Montgomery Distributors, Inc. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 November 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1275,85-1275
• Citation: 505 So.2d 443,11 Fla. L. Weekly 2472
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2472 MONTGOMERY DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Appellant, v. G. HEILEMAN BREWING COMPANY, INC., etc., et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 443

505 So.2d 443

11 Fla. L. Weekly 2472

MONTGOMERY DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Appellant, v. G. HEILEMAN BREWING COMPANY, INC., etc., et al., Appellees.

No. 85-1275.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fourth District.

Nov. 26, 1986.

Rehearing Denied May 4, 1987.

Philip M. Burlington of Edna L. Caruso, P.A., and Montgomery, Searcy & Denney, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

C. Reed Guthridge and Andrew V. Showen of Foley & Lardner, Van Den Berg, Burke, Wilson & Arkin, Orlando, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

This is a non-final appeal from an order compelling arbitration. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(v), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Appellant, Montgomery Distributors (Montgomery) and appellee, Heileman Brewing Company (Heileman) entered into a wholesaler appointment agreement for the distribution of Heileman's malt liquor products. A dispute arose and Montgomery filed a four-count complaint against Heileman and William Thies & Sons, Inc. Counts I and II of Montgomery's complaint alleged causes of action based on breach of contract. Count III alleged a state antitrust action pursuant to section 542.18, Florida Statutes, stating that Thies and Heileman conspired to restrain trade or commerce in the market. Count IV alleged a monopoly action pursuant to section 542.19, Florida Statutes, stating that the appellees attempted to monopolize the wholesale malt liquor distribution market. Counts III and IV asked for treble damages, costs and attorney's fees pursuant to the state antitrust act.

In response to the complaint Heileman filed a motion for an order compelling arbitration relying upon paragraph 10 of the contract:

10.1 All controversies, disputes and claims of whatsoever nature and description between the parties hereto shall be settled by binding arbitration, upon demand of either party, in WHOLESALER'S state in a neutral location and in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association then in effect.

The trial judge granted Heileman's motion and this non-final appeal ensued.

The issue for our resolution is whether the trial court erred in compelling arbitration. We hold that it should not have compelled arbitration of the antitrust claims.

Appellant cites Sabates v. International Medical Centers, Inc., 450 So.2d 514 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), in support of its contention that the trial court erred when it ordered arbitration of the antitrust claims. In Sabates, the Third District quashed an order referring an antitrust claim to arbitration. The Third District recognized the policy favoring enforcement of agreements to arbitrate but also noted it was not without exceptions. The court followed the abundant federal authority available dealing with the arbitrability vel non of comparable federal antitrust claims.

Under federal law, antitrust claims are held to be not subject to arbitration. See, e.g. Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir.1978); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir.1974); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir.1968); American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 [2d Cir.1968]; Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F.Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y.1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 608, 54 L.Ed.2d 477 (1977). The oft-cited reasons underlying these uniform holdings are (1) because a wide range of public interests are affected by private antitrust claims, a "claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter," American Safety Equipment, 391 F.2d at 826; (2) the complexity of the issues and extensiveness of the evidence generally involved in antitrust litigation make resolution of these claims more appropriate for the judicial forum, id. at 827; (3) it is unwise to allow commercial arbitrators, "frequently men drawn for their business expertise ... to determine these issues of great public interest," id.; see Applied Digital, 576 F.2d 116; Cobb, 488 F.2d 41, 47; and (4) because arbitrators are not bound by rules of law and need not give reasons for their rulings, there is no way to insure consistency of interpretation of statutory law or application of arbitration awards. Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Products, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968, 237 N.E.2d 223 (1968).

450 So.2d at 517.

The court concluded, after giving due consideration and great weight to these federal authorities, particularly the American Safety decision (see quote above), that antitrust claims under the Florida statute are not a proper subject for arbitration but should be judicially determined instead.

We agree with the Third District that the policy favoring arbitration should give way to the policy that antitrust claims are better suited to be heard in the courts. We do not believe that there has been a shift from this policy despite recent U.S. Supreme Court cases dealing with the arbitrability of state securities claims and antitrust claims in international commercial agreements. In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of public policy favoring arbitration and ruled that claims under a state securities act, which were formerly nonarbitrable, are now subject to arbitration. See also Oppenheimer & Co. v. Young, 434 So.2d 369 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), affirmed, 456 So.2d 1175 (Fla.1984), vacated, 470 U.S. 1078, 105 S.Ct. 1830, 85 L.Ed.2d 131 (1985). In Mitsubishi...