Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Bell, 1264
Decision Date | 16 June 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 1264,1264 |
Parties | MONTGOMERY WARD & CO., INCORPORATED, v. Herman Charles BELL. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Alfred M. Porth, Baltimore, with whom were Theodore B. Cornblatt, S. Woods Bennett and Smith, Somerville & Case, Baltimore, on brief, for appellant.
Thomas V. Friedman, Baltimore, with whom were Joyce V. Seunarine and Rosen, Esterson & Friedman, Baltimore, on brief, for appellee.
Argued before MOYLAN, LOWE and WILNER, JJ.
On April 23, 1975, appellee suffered an accidental injury during the course of his employment with appellant. He filed a claim with the Workmen's Compensation Commission which, on September 23, 1977, conducted an evidentiary hearing to consider the nature and extent of appellee's disability. Following the hearing, the Commission referred appellee to its medical examiner (who, in turn, referred him to a neurosurgeon) for an evaluation of appellee's permanent disability. On February 16, 1978, the Commission awarded appellee permanent disability benefits for a 60% industrial loss of use of his body as the result of his accidental injury.
Appellant the employer appealed this decision to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, submitting the case for decision by the court (without a jury) on the record made before the Commission. No new or additional evidence was offered in the judicial proceeding. After reviewing the administrative record, the court, on August 1, 1979, affirmed the Commission's award. In its Memorandum Opinion, the court said:
Dissatisfied, appellant moved for a new trial. Quoting now from a stipulation entered into by the parties pursuant to Maryland Rule 1026(e):
Appellant presses its claim in this Court that the trial court applied an incorrect standard of review in affirming the Commission's award. This is based upon the proposition, inferred from the wording of the Memorandum Opinion, that the court viewed its role as being limited to a determination of whether the evidence before the Commission was sufficient to support its conclusion and not as encompassing the broader scope of review set forth in Md.Ann.Code art. 101, § 56(a).
We agree with appellant as to what the proper scope of review is in an accidental injury case. As to whether the trial court applied that test, the record, unfortunately, is not as clear as it could be; however, for the reasons we shall hereafter explain, we cannot say that the court applied an incorrect standard of review.
The standard, and scope, of judicial review of Workmen's Compensation Commission decisions is set forth primarily in sections 56(a) and (c) of art. 101. Section 56(c) provides, in relevant part, that "(i)n all court proceedings under or pursuant to this article, the decision of the Commission shall be prima facie correct and the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same." There is little dispute about the meaning or applicability of that provision.
Section 56(a) is quite lengthy and encompasses a number of matters pertaining to appeals from the Commission. The relevant parts, in terms of this proceeding, are as follows:
As the Court of Appeals noted in Md. Bureau of Mines v. Powers, 258 Md. 379, 265 A.2d 860 (1970), § 56(a), coupled with a provision in § 29 of art. 101, distinguishes between appeals involving occupational diseases and all other appeals (i. e., those involving accidental injuries) in terms of the scope of judicial review. In appeals involving accidental injuries, the reviewing court has very broad authority, notwithstanding the prima facie correctness of the administrative decision. This review, said the Court at p. 382, 265 A.2d 15 p. 862, "extends both to findings of fact and applicable law" and "provides for a trial which is essentially de novo." See also Dent v. Cahill, 18 Md.App. 117, 305 A.2d 233 (1973).
Where the appeal concerns an occupational disease, however, the General Assembly intended that Commission determinations be cloaked with a more pervasive degree of finality, necessarily restricting the revisionary authority of the court. At 258 Md. p. 383, 265 A.2d at p. 862 (omitting citations):
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