 527, 531, 132 A.2d 853 (1957); Abe v. State, 230 Md. 439, 440, 187 A.2d 467 (1963); and Wasileski v. State, 241 Md. 323, 324, 216 A.2d 551 (1966).

In Hughes v. State, supra, fast driving and swerving the vehicle toward a group of people, without an intent to harm, was sufficient to establish conduct constituting a wanton or reckless disregard for human life.

In Duren v. State, supra, 203 Md. at 590, 102 A.2d at 281, the Court of Appeals speaking through Judge Hammond (presently Chief Judge) stated:

'If there is found such lack of control, whether by reason of speed or otherwise, in a place and at a time when there is constant potentiality of injury as a result, there can be found a wanton and reckless disregard of the rights and lives of others and so, criminal indifference to consequences.'

The lessening of the control of the vehicle by reason of speed in the environment of a city street sufficiently established the gross...