Montañez-Allman v. Garcia-Padilla, CIVIL NO. 13-1683 (PG)
| Decision Date | 26 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 13-1683 (PG) |
| Parties | AGUSTIN MONTAÑEZ-ALLMAN, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. ALEJANDRO GARCIA-PADILLA, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Pending before the court is the unopposed motion to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants Alejandro Garcia-Padilla ("Garcia-Padilla), Elizabeth Lopez-Cabrera ("Lopez-Cabrera"), Eduardo Bhatia-Gautier ("Bhatia"), and Miguel Pereira-Castillo ("Pereira") (collectively, "Defendants").1 Docket No. 66. After carefully considering the Defendants' arguments, the court grants the motion for the reasons explained below.
Since the facts of this case have been stated in previous decisions, the court only briefly recapitulates them here. See e.g. Docket Nos. 18 and 36.
In March of 2010, former Puerto Rico Governor Luis Fortuño-Burset ("Fortuño"), of the New Progressive Party ("NPP"), appointed Augustin Montañez-Allman ("Montañez" or "Plaintiff") as Veteran's Advocate pursuant to Law No. 57-1987. During Fortuño's administration, the Puerto Rico Legislature enacted Reorganization Plan No. 1-2011, known as the Advocate Office Reorganization Plan ("Plan No. 1"), which consolidated the administrative functions and duties of four existing ombudsmen offices, including the Veteran's, under the Advocate Office Administration ("AOA" or "OAP" for its Spanish acronym). Plan No. 1 created the "Office of the Veteran's Advocate;" vested the Agency's head with rule-making and decision-making authority; established a fixed term of appointment for the Advocate position, and placed limitations on the governor's removal power. In June 2011, Fortuño reappointed Montañez as Veteran's Advocate for a ten-year term, to expire in 2021.
After the November 2012 General Elections, Garcia-Padilla, of the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"), became governor. In July of 2013, the Legislature enacted Law 75-2013 ("Law 75") and Law No. 79-2013 ("Law 79").2 The former repealed Plan No. 1, and the latter purported to create a new VA Office, now called the "Office of the Veterans Advocate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico."3 The second amended complaint states that the new Advocate position was undistinguishable to that supposedly eliminated: the governor's pick would have nearly identical functions, duties and responsibilities, enjoy similar privileges and remain term-limited. See Docket No. 12 at ¶¶ 23-26.
Plaintiff alleges that in August of 2013, he received several letters from Garcia-Padilla pertaining to the transition process between the "extinct" VA Office and the "new" one. Id. at ¶¶ 31-35. During this time, Plaintiff worked on the transition alongside members of Garcia-Padilla's Transition Committee. Id. at ¶¶ 31-35. Apparently, he was never advised of his imminent removal. Id. However, on August 28, 2013, Plaintiff received written notice of co-defendant Lopez-Cabrera's appointment as Acting Veteran's Advocate under Law 79. See id. at ¶ 38. On that same date, Garcia-Padilla's Chief of Staff, Ingrid Vila, asked Montañez to surrender control of the VA Office. The instant action soon followed.
On October 6, 2013, Montañez filed the second amended complaint (or the "amended complaint") against Garcia-Padilla and other PDP Defendants alleging violations of his rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Puerto Rico law. See Docket No. 12. Montañez's wife and their children joined as plaintiffs for purposes of the state law claims. See id. at 2. The complaint included a preliminary injunction request, which the court granted on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. See Docket No. 36. Defendants appealed. On April 1, 2015, the First Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case with instructions to vacate the preliminary injunction so that Plaintiff could file suit in Puerto Rico court. See Montanez-Allman v. Garcia-Padilla, 782 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2015). The First Circuit explained that in light of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's opinion in Díaz-Carrasquillo v. García-Padilla, 2014 TSPR 75, 2014 WL 3013335 (P.R. 2014) (), Plaintiff would not suffer irreparable injury if denied federal injunctive relief. See Montanez-Allman, 782 F.3d at 45-46. On April 28, 2015, this court dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment claims.4 See Dockets Nos. 56 and 57.
Mainly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired among themselves to deprive him of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 by removing him from the Advocate post solely because of his political affiliation to the NPP. See Docket No. 12 at ¶¶ 49 and 54. Defendants move for dismissal of the amended complaint in its entirety under Rule 12(b)(6). See Docket No. 66. Defendants mostly argue that Plaintiff's claim fails because political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the Advocate position. Id. at 11-16. In addition, Defendants (save for Col. Lopez) have raised official, qualified, absolute or Eleventh Amendment immunity.5 Id. at 27-34.
Against this background, the court parses the legal standard applicable to the matter at hand.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. "To avoid dismissal, a complaint must provide 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Garcia-Catalan v. U.S., 734 F.3d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under this rule, the court must "ask 'whether the complaint "states a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," accepting the plaintiff's factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.'" Cooper v. Charter Communications Entertainments I, LLC, 760 F.3d 103, 106 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Maloy v. Ballori-Lage, 744 F.3d 250, 252 (1st Cir. 2014)). The court "may augment these facts and inferences with data points gleaned from documents incorporated by reference into the complaint, matters of public record, and facts susceptible to judicial notice." A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011)).
"To cross the plausibility threshold, the plaintiff must 'plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Cooper, 760 F.3d at 106 (citing Maloy, 744 F.3d at 252). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ... , on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) ... ." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, courts employ a two-pronged analysis. First, we identify and disregard statements in the complaint that consist of legal conclusions couched as facts. See Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679); see also Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 266 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (court "need not accept as true legal conclusions from the complaint or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement"). Then, all the "[n]on-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint must then be treated as true, even if seemingly incredible." Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664-664.
In the instant case, Montañez's federal claims are based on Section 1983, which "provides a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States when that deprivation takes place 'under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.'" Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Moreover, "Section 1983 is the conventional vehicle through which relief is sought for claims of political discrimination by state actors." Garcia-Gonzalez v. Puig-Morales, 761 F.3d 81, 92 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013)).
To prevail in a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plausibly plead three elements: deprivation of a right, a causal connection between the actor and the deprivation, and state action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2009). To establish the second (or causation) element, plaintiff must sufficiently allege: (1) that the actions of the defendant deprived him or her of a protected right, and (2) "that the defendant's conduct was intentional, grossly negligent, or amounted to a reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights." Concepcion v. Municipality of Gurabo, 558 F. Supp. 2d 149, 162 (D.P.R. 2007). Furthermore, the complaint's allegations must show the link between each particular defendant and the federal right violation. See González-Piña v. Rodríguez, 407 F.3d 425, 432 (1st Cir. 2005). A plaintiff may do so by indicating any "personal action or inaction [by the defendants] within the scope of [their] responsibilities that would make [them] personally answerable in damages under Section 1983." Pinto v. Nettleship, 737 F.2d 130, 133 (1st Cir. 1984).
Montañez alleges he was the victim of political discrimination. As we know, the First Amendment "insulates public employees who hold non-policymaking positions from...
To continue reading
Request your trial