Moody v. City of Vero Beach, 862
| Decision Date | 30 October 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 862,862 |
| Citation | 203 So.2d 345 |
| Parties | Tam P. MOODY and Diane N. Moody, his wife, and Charles F. Davenport and Dorothy H. Davenport, his wife, Appellants, v. CITY OF VERO BEACH, a municipal corporation of the State of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Darrell Fennell, of Gould, Cooksey & Fennell, Vero Beach, for appellants.
James T. Vocelle, Fred T. Gallagher, Vero Beach, for appellee.
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Tam Moody and Diane N. Moody and Charles F. Davenport and Dorothy H. Davenport, from an order dismissing their complaint against defendant, City of Vero Beach.
In 1964 defendant paved certain streets within its city limits. In early 1965 the plaintiffs purchased property fronting two of these streets. The Moody property was on Mockingbird Drive and the Davenport parcel bordered on Gayfeather Lane. Subsequently, on June 1, 1965, defendant passed two resolutions concerning construction and paving of streets in the city, the costs of which in part were to be paid by special assessments against the lots abutting and benefited thereby. Mockingbird and Gayfeather were included in these resolutions, which set a time and place for hearing objections to the improvements from affected property owners. Plaintiffs appeared and filed their objections to the proposed assessments. On July 20, 1965, the defendant passed a resolution adopting and confirming its earlier proposed improvements and special assessments.
Plaintiffs brought the instant suit to have the assessment declared void for failure of the city to comply with F.S.A. ch. 170. The trial court dismissed the complaint and this appeal followed.
Plaintiffs pose two questions for our determination: (1) Does F.S.A. ch. 170 contemplate assessments for improvements previously completed? (2) Assuming such an assessment is permissible, is it valid as against one who purchased property after the improvement was complete but before the assessment was levied?
An affirmative answer to the first question arises from F.S.A. § 170.14 which provides for a special assessment to be made 'if the governing authority of a municipality shall have omitted to make such assessment when it might have done so * * *.' This is clearly the situation here where the City of Vero Beach could have made a special assessment prior to the 1964 improvements. It omitted to do so and under the provisions of F.S.A. § 170.14 was entitled to levy the assessment when it did. ' (A)n assessment for benefits derived from improvements previously made does not constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law * * *. ' Anderson v. City of Ocala, 1922, 83 Fla. 344, 357, 91 So. 182, 187.
Irregularities, as such, in administering specific procedures involving special assessments do not render such procedures void if constitutional guarantees are not denied. Abrams v. City of Hollywood, Fla.App.1958, 105 So.2d 602. We recognize that a person to be specially assessed is to have an opportunity to be heard at some point during the assessment procedure. City of Hollywood v. Davis, 1944, 154 Fla. 785, 19 So.2d 111.
Here, the plaintiffs were afforded notice and hearing with their objections noted. In their complaint the plaintiffs have not contested either the authority of the city to make the improvements or the costs thereof. Neither have they questioned whether their lots were benefited to the extent of the assessments.
Therefore, it has not been shown that the defendant-city abused its statutory authority, and the first question is answered in the affirmative.
Notwithstanding the general validity of the assessment, it is plaintiffs' position in the second question raised that they are bona fide purchasers who bought after the improvements were made, without any notice of their property's liability for a special assessment and that therefore they took free of the obligation to pay the special assessment. This contention cannot be sustained. As early as 1904 the United States Supreme Court in City of Seattle v. Kelleher, 1904, 195 U.S. 351, 25 S.Ct. 44, 49 L.Ed. 232, faced a situation similar to the one here, with that court first observing that a special...
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...forceful are cases in which the buyer, not the seller, was compelled to pay an unexpected special assessment. In Moody v. City of Vero Beach, 203 So.2d 345 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967), the buyers bought a piece of property, and later learned of a special assessment for improvements performed before......
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City of Cooper City v. Joliff, 4D16-2504.
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Davis v. Marion Cnty.
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