Montgomery Ward Stores v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 01 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 1596,1596
• Citation: 647 A.2d 1218,101 Md.App. 535
• Parties: MONTGOMERY WARD STORES et al. v. Frances WILSON. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 535

101 Md.App. 535

647 A.2d 1218

MONTGOMERY WARD STORES et al. v. Frances WILSON.

No. 1596, Sept. Term, 1993.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 28, 1994.

John B. Kaiser (McCarthy, Bacon & Costello, on the brief), Lanham, for appellant.

E. Gregory Lardieri, Greenbelt, for appellee.

Argued before ALPERT, GARRITY and FISCHER, JJ.

ALPERT, Judge.

Having been found liable for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, appellants, Montgomery Ward Stores and Jeffrey Bresnahan, appeal from a judgment entered by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County on a jury verdict in favor of appellee, Frances Wilson, in the amount of $15,000 in compensatory damages and $45,000 in punitive damages. Appellants raise the following issues on appeal:

I. The circuit court erred in failing to grant appellant's motion for judgment.

II. The trial court erroneously instructed the jury and erroneously permitted the jury to consider the issue of punitive damages.

III. The trial court erroneously excluded important evidence critical to appellant's defense.

Facts and Proceedings

In August 1987, the loss prevention department for the Montgomery Ward store in Temple Hills, Maryland, received complaints from customers regarding unauthorized credit charges on their monthly statements. Appellee was employed as a sales associate with Montgomery Ward from August through October of 1987. On September 4, 1987, she was approached by security guards, who stated that they wanted to interview her. Appellee proceeded upstairs to the office, where she was interviewed by Jeffrey Bresnahan, Montgomery Ward's loss prevention manager. She testified that Mr. Bresnahan asked if she "knew of anybody that's doing any stealing in the store." He then showed her "a couple of slips that had some signatures on them" and asked her if they were her signatures. Appellee denied ever having seen those credit card slips before. Later that day, appellee overheard Mr. Bresnahan say that she was lying and that he would get a warrant for her arrest.

In October 1987, while appellee was working in the store, a security guard and two Prince George's County Police Officers approached her. She was placed under arrest, handcuffed, and escorted out of the store in front of numerous customers and other employees. Appellee stated that she was "scared, nervous, humiliated, and embarrassed." Eventually, appellee was informed that she had been arrested on charges of credit card theft. The case against her was later "dismissed" in the District Court. As a result of the arrest, appellee lost her position with Montgomery Ward and had difficulty finding other employment. Appellee's mother, Mary Powell, testified that prior to this incident appellee had never been in any trouble with the law. She stated that after the arrest appellee's personality changed and her "nerves got real bad." Appellee's behavior returned to normal within a year, however.

Sandra Broadway was employed as a sales associate at Montgomery Ward during August and September of 1987. She and appellee were co-workers. She testified that Mr. Bresnahan interviewed her on September 2, 1987, regarding unauthorized credit card transactions that had been recorded on her cash register. She told him that appellee was the one responsible for making these credit card charges. Ms. Broadway stated that on several occasions appellee gave her slips of paper with account numbers written on them and asked her to charge merchandise to these accounts. According to Ms. Broadway, appellee said that she had permission to use these accounts because they belonged to her cousin or her sister. Ms. Broadway said that she accepted these charges from appellee, although appellee never presented a credit card. At trial, Ms. Broadway admitted that it was a violation of store policy to accept credit card charges without presentation of a credit card or a driver's license to verify the identity of the person making the charge.

Lisa Holmes was employed as a sales associate at Montgomery Ward in August and September of 1987. She testified that she saw appellee purchase merchandise from Ms. Broadway by giving her a piece of paper with a credit card number on it. She heard appellee say that the charge account belonged to her cousin. Ms. Holmes reported this incident to the loss prevention department when she was interviewed, although she stated that appellee had asked her not to report it.

Mr. Bresnahan testified that on August 26, 1987, he started an investigation into complaints of fraudulent credit card use. Based on his review of the register receipt tapes he determined that these fraudulent charges had all been recorded under Ms. Broadway's identification number. He initially suspected that Ms. Broadway was responsible for the fraudulent charges. When he interviewed Ms. Broadway, however, she told him that she had permitted appellee to make these charges on several occasions because appellee had claimed that she was authorized to use these credit card account numbers. Although Ms. Broadway's acceptance of these charges from appellee without presentation of a credit card or a driver's license was in violation of store policy, Mr. Bresnahan testified that no disciplinary action was taken against Ms. Broadway. He stated that he found "no problem" with the way Ms. Broadway had handled the credit charges at issue here. Rather, his interview with Ms. Broadway led him to investigate appellee as a suspect. He stated that when he interviewed appellee she was not cooperative and that her answers were "limited to one word, yes or no." Mr. Bresnahan then interviewed Ms. Holmes, who stated that she saw appellee charge items by presenting an account number on a piece of paper to Ms. Broadway. Ms. Holmes told Mr. Bresnahan that she heard appellee say that the account belonged to her cousin.

Mr. Bresnahan testified that the merchandise that was fraudulently charged included a full-figured sweater and a maternity bra. There was evidence that appellee is a petite woman who would probably not wear such clothing. No attempt was made to compare appellee's handwriting with any handwriting or signatures on the charge slips. Mr. Bresnahan consulted with the store management and a determination was made to press charges against appellee. No further investigation was undertaken. The application for the statement of charges was submitted to the Commissioner for Prince George's County and a warrant was issued for appellee's arrest. Appellee was arrested and the case was set for trial in the District Court. The charges were subsequently dismissed for reasons that are not apparent in the record. Appellee filed suit for false arrest and malicious prosecution. Appellants' motion for judgment was denied, and the jury verdict, in favor of appellee were entered. This appeal followed.

I. Malicious Prosecution

Appellants contend that the trial court erred by failing to grant their motion for judgment on the malicious prosecution count. The necessary elements for a claim of malicious prosecution are:

(a) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff,

(b) termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused,

(c) absence of probable cause for the proceeding, and

(d) malice, or a primary purpose in instituting the proceeding other than that of bringing an offender to justice.

Brewer v. Mele, 267 Md. 437, 440, 298 A.2d 156 (1972). Appellants argue that appellee failed to establish a legally cognizable claim of malicious prosecution because she did not prove that the criminal proceeding against her was brought without probable cause and with malice. We disagree. Probable Cause

In both malicious prosecution and false arrest cases, Maryland courts have frequently addressed the issue of whether probable cause was established as a matter of law or whether a factual dispute warranted submission of the probable cause issue to the jury. Probable cause consists of a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances strong enough to warrant a cautious person's belief that the accused is guilty. Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 298 Md. 484, 493, 471 A.2d 297 (1984). In determining whether probable cause existed, the focus is on the facts known, or which reasonably should have been known, to the one initiating the criminal proceeding. Id. at 495, 471 A.2d 297.

When there are sufficient facts supporting probable cause that are undisputed, probable cause may be decided as a matter of law. See, e.g., Stansbury v. Luttrell, 152 Md. 553, 137 A. 339 (1927) (where Luttrell admitted that he directed his servants to cut timber on property that did not belong to him, there was probable cause as a matter of law to prosecute him for theft); Medcalfe v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 45 Md. 198 (1876) (where Medcalfe admitted that he appropriated his principals' funds to his own use, probable cause for embezzlement existed as a matter of law); Kimbrough v. Giant Food, 26 Md.App. 640, 339 A.2d 688 (1975) (where Kimbrough, an employee, gave an "incredible" explanation for his conduct in leaving store with groceries that had been mislaid by a customer, probable cause for shoplifting existed as a matter of law).

In Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281 Md. 689, 381 A.2d 1146 (1978), an Exxon supervisor claimed that he saw Kelly, a mechanic, loading gasoline into the trunk of his car. Kelly was charged with theft. Subsequently, a nolle prosequi was entered and Kelly filed suit for, inter alia, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The Court of Appeals held that because Kelly categorically denied stealing the gas, the facts relied upon to determine probable cause were in dispute, and the issue of probable cause was a jury question. The court stated "[F]urthermore, under conflicting evidence 'the issues as to probable cause and malice, however great the preponderance of probability may [seem] to be on the side of [the] defendant, [are] issues of fact,...