Montich v. Miele USA, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 March 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–2725.
• Citation: 77 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 265,849 F.Supp.2d 439
• Parties: Daisy MONTICH, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MIELE USA, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

849 F.Supp.2d 439

77 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 265

Daisy MONTICH, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.MIELE USA, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 11–2725.

United States District Court,

D. New Jersey.

March 27, 2012.

James E. Cecchi, Esq., Lindsey H. Taylor, Esq., Carella Byrne Cecchi Olstein Brody & Agnello, P.C., Roseland, NJ, Julie Diane Miller, Esq., Complex Litigation Group LLC, Highland Park, IL, for Plaintiff.

John B. Kearney, Esq., Ballard, Spahr LLP, Cherry Hill, NJ, for Defendant.

OPINION

WOLFSON, District Judge:

Presently before the Court is Defendant Miele USA, Inc.'s (“Miele” or “Defendant”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Daisy Montich's (“Montich” or “Plaintiff”) Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed her four-count Complaint on behalf of herself and a putative class alleging that Defendant (1) violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. § 56:8–1 et seq. (“NJCFA”) (Count I); (2) violated similar Consumer Protection Acts of other states (including California) (Count II); (3) breached an implied warranty of merchantability (Count III); and (4) was unjustly enriched (Count IV). Plaintiff's claims stem from her purchase and use of a front-loading washing machine manufactured by Miele. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that mold or mildew began to develop after about a year of normal use of the washing machine at her home in Torrence, California. Defendant argues that Plaintiff raises no viable claims. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED–IN–PART and DENIED–IN–PART: Count I of the Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, Count II is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and Defendant's Motion is DENIED with respect to COUNTS III and IV.

I. BACKGROUND

In addressing Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, this Court must accept Plaintiff's allegations contained in the Complaint as true. See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 457 (3d Cir.2003); Dayhoff, Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1302 (3d Cir.1996). Thus, the facts recited below are taken from the Complaint and do not represent this Court's factual findings.

In July 2007, Montich, a citizen of California, purchased a Miele front-loading washing machine from a Ferguson Enterprises, Inc. retail store in California. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 17. Miele is headquartered in Princeton, New Jersey. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff paid $1,799 and took delivery of the Miele washing machine on September 25, 2007, at her residence in Torrence, California. Id. ¶ ¶ 6, 17. In the summer of 2008, after normal home use, she noticed an odor of mildew or mold from both the machine and the laundered clothes. Id. ¶¶ 6, 18. Montich contacted Miele about the smell. Id. ¶ 20. In response, Miele sent her a “Descaler” to run during an empty cycle to remedy the odor. Id. Despite using the Descaler, her machine continued to smell of mildew or mold. Id.

Plaintiff's claims are brought on behalf of herself and two defined classes. Class A is defined as “All persons and entities who own a Miele Washing Machine.” Compl. ¶ 21. Class B is a subset of Class A and is defined as “All persons and entities in New Jersey, Arizona, California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Texas, Wisconsin, and Washington who own a Miele Washington Machine.” Id. Plaintiff's NJCFA and breach of an implied warranty claims are brought on behalf of Class A, while her other consumer fraud act and unjust enrichment claims are brought on behalf of Class B.

In the instant matter, Defendant moves to dismiss the claims on the bases that (1) Plaintiff cannot avail herself of the NJCFA because California law applies to Plaintiff's consumer fraud claims; ¹ (2) Plaintiff does not have standing to bring a claim under California's Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) and False Advertising Law (“FAL”) because she failed to plead actual reliance; (3) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a breach of implied warranty under California law because she did not buy the machine directly from Defendant and therefore lacks privity; ² and (4) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for unjust enrichment under New Jersey law because Defendant was not directly enriched by Plaintiff's purchase. Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to meet the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) for her claims based on fraud.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff cites to several federal court opinions involving other motions to dismiss in similar cases alleging moldy front-loading washing machines and argues that Defendant's motion in general “treads well-trodden ground” and ignores “spot on authority.” Pl. Opp'n 1–3. The Court has considered these decisions and does not find them to be analogous to the facts and legal issues before it today. Other than Harper v. LG Elecs. United States, Inc., 595 F.Supp.2d 486, 490 (D.N.J.2009), which is discussed at length, infra, none of the cases cited by Plaintiff involve a potential conflict of law between New Jersey and California. And, in all other cases beside Harper, the courts dismissed some of the same causes of action that Plaintiff now brings. See Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 06–7023, 2009 WL 37134687, at *4, *5, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102413, at *14, *18 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 4, 2009); In re Whirlpool Corp. Front–Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 684 F.Supp.2d 942, 956, 960 (N.D.Ohio 2009); Tait v. BSH Home Appliances Corp., No. 10–711, 2011 WL 3941387, at *4, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103584, at *12 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 31, 2011).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a complaint “shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends ... (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). The purpose of a complaint is “to inform the opposing party and the court of the nature of the claims and defenses being asserted by the pleader and, in the case of an affirmative pleading, the relief being demanded.” Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1182 (3d ed.2004). Furthermore, Plaintiff's fraud-based claims must be pled with particularity per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). To meet this heightened pleading standard, a plaintiff “must state the circumstances of the alleged fraud with sufficient particularity to place the defendant on notice of the precise misconduct with which it is charged.” Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 200 (3d Cir.2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the Supreme Court clarified the 12(b)(6) standard. Specifically, the Court “retired” the language contained in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id. at 561, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99). Instead, the factual allegations set forth in a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. As the Third Circuit has stated, “[t]he Supreme Court's Twombly formulation of the pleading standard can be summed up thus: ‘stating ... a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ the required element. This ‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.’ ” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

In affirming that Twombly standards apply to all motions to dismiss, the Supreme Court recently explained the following principles. “First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir.2009). “Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. The plausibility standard requires that “the plaintiff plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged” and demands “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Ultimately, “a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211. In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court may consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993).

III. DISCUSSIONA. Choice of Law Principles

Plaintiff's claims are all based on state law. Therefore, the Court must decide which state law to apply to her claims—New Jersey or California. A federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply...