Moody v. City of Galveston
| Decision Date | 01 March 1899 |
| Citation | 50 S.W. 481 |
| Parties | MOODY et al. v. CITY OF GALVESTON.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from district court, Galveston county; William H. Stewart, Judge.
Action by the city of Galveston against W. L. Moody & Co. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.
Lovejoy, Sampson & Malevinsky, for appellants. R. Waverly Smith, for appellee.
Action by the city to recover of appellants personal judgment for taxes assessed for the year 1896. The case was tried by the court without a jury, and judgment was given in favor of the city for the sum claimed.
It appears from the evidence that appellants undertook or offered to make an assessment of personal property to the city assessor, tendering a statement worded thus: "Credits, cash, office furniture, etc., $20,000." The assessor refused to assent to the valuation of $20,000, and declared his intention to make the valuation $200,000. Thereupon appellants went no further with the assessment, and did not sign or swear to the statement they had offered. The assessor in due time placed the same on the unrendered roll, thus: "W. L. Moody & Co., credits, cash, office furniture, etc., $200,000." This, among other assessments, was referred by the assessor to the board of appraisers, and of the meeting of this body the required notice to the public was given; and appellants did not appear before it, and the valuation was approved. It also appears from the testimony that appellants had on January 1, 1896, more of cash and solvent credits than the value of $200,000.
Appellants first advance two propositions, in substance, that the assessment as entered upon the assessment roll (unrendered) by the assessor against W. L. Moody & Co. was inherently defective and void, in that the description of the property did not show the character of the property, and the amount of the assessment on each class of property. The roll read as follows: "Unknown, W. L. Moody & Co., credits, cash, office furniture, etc., $200,000." There is ample evidence to show that defendants presented to the assessor, with a view to their assessment for the year 1896, an unsigned and unsworn list or statement of personal property, describing it as above, and valuing it at $20,000. The assessor refused to admit this valuation, and, the property thus listed not being signed nor sworn to, he placed it upon the unrendered roll, valuing the property at $200,000. Defendants alleged that they presented to the assessor for 1896 "their assessment on the following personal property, to wit, credits, cash, office furniture, and fixtures, etc., belonging to defendants, etc., amounting to $20,000." This being the form of description by which defendants presented their property for assessment, we think they cannot say that the assessment is void or defective because the assessor adopted or followed it. Dallas Title & Trust Co. v. City of Oak Cliff, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 217, 27 S. W. 1036; Cooley, Tax'n (2d Ed.) p. 360.
There is no merit, in its application here, in the proposition advanced under assignment No. 2, complaining of the overruling of an exception. It is that no tax can be collected to pay interest, etc., on bonds prior to their sale. The allegation in the petition was that the taxes were levied to provide for interest and sinking fund upon outstanding bonds of the city. This was not subject to demurrer.
The next propositions are under assignments 3 and 7. They are as follows: "Under the terms and provisions of the city's charter, it was the duty of the assessor, if his testimony be true, that there was no rendition by appellants, to enter W. L. Moody & Co.'s property on the unrendered roll by proper description; and the valuation should have been made by the board of appraisers, and not by the assessor." And further: "The assessor had no right to place the valuation upon W. L. Moody & Co.'s property." So far as this assignment complains of the matter of description, it has been disposed of. It appearing from evidence that defendants did not render this property in the manner required by the charter and ordinances (not...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Republic Ins. Co. v. Highland Park I. School District
...the assessment are similar to those rendered or described by him. Denman v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 85 S.W.2d 252, 253; Moody v. Galveston, 21 Tex.Civ.App. 16, 50 S.W. 481; City of Rising Star v. Dill, A thorough study of the briefs justify the statement that the principal objective for which ......
-
Highland Park Independent Sch. Dist. v. Republic Ins. Co., 11791.
...R. C. S. 1925; article 1054, R. C. S. 1925; Clawson Lumber Co. v. Jones, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 208, 49 S. W. 909; Moody v. City of Galveston, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 16, 50 S. W. 481 (writ of error refused); State v. Couts' Estate (Tex. Civ. App.) 149 S. W. 281; Chicago, R. I. & G. R. Co. v. State (T......
-
Robinson v. Budget Rent a car Systems
...rather than mandatory." Id. at 744 (citing Markowsky v. Newman, 136 S.W.2d 808, 811-14 (Tex. 1940) and Moody v. City of Galveston, 50 S.W. 481, 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, writ ref'd) (emphasis Robinson contends Himont expands Markowsky too far beyond its holding. I disagree. In Markowsky, th......
-
Stevens v. City of El Paso
...Lumber Co. v. Jones, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 208, 49 S. W. 909; Mann v. State, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 701, 46 S. W. 652; Moody v. City of Galveston, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 16, 50 S. W. 481; City of Longview v. Citizens' National Bank et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) 294 S. W. 313 (on motion for rehearing), and Stan......