Montoy v. State, 88,440

Decision Date24 January 2003
Docket NumberNo. 88,440,88,440
Citation275 Kan. 145,62 P.3d 228
PartiesERIC AND RYAN MONTOY, et al., Appellants, v. STATE OF KANSAS, et al., Appellees.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Alan L. Rupe, of Husch & Eppenberger, LLC, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Dwight D. Fischer, and Alisa A. Nickel, of the same firm, and John S. Robb, of Somers, Robb and Robb, of Newton, were with him on the briefs for appellants.

Dan Biles, of Gates, Biles, Shields & Ryan, P.A., of Overland Park, argued the cause, and William Scott Hesse, assistant attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellees.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

DAVIS, J.:

In this constitutional challenge to the Kansas scheme of financing public education, numerous students representing African-American, Hispanic, and disabled groups, along with two large school districts, sued the State of Kansas, the Governor, the chairperson of the Kansas State Board of Education (State Board), and the Commissioner of the Kansas State Department of Education. In three separate counts, the plaintiffs alleged (1) a violation of the requirement that the legislature provide for the suitable finance of the educational interests of the State under Kan. Const. art. 6, § 6(b); (2) a violation of equal rights protection under the Kansas Constitution; and (3) a violation of substantive due process rights under the Kansas Constitution. The district court sua sponte granted judgment to the defendants, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to present legally sufficient claims.

In their appeal, the plaintiffs claim (1) that the district court erred by excluding certain claims on the grounds that they were outside the pleadings; (2) that the district court erred by failing to treat the dismissal of their case as a dismissal based upon a motion for summary judgment; and (3) that contrary to the findings of the district court, their claims are legally sufficient. We conclude the district court prematurely granted judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

Excluded claims

We first consider whether the district court erred in excluding consideration of certain claims of the plaintiffs. The district court explained its exclusion as follows:

"Plaintiffs have raised several new issues that were not contained in their pleadings. Kansas law requires that a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute be specifically raised in the pleadings. Missionary Baptist Convention v. Wimberly Chapel Baptist Church, 170 Kan. 684 (1951). Plaintiffs had the opportunity to amend their pleading to include these new issues prior to the Court ordered deadline of November 11, 2000. Plaintiffs failed to do so. The issues raised by Plaintiffs that the Court will not consider because they were not properly pled are: (1) Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to K.S.A. § 72-8801 et seq. (Capital Outlay); (2) Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to K.S.A. § 72-961 et seq. (Special Education Excess Costs); and (3) Plaintiffs' claim that the SDFQPA [School District Finance and Quality Performance Act] violates Article 6, § 2(a) of the Kansas Constitution (as being an encroachment on the `general supervision' responsibility of the State Board of Education). Plaintiffs failed to properly raise these issues or amend their petition to include these issues. Therefore, this Court will not permit these claims to be raised at this point in the case."

While Missionary Baptist Convention v. Wimberly Chapel Baptist Church, 170 Kan. 684, 228 P.2d 540 (1951), excluded consideration of constitutional claims raised for the first time on appeal, the district court's reliance upon the holding in Missionary Baptist is inappropriate in this case. Missionary Baptist is a case where the excluded constitutional issues surfaced the first time before the appellate court, not the district court. The constitutionality of the statutes involved in Missionary Baptist was neither raised in the pleadings nor presented by the parties to the action at any stage of the proceedings before the district court. 170 Kan. at 687-88. Unlike Missionary Baptist, the plaintiffs' constitutional issues in this case were raised by the plaintiffs before the district court. Thus, this court's decision in Missionary Baptist fails to provide authority for excluding consideration of the plaintiffs' challenges to the capital outlay provisions, the special education provisions, and the encroachment on the general supervision responsibility of the State Board. Other reasons for exclusion of the plaintiffs' additional claims before the district court and advanced by the district court and the defendants in this appeal are considered herein.

In Count I of their petition, the plaintiffs alleged a violation of Kan. Const. Art. 6, § 6(b), which requires the legislature to "make suitable provision for finance of the educational interests of the state." Under this count, the petition made the constitutionality of the School District Finance and Quality Performance Act (SDFQPA), K.S.A. 72-6405 et seq., the issue before the trial court. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' three additional constitutional claims, capital outlay provisions, the special education excess cost provisions, and the encroachment on the general supervision responsibility of the State Board on the basis that these matters were not specifically pled by the plaintiffs. The question presented is whether consistent with notice pleading, the claims of the plaintiffs are broad enough to include the additional constitutional claims.

Since the adoption of the Kansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Kansas courts have followed the rules of notice pleading. K.S.A. 60-208(a)(1) requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." A rule of liberal construction applies when judging whether a claim has been stated. The purpose of the petition is to give notice of the substance of the plaintiffs' claims. Discovery will more easily and effectively fill the gaps. See Fowler v. Criticare Home Health Services, Inc., 27 Kan. App. 2d 869, 873-75, 10 P.3d 8 (2000),aff'd271 Kan. 715, 26 P.3d 69 (2001). We note in this case that while discovery was nearing completion, it was not complete. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that outstanding discovery related to the three additional issues they asked the district court to consider. Ordinarily, a summary disposition of a pending case before the district court should not be granted until discovery is complete. See Bell v. Kansas City, Kansas, Housing Authority, 268 Kan. 208, 220, 992 P.2d 1233 (1999).

Based upon the record before us, including matters considered by the district court in a memorandum filed by the plaintiffs and the defendants' response, and the defendants' pretrial questionnaire, the three issues of capital outlay, special education excess costs, and encroachment on the general supervision responsibility of the State Board were sufficiently raised and should have been considered by the trial court in its resolution of this case. The plaintiff's petition focused on the SDFQPA in particular. However, while the petition focused on SDFQPA, it alleged a violation of the suitability requirement. Under the liberal interpretation of the pleadings required by our rules of notice pleading, relying on discovery to fill in any gaps, we conclude that the trial court erred in refusing to consider the three excluded issues.

We acknowledge that the district court's deadline for amending the pleadings had passed. However, it is clear that the plaintiffs sought to include their three additional constitutional claims before the district court. A final pretrial conference order was not entered in this case. K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 60-216(c)(3) provides that the district court should consider at any pretrial conference "the necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings." See Brown v. United Methodist Homes for the Aged, 249 Kan. 124, 141-42, 815 P.2d 72 (1991). Once a pretrial order is made pursuant to K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 60-216, it supercedes the pleadings and controls the subsequent course of the action. Herrell v. Maddux, 217 Kan. 192, 193, 535 P.2d 935 (1975).

The spirit of our present rules of civil procedure permits a pleader to shift the theory of his or her case as the facts develop, as long as he or she has fairly informed his or her opponent of the transaction or the aggregate of the operative facts involved in the litigation. Griffith v. Stout Remodeling, Inc., 219 Kan. 408 Syl ¶ 3, 548 P.3d 1238 (1976). The determination of whether a party's claim is a late shift in the thrust of the case which prejudices the opponent is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Where such exercise of discretion is questioned on appeal, we must determine whether the opposing party was taken by surprise and, if so, whether it resulted in substantial prejudice to that party. Boydston v. Kansas Board of Regents, 242 Kan. 94, Syl. ¶ 1, 744 P.2d 806 (1987).

We do not believe that consideration of the additional constitutional claims would cause the defendants surprise or unfair prejudice. Even if accomplished through amendment by a final pretrial conference order allowing the plaintiffs to advance their three claims, we find such an amendment would cause no surprise or unfair prejudice to the defendants. See Johnson v. Board of Pratt County Comm'rs, 21 Kan. App. 2d 76, 90-91, 897 P.2d 169 (1995). We conclude that it was error for the district court to exclude consideration of the plaintiffs' three additional constitutional claims.

Summary Judgment Procedure

The plaintiffs claim that the order entered was a summary judgment without any of the procedural safeguards set forth in K.S.A. 60-256. The plaintiffs complained to the district court that its memorandum decision was entered without the benefit of Supreme Court Rule 141 (2002 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 189), and the procedure set forth in K.S.A. 60-256. In...

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