Montoya v. Napolitano, 13-cv-0030-JCH/GBW
| Decision Date | 05 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-cv-0030-JCH/GBW,13-cv-0030-JCH/GBW |
| Parties | CHARLES MONTOYA, Plaintiff, v. JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
On April 23, 2015, Defendant Janet Napolitano filed a Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 72), asking this Court to reconsider its denial of summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., on a failure-to-accommodate theory of liability, as set forth in the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order (ECF No. 61), filed on April 16, 2015. Defendant argues that the Court should reconsider certain facts in the record and find that there is no material factual dispute that (1) Plaintiff was reasonably accommodated when he accepted the Las Cruces Mission Support Assistant ("MSA") position in El Paso on April 2, 2012; and (2) Plaintiff was not qualified for the position posted for the Mission Support Specialist ("MSS") position in the Las Cruces Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") office. Having considered the motion, evidence, relevant law, and otherwise being fully advised, the Court will grant Defendant's motion for reconsideration in part as described herein.
The facts construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff for purposes of considering Defendant's motion for summary judgment are set forth in the Court's April 16, 2015Memorandum Opinion and Order (ECF No. 61), and with the exception of those facts discussed infra, the Court incorporates those facts by reference. The following facts are those relevant to the motion to reconsider.
On January 25, 2012, Lisa Calzada, on Plaintiff's behalf, notified Defendant that Plaintiff accepted its offer to conduct an agency-wide search for funded vacancies within or near Las Cruces for which he would qualify. Pl.'s Ex. 22, ECF No. 49-6 at 7-8 of 25. The Agency performed the job search, and on or about March 15, 2012, Sarah Hobbs, Human Resources ("HR") Specialist from the Minneapolis Hiring Center made a written offer to Plaintiff for an MSA position in Las Cruces. See Pl.'s Dep. 66:10-67:25, ECF No. 36-2. The MSA position was a demotion to a GS-05 position with a total salary of $40,706. See Pl.'s Ex. 25, ECF No. 49-6 at 15 of 25. The letter indicated that Plaintiff would be terminated if he did not accept the demotion. See Pl.'s Ex. B, ECF No. 95-1 ().
On March 22, 2012, Plaintiff's counsel sent a letter to Ms. Hobbs stating that Plaintiff was being forced to accept the position of MSA or be terminated, so Plaintiff was accepting the position but would continue to pursue his pending charges of discrimination with the EEOC. Pl.'s Ex. 23, ECF No. 49-6 at 10 of 25. On March 28, 2012, Ms. Hobbs sent Plaintiff another letter offering the position again, rescinding the prior offer that had the "erroneous information" regarding potential termination, and notifying him that his acceptance must be on a purely voluntary basis and not under protest. Pl.'s Ex. 31, ECF No. 49-7 at 24 of 33. On March 31, 2012, Plaintiff's counsel sent Ms. Hobbs another letter notifying her that Plaintiff was accepting the position, as he believed he would otherwise be terminated, and clarifying that he would notrelease his pending EEO claims. Pl.'s Ex. 24, ECF No. 49-6 at 12-13 of 25. Although Plaintiff made $55,354 annually in his GS-9 SES position, id., he accepted the offer for the new position on April 2, 2012, because he believed if he declined the offer, there would be no further consideration of reassignment as a reasonable accommodation. Pl.'s Dep. 67:12-68:15, ECF No. 36-2. Plaintiff signed the March 28, 2012 letter that contained the following language:
Pl.'s Ex. 31, ECF No. 49-7 at 24 of 33. On April 4, 2012, Plaintiff signed an acknowledgement that he understood and accepted the salary change that came with the MSA position, but noted that he was not waiving his EEO claims. Pl.'s Ex. 25, ECF No. 49-6 at 15 of 25. In his deposition, Plaintiff acknowledged that he understood that, by accepting the MSA position, he was accepting it as a reasonable accommodation for his covered disability. Pl.'s Dep. 69:16-20, ECF No. 36-2.
On or around April 4, 2012, Joseph Maurer, Division Chief, Operational Support, instructed Lynne Kellaway to submit "Recruit and Fill" personnel actions for positions in the El Paso Sector under a new structure, including an MSS, GS-9 position in Las Cruces. See Pl.'s Ex. 37, ECF No. 56 at 34-35 of 47. On or around April 8, 2012, Plaintiff began working in the MSA position in Las Cruces. See Pl.'s Dep. 69:8-15, ECF No. 36-2. On April 17, 2012, Plaintiff learned that a Vacancy Announcement was posted for the MSS GS-9 position at the Las Cruces Border Patrol Station. Pl.'s Ex. 37, ECF No. 56 at 11, 13 of 47. Plaintiff applied for the position. Id.
In the Court's April 16, 2015 Memorandum Opinion and Order, it noted that the parties disputed whether Plaintiff was qualified for the position. Mem. Op. and Order 10, ECF No. 61. Defendant asserted that it rejected his application because he did not meet the minimum education and/or experience requirements for the specialty and grade. See Pl.'s Dep. 84:22-85:6, ECF No. 36-2. The Court, however, construing the inferences in Plaintiff's favor, found that Plaintiff's statement that his Notice of Results showed that he was qualified for the position created a question of fact for the jury. See Mem. Op. and Order 18, ECF No. 61.
The Government now asks the Court to reconsider that conclusion and find that the record undisputedly shows Plaintiff was not qualified for the position. Plaintiff submitted his declaration, made under penalty of perjury, in which he stated that he had "a copy of my Notice of Results showing that I am qualified for the position." See Plaintiff's Ex. 37, ECF No. 56 at 2, 13-14 of 47. The Government asks this Court to consider the contents of the Notice of Results sent to Plaintiff, arguing that it refutes Plaintiff's statement that it shows he was qualified for the position.
An order denying summary judgment is interlocutory. The Court has broad discretion to reconsider its interlocutory orders prior to entry of judgment. Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 647 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2011) (); Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1167 n.9 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (). The Court'sdiscretion to revise its interlocutory orders is not limited by the standards for reviewing a post-judgment motion filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b). See Raytheon Constructors Inc. v. ASARCO, Inc., 368 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2003) (). "Notwithstanding the district court's broad discretion to alter its interlocutory orders, the motion to reconsider 'is not at the disposal of parties who want to rehash old arguments.'" Nat'l Bus. Brokers, Ltd. v. Jim Williamson Prods., Inc., 115 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1256 (D. Colo. 2000) (quoting Young v. Murphy, 161 F.R.D. 61, 62 (N.D. Ill. 1995)). "Rather, as a practical matter, to succeed in a motion to reconsider, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Even under this lower standard, "[a] motion to reconsider should be denied unless it clearly demonstrates manifest error of law or fact or presents newly discovered evidence." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Mindful of these principles, the Court will not alter its previous Memorandum Opinion and Order unless the Court has misapprehended the facts, a party's position, or the controlling law. Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000) ); see Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. v. Universal Am. Mortgage Co., LLC, No. 13-cv-00090-PAB-MJW, 2014 WL 5069409, at *1 (D. Colo. Oct. 9, 2014). Motions for reconsideration are "inappropriate vehicles to reargue an issue previously addressed by the court when the motion merely advances new arguments, orsupporting facts which were available at the time of the original [filing]." Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012.
Plaintiff submitted voluminous exhibits in support of its response to the motion for summary judgment. Although the Notice of Results email was submitted to the Court by Plaintiff as part of Plaintiff's Exhibit 37, Plaintiff did not cite to pages 42-43 of Plaintiff's Exhibit 37, a 47 page exhibit. Nor did Defendant cite to these pages of the record in its Reply to refute Plaintiff's...
To continue reading
Request your trial