Montgomery Cnty. v. Gang
| Decision Date | 08 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 768,768 |
| Parties | MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND v. PETER GANG |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT - WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION - READJUSTMENT - LIMITATION ON RETROACTIVE ADJUSTMENT OF RATE OF COMPENSATION
The Workers' Compensation Commission's broad revisory power under Maryland Code, Labor & Employment Article ("LE"), § 9-736(b) does not permit the Commission to retroactively readjust the rate of compensation of an award already paid. The revisory power is limited by statute to future awards where a statutory circumstance required under LE 9-736(a) exists, such as aggravation, diminution or termination of disability.
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 423509V
REPORTED
*Eyler, Deborah S., Shaw Geter, Raker, Irma, S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Shaw Geter, J.
*Eyler, Deborah S., J., participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; she participated in the adoption of this opinion as a retired, specially assigned member of this Court.
In 2012, the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission awarded Peter Gang compensation for an injury he sustained while employed with Montgomery County. The rate of pay, however, was incorrectly calculated, as it failed to recognize Mr. Gang's status as a "public safety officer," which entitled him to higher compensation. Four years later he filed a "Request for Document Correction," whereupon the Commission issued an amended award that retroactively increased his rate of pay. On judicial review, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County affirmed the Commission's decision. Montgomery County timely appealed and presents us with the following question, which we have rephrased1:
Did the Commission err in retroactively modifying appellee's award of workers' compensation?
For the reasons stated below, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court.
Appellee Peter Gang was a correctional officer employed by Montgomery County, appellant. On September 17, 2011, Gang was accidentally injured at a facility and thereafter filed a workers' compensation claim. Following a hearing on April 26, 2012, the Workers' Compensation Commission issued a decision on May 2, 2012, which found Gang suffered a permanent partial disability and awarded him compensation at the rate of $157 a week, for 70 weeks.
The order, however, failed to recognize his status as a "public safety officer," under § 9-628 of the Labor and Employment Article, which entitled him to a higher rate of pay. Both parties agree the May 2, 2012 Order was error and that Gang initially received compensation at the incorrect rate.2 Neither party filed a motion for rehearing3 or appeal to the circuit court.4
Almost four years later, on March 22, 2016, a "Request for Document Correction" was filed by Gang's counsel regarding the 2012 case.5 The request alleged that Gang was paid at an incorrect rate. The Commission, on March 25, 2016, issued an amended award, retroactively modifying his compensation to $314 a week. Appellant objected to the Commission's actions because it had not been notified and filed a "Request for Rehearing" on April 6, 2016. Appellee then filed a request, on April 13, asking that the Commission "withdraw the Document Correction filed on 3/22/16, strike the Order issued on 3/25/16and set this case in for hearing on the issue of the correct weekly permanent partial disability rate in the 5/2/12 Order."
The Commission denied the County's "Request for Rehearing." The County then filed a second "Request for Rehearing" on April 21, 2016, and argued that in light of appellee's withdrawal of his initial Document Correction, the Commission should "rescind the order dated 3/25/16 that implemented that document correction and the denial of the rehearing request dated April 19, 2016."
Following a hearing on June 27, 2016, the Commission issued an order that affirmed the March 25, 2016 Order, finding it was a proper use of the Commission's "continuing jurisdiction" under Labor and Employment Section 9-736(b) of the Maryland Code.
Appellant filed a petition for an on the record judicial review in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, on July 26, 2016,6 and appellee filed a cross-appeal for a de novo review on August 9. Appellee also filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Judicial Review on October 18, 2016, which was opposed by appellant and denied by the court at a hearing on December 13, 2016. An on the record review of the Commission's findings was held on April 19, 2017, where counsel presented argument. The circuit court affirmed the decision of the Commission, memorialized in an order entered May 25, 2017. Appellant then brought this timely appeal.
With an Simmons v. Comfort Suites Hotel, 185 Md. App. 203, 224-25 (2009) (internal citation and quotation omitted). The reviewing court is "limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law." W.M. Schlosser Co. v. Uninsured Employers' Fund, 414 Md. 195, 204 (2010) (internal citation and quotation omitted). We examine the agency's decision "in the light most favorable to it" and "the agency's decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid." Id. at 205 (internal citation and quotation omitted). While an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute should "ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts," id., "[m]istaken interpretation of law, however honestly arrived at, are held not to be within the exercise of sound administrative discretion." Subsequent Injury Fund v. Baker, 40 Md. App. 339, 343 (1978) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
When interpreting the language of a statute, the primary goal is to "ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature." Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 571 (2006) (internal citation and quotation omitted). We first look to the statute's plain language,"giving it its natural and ordinary meaning" and "[w]e neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words." Id. at 571-72 (internal citation and quotation omitted). If the statutory provisions are "clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written." Md. Div. of Labor and Indus. v. Triangle Gen. Contractors, Inc., 366 Md. 407, 420 (2001) (internal citation and quotations omitted). In such circumstances, "no construction or clarification is needed or permitted, it being the rule that a plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to extend or limit the scope of its operation." Id. at 420-21 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Dept. of Labor, 356 Md. 180, 189 (1999) (internal quotations omitted)).
Section 9-736 of the Labor and Employment Article addresses the Workers' Compensation Commission's revisory power and states:
Appellant argues the Commission's retroactive award was in violation of its authority, relying on the language of the statute and the Court of Appeal's decision in Sealy Furniture of Maryland v. Miller, 356 Md. 462 (1999). Appellee, on the other hand, argues the modification was properly within the Commission's broad revisory power and, in support of his position, cites Subsequent Injury Fund v. Baker, 40 Md. App. 339 (1978) and Waters v. Pleasant Manor Nursing Home, 127 Md. App. 587 (1999). He claims the Commission "did not change a past rate of compensation," but rather "merely corrected a clerical mistake in the original Order."
In Sealy Furniture of Maryland v. Miller, the Court of Appeals addressed the limits of the Commission's revisory power. There, the Commission ordered Employer to pay permanent partial disability benefits and granted Employer's request for a credit reimbursing them for six months of mistaken payments to Employee, "the effect of which was to excuse any further payments."7 Sealy Furniture of Maryland, 356 Md. at 465.
On review, the Court of Appeals concluded the Commission did not have the authority to credit the overpayment against a new award. Id. at 467-68. "[A]lthough the revisory power of the Commission under § 9-736 is broad, it is not unlimited." Id. at 468. Further, "(the) Commission may not disregard other legislative directives, Jung v. Southland Corp., 351 Md. 165 [] (1998), or, indeed, the construction of the workers' compensation law by this Court." Id. The Court then stated that "if [overpayments are] to be corrected by allowing a recovery, either directly or in the form of a credit against another award, the Legislature will...
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