Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran

Decision Date08 June 1984
Docket NumberNo. 83-164,83-164
Citation41 St.Rep. 906,210 Mont. 38,682 P.2d 163
PartiesMONTANA COALITION FOR STREAM ACCESS, INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, and Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, and the State of Montana, Involuntary Plaintiffs and Respondents, and The Montana Department of State Lands, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dennis Michael CURRAN, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver, Alexander Blewett, III, argued, Great Falls, for Curran.

Goetz, Madden & Dunn, James H. Goetz, argued, Bozeman, for Mont. Coalition for Stream Access.

Stan Bradshaw, argued, Helena, for Dept. of Fish, Wildlife & Parks.

John F. North, argued, Helena, for Dept. of State Lands.

Albert Stone, U of M Law School, Missoula, Vincent J. Kozakiewicz, Nat. Wildlife Fed. and Mont. Wildlife Federation, Missoula, Daniel C. Murphy, Mont. Stock & Wool Growers, Helena, Berg, Coil, Stokes, Follefson, P.C.,Michael Coil, Doug McClelland, Mont. Trout Unlimited, Bozeman, for amicus curiae.

HASWELL, Chief Justice.

Appellant D. Michael Curran ("Curran"), appeals a Rule 54(b)-certified partial summary judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs, Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. ("Coalition"), the State of Montana, the Montana Department of State Lands and the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks. The District Court held that the public have a right to use waters and the streambed of the Dearborn River up to the high water mark as it flows through Curran's property and that the State of Montana owns the streambed between the low water marks. The District Court also dismissed Curran's counterclaim for inverse condemnation. We affirm.

The Dearborn River is approximately sixty-six miles long and originates along the east slope of the Continental Divide in west-central Montana. The river flows generally in a southeasterly direction from its source near Scapegoat Mountain, approximately thirty miles southwest of Augusta, Montana, to the Missouri River.

The first twenty miles of the Dearborn is through mountains and canyon terrain, roughly twelve miles of which is within the Scapegoat Wilderness. After it leaves the Wilderness area, the river emerges onto rolling plains and continues its flow for about twenty-nine miles, where it again enters a moderately timbered region. It then extends another seventeen miles and enters the Missouri River near Craig, Montana.

The Coalition is a nonprofit Montana corporation formed to promote public access to Montana's rivers. Individual members of the Coalition use the stretch of the Dearborn running through Curran's property for recreational pursuits such as floating and fishing. Some members of the Coalition who have floated or attempted to float the Dearborn have experienced interference and harassment from Curran or his agents.

Curran and Curran Oil Co., of which he is a principal stockholder, have extensive land holdings in Lewis and Clark and Cascade Counties. Curran also holds leases to some state lands through which the Dearborn flows. Approximately six to seven miles of the Dearborn flows through property owned or controlled by Curran. About four and one-half sections of Curran's land on the Dearborn are immediately upstream from the point at which U.S. Highway 287 crosses the Dearborn and about six and one-half sections, including one isolated section, are downstream from Highway 287.

Curran claims title to the banks and streambed of a portion of the Dearborn River and claims to have the right, as an owner of private property, to restrict its use.

The District Court essentially held that the Dearborn River is in fact navigable for recreation purposes under Montana law; that recreation access to it is determined by state law according to one criterion--namely, navigability for recreation purposes; and that the question of recreational access is to be determined according to state, not federal, law.

The following issues are raised by the parties:

1. Whether the District Court erred in its application of the federal test of navigability for title purposes.

2. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of navigability of the Dearborn.

3. Whether the District Court erred in determining that recreational use and fishing make a stream navigable.

4. Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Curran's counterclaim for inverse condemnation.

5. Whether the claims of the Coalition, the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks and the Department of State Lands should have been dismissed for failure to name indispensable parties under Rule 19, M.R.Civ.P.

6. Whether the Coalition has standing to bring this action.

7. Whether the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

8. Whether Montana has adopted the log-floating test of commercial navigability.

9. Whether the Dearborn River is navigable under the federal commercial use test.

I

The first issue to be addressed is whether the District Court erred in its application of the federal test of navigability for title purposes.

Curran maintains that the District Court erred by misconstruing the law to be applied in determining the navigability of the Dearborn at the time Montana was admitted to the Union.

The United States Supreme Court has held, and all parties agree, that federal law controls the issue of navigability for title purposes. Brewer-Elliott Oil and Gas Company v. United States (1922), 260 U.S. 77, 43 S.Ct. 60, 67 L.Ed. 140.

Federal law on navigability for title purposes provides that rivers are navigable in law which are navigable in fact. The Daniel Ball (1870), 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 19 L.Ed. 999. "And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water." The Daniel Ball, supra, at 563. In 1874, the United States Supreme Court elaborated on its holding in The Daniel Ball, supra, and stated that "... the true test of navigability of a stream does not depend on the mode by which commerce is, or may be, conducted, nor the difficulties attending navigation. If this were so, the public would be deprived of the use of many of the large rivers of the country... The capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a river, rather than the extent and manner of that use." The Montello (1874), 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 22 L.Ed. 391.

Navigability in fact under federal law can be determined by the log-floating test. The Montello, supra; Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (9th Cir.1982), 681 F.2d 1134, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1769, 76 L.Ed.2d 343 (1983); State of Oregon v. Riverfront Protection Association (9th Cir.1982), 672 F.2d 792. In Riverfront Protection Association, supra, the McKenzie River was declared navigable despite the fact that log drives could only be conducted during April, May and early June.

The evidence in this case, supplied by the affidavits of two competent historians, demonstrates that the Dearborn River was used in 1887, two years before Montana statehood, to float approximately 100,000 railroad ties. Furthermore, in 1888 and 1889, one or two log drives per year were floated down the Dearborn. One drive in 1888 contained 700,000 board feet. Clearly, the Dearborn satisfied the log-floating test for navigability under the federal test of navigability for title purposes.

Since the Dearborn was navigable under the log-floating test at the time of statehood in 1889, title to the riverbed was owned by the federal government prior to statehood and was transferred to the State of Montana upon admission to the Union.

The landmark case dealing with state and federal ownership of beds underlying navigable waters is Martin v. Waddell (1842), 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 10 L.Ed. 997. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Chief Justice Taney stated, "For when the Revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the constitution to the general government." Waddell, supra.

Under English common law, the crown owned only the beds of waters which were (1) below the high water mark, (2) navigable and (3) affected by the ebb and flow of the tide. Title to nontidal beds was prima facie in the owner of the share to the thread of the stream, usque ad filum aquae. In 1851 the Supreme Court held that admiralty jurisdiction extended to nontidal waters. The Genesee Chief (1851), 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 13 L.Ed. 1058. In 1876, in Barney v. Keokuk (1876), 94 U.S. 324, 24 L.Ed. 224, Genesee Chief, supra, was applied to hold that the states owned the beds to nontidal navigable waters.

States admitted to the Union subsequent to the original thirteen succeeded to the same rights on the theory that the lands acquired by the United States from the original thirteen colonies or from foreign governments were held in trust for the new states in order that they might be admitted on an equal footing with the original states. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan (1845), 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 11 L.Ed. 565.

As far as treatment of the lands still in a territorial status, the federal government exercised sovereignty. In Shively v. Bowlby (1894), 152 U.S. 1, 48-50, 14 S.Ct. 548, 566, 38 L.Ed. 331, the Supreme Court stated:

"By the Constitution, as is now well settled, the United States, having rightfully acquired the Territories, and being the only government which can impose laws upon them, have the entire dominion and sovereignty, national and municipal, Federal and state, over all the Territories, so...

To continue reading

Request your trial
31 cases
  • Pub. Lands Access Ass'n, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Madison Cnty.
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • January 15, 2014
    ...this claim, Kennedy argues our Stream Access Law is unconstitutional and challenges our decisions in Mont. Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 210 Mont. 38, 682 P.2d 163 (1984), and Mont. Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 211 Mont. 29, 684 P.2d 1088 (1984).¶62 Kennedy's argument f......
  • PPL MONTANA, LLC v. State
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • March 30, 2010
    ...passed to Montana when it became a state in 1889 pursuant to the "equal footing" doctrine. In Mont. Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 210 Mont. 38, 682 P.2d 163 (1984), we described this doctrine as The landmark case dealing with state and federal ownership of beds underlying nav......
  • Pub. Lands Access Ass'n, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Madison Cnty.
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • January 16, 2014
    ...this claim, Kennedy argues our Stream Access Law is unconstitutional and challenges our decisions in Mont. Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 210 Mont. 38, 682 P.2d 163 (1984), and Mont. Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 211 Mont. 29, 684 P.2d 1088 (1984). ¶ 62 Kennedy's argument......
  • State v. Meyers
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • January 31, 2020
    ...public has lawful access may not be abrogated. 415 Mich. 45, 327 N.W.2d 838, 871–72 (1982) ; see also Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran , 210 Mont. 38, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (1984) (holding that a private party may not interfere with traffic along a stream because "any surface water......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
12 books & journal articles
  • LOCATING LIABILITY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RECENT TRENDS IN CLIMATE JURISPRUDENCE.
    • United States
    • Environmental Law Vol. 50 No. 3, June 2020
    • June 22, 2020
    ...out of the atmosphere in order to avoid catastrophic, runaway climate change). (233) See, e.g., Mont. Coal, for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 172 (Mont. 1894) (declaring a snowmelt-fed river in Montana within the public trust doctrine); Public Engagement, CALIFORNIA STATE LANDS COM......
  • Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: the categorical and other "exceptions' to liability for Fifth Amendment takings of private property far outweigh the "rule".
    • United States
    • Environmental Law Vol. 29 No. 4, December 1999
    • December 22, 1999
    ...make no use of the land which would substantially impair the [public] trust"); see also Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (holding that there was no taking of surface waters held in the public trust irrespective of stream bed (206) Coastal Petrole......
  • Oregon's public trust doctrine: public rights in waters, wildlife, and beaches.
    • United States
    • Environmental Law Vol. 42 No. 1, January 2012
    • January 1, 2012
    ...30 P. 154, and Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)). (6) See, e.g., Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170-71 (Mont. 1984) (recognizing public rights to use all waters for recreational purposes without regard to bed ownership under the state consti......
  • § 12.2 - Lands Managed by the Department of Natural Resources
    • United States
    • Washington State Bar Association Washington Real Property Deskbook Series Volume 6: Land Use Development (WSBA) Chapter 12 State- Owned Public Lands
    • Invalid date
    ...the purpose of rights arising under state law, such as the right to float on the water. See Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 210 Mont. 38, 682 P.2d The United States Supreme Court has held that state ownership of lands underlying navigable waters arises under the United States......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT