Montford v. State
| Decision Date | 15 January 1916 |
| Docket Number | (No. 210.) |
| Parties | MONTFORD. v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error from Superior Court, Laurens County; J. L. Kent, Judge.
Ed Montford was convicted of murder, and brings error. Reversed.
W. D. McNeil, of Macon, and R. Earl Camp, P. S. Twitty, Geo. B. Davis, and S. P. New, all of Dublin, for plaintiff in error.
E. L. Stephens, Sol. Gen., of Wrightsville, Clifford Walker, Atty Gen., and Mark Bold-ing, of Atlanta, for the State.
BECK, J. Ed Montford and John Gard ner were jointly indicted for the murder of Herschel Beacham. Upon the trial of Montford a verdict of guilty, with a recommendation that he be imprisoned for life, was rendered. John Gardner was the only eye witness to the killing, introduced on the trial. Numerous other witnesses testified to facts claimed by the state to be corroborative of the evidence of Gardner, and the record is swollen to large proportions with evidence offered to establish certain facts contended by the state to be corroborative of the sole eyewitness to the homicide. The defendant contended that Gardner was shown to be an accomplice, and insisted that no conviction could be had unless this witness was corroborated in one of the ways required by law for the corroboration of an accomplice. The state insisted, on the other hand, that Gardner, though he was present and did certain acts which might have made him a principal or an accomplice, performed those acts under duress, and that, having participated in the crime under duress, he was not an accomplice. After a conviction the defendant moved for a new trial; and, the motion having been overruled, he excepted.
1. The court did not err in refusing to give the following in charge to the jury:
The court gave section 1017 of the Penal Code, and also instructed the jury that:
"Participation in the commission of the same criminal act, and in the execution of a common criminal intent, is necessary to render one criminal in a legal sense—an accomplice of another."
This charge of the court gave the jury sufficient information as to what would constitute an accomplice, to enable them to determine, under the facts of the case, whether Gardner was an accomplice or not.
2. Under the evidence it was a question for the jury to determine whether Gardner, the principal witness for the state, was an accomplice and participated in the crime; the defendant contending that he was an accomplice, and the state contending that he was not an accomplice, because of the fact that the acts which constituted his participation in the commission of the homicide were committed under coercion of threats and menaces. Upon this subject counsel for the accused in writing requested the court to give the following charge:
"Where the state claims that any witness is not an accomplice, and the defendant, on the other hand, claims that the witness is an accomplice, because of duress, and the defendant claims that there was no duress, then it becomes a question of fact for the jury to settle and determine as to whether or not the witness was an acomplice, and as to whether or not such witness acted under duress; and in determining this question the jury can look to all the facts and circumstances of the case; and before the jury should find that the witness was forced by duress to take the part that he did take, provided the jury believe that he did in fact take a part, the jury ought to believe that the force or duress was of such a nature as to excite in the mind of such a witness a reasonable fear that his life was in danger, or that a felony was about to be committed upon him, and the facts and circumstances ought to be sufficient to cause the jury to believe that such witness was not guilty of any crime or offense."
In section 41 of the Penal Code it is provided:
"A person committing a crime or misdemeanor under threats or menaces, which sufficiently show that his life or member was in danger, or that he had reasonable cause to believe, and did actually believe, that his life or member was in danger, shall not be found guilty; and such threats and menaces being proved and established, the person compelling, by said threats and menaces, the commission of the offense, shall be considered a principal, and suffer the same punishment as if he had perpetrated the offense."
Upon comparison of the request to charge with the Code section just quoted, it will be seen that the requested instruction was in the main a correct statement of the law upon this subject. The threats and menaces which will excuse a person committing a crime under this influence are such as put him in...
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Montford v. State
...87 S.E. 797 144 Ga. 582 MONTFORD v. STATE. No. 210.Supreme Court of GeorgiaJanuary 15, Syllabus by the Court. In the charge as given by the court the jury were sufficiently informed as to what would constitute an accomplice, and the failure to give the instruction contained in a written req......