Moody v. Dillon Co.

Decision Date11 June 1947
Docket Number15959.
Citation43 S.E.2d 201,210 S.C. 458
PartiesMOODY v. DILLON CO.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Bridges & Blackwell, of Florence, for appellant.

Samuel Want, James S. Verner, and Sam Rogol, all of Darlington, for respondent.

OXNER Justice.

This is an action to recover damages on account of personal injuries sustained by respondent at about 4:00 P.M. on August 10 1945, in the town of Dillon. Respondent alleged that his injuries resulted from the negligent operation of appellant's truck. At appropriate stages of the trial appellant moved for a nonsuit and a directed verdict upon the grounds (1) that there was no evidence of any actionable negligence on its part, and (2) that respondent was guilty of contributory negligence. These motions were overruled by the trial Judge and the case submitted to the jury, resulting in a verdict for respondent in the sum of $12,000 actual damages. The trial Judge found that the amount of the verdict was excessive and ordered a new trial unless respondent remitted on the record the sum of $4,000. The remission was made and judgment entered against appellant in the sum of $8,000. This appeal followed.

The first question to be determined is whether the Court below erred in refusing appellant's motions for a nonsuit and a directed verdict.

Respondent was employed by the Dillon Cotton Company as warehouse manager and shipping clerk. There were about one hundred bales of cotton in the warehouse at Dillon, South Carolina which this Company desired to ship over the line of the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company, and there were about eleven bales of cotton on the platform of the Atlantic Coast Line freight depot which it desired to move into its warehouse. The Dillon Cotton Company did not have a truck available for use in moving this cotton and through respondent mace arrangements with appellant Dillon Company whereby the Dillon Company agreed to rent to the Dillon Cotton Company a truck with a driver to be used in moving the cotton, for which services appellant charged 15¢ for each bale of cotton moved. (The two companies have strikingly similar names and both operate cotton warehouses at Dillon South Carolina, but they are separate and distinct corporations and have no connection with each other.) The driver of the truck was an employee of appellant and his sole duty was to drive this truck; he had nothing whatever to do with the loading and unloading of the cotton, which was done by respondent and four Negro helpers. The manual labor of loading and unloading was done by the helpers under the supervision of respondent who selected the bales to be moved and did the necessary checking. The truck used was a 1942 Chevrolet. It had an enclosed metal cab with a rear window and a flat body about twelve feet long upon which could be loaded about ten bales of cotton.

The parties commenced this work about 9:30 A.M. on the day of the accident. The weather was clear. They first proceeded to move the cotton from the warehouse and load same in the box cars on the siding at the freight depot of the Seaboard Air Line Railway. This required about ten trips. The driver of the truck was unfamiliar with the cotton to be moved and respondent or one of his helpers would direct him where to park and when to move. In moving this cotton it became necessary from time to time for respondent to go on the truck and check the numbers on the bales to see if they corresponded with the list of cotton to be moved. The respondent and his helpers were frequently going on and off the truck while it was parked for loading and unloading. After the last of the cotton to be shipped was taken to the Seaboard Air Line Railway depot and the final car loaded, respondent told the driver to bring the truck to the Atlantic Coast Line depot where there were eleven bales of cotton to be moved to the warehouse for restorage. It was then approaching four o'clock in the afternoon.

These eleven bales were scattered among about thirty-five bales of cotton standing on the platform against the wall of the Atlantic Coast Line freight depot and extending for a distance of approximately one hundred feet along this platform. The platform was about five feet wide and between the cotton and the edge of the platform there was a space of about two feet which was sufficient for a person to walk on in checking the cotton. It was necessary for respondent to go through all of this cotton and pick out the eleven bales to be moved which was done by checking the numbers on the tags attached to the bales.

When respondent first arrived at the depot, he had some difficulty in identifying one particular bale of cotton and for this reason had to go to the office of his employer, a distance of about a block, to get the necessary information. As he returned to the depot and had reached the steps at end of the platform, the truck passed him and after proceeding a short distance parked about 12 or 14 inches from and parallel to the platform, which was a proper position for loading the cotton on the truck. Respondent walked up the steps to the platform and proceeded to check the cotton so as to identify the bales to be moved. In doing this he walked along the two foot space between the cotton and the edge of the platform. After he had checked the numbers on about six bales of cotton, he came to a sixty gallon oil drum about half full of water which was placed there by the railroad company for protection against fire. The diameter of this drum was wider than the two foot passage space and about a third of the drum extended over the edge of the platform, thereby obstructing the path of respondent. The truck was parked along the platform at this point, the flat body of the truck being about four inches lower than the platform. The truck had then been parked about two or three minutes and respondent thought it would continue standing there until the cotton near-by was loaded, after which the driver would be directed to move to another place along the platform. In order to pass around the drum, respondent stepped off the platform onto the body of the truck, intending to take one or two steps forward and then get back on the platform, but when he got one foot on the truck, the driver without notice drove forward, causing respondent to lose his balance and to be thrown on the ground from the back of the truck, resulting in the injuries now complained of.

The driver of the truck and respondent had known each other for some time. It is admitted that the driver saw respondent as he passed him at the steps of the platform. The driver said that he 'drove up and stopped and then started pulling up again to get real close to the platform,' stating that the motor was still running. He further testified as follows:

'Q. Did you look back before you moved the truck forward? A. Yes.

'Q. Did you see anything? A. No, sir.

'Q. Why did you look back? A. To see was everything clear.'

In determining whether the Court below erred in overruling appellant's motions for a nonsuit and a directed verdict the testimony and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to respondent. 'Negligence is the 'want of due care', and is generally a mixed question of law and fact. In determining if negligence is inferable, all of the surounding conditions and circumstances must be taken into consideration, and if a reasonable inference can be drawn from all of the facts and circumstances and conditions prevailing at the time of the alleged negligence that one charged therewith did not observe ordinary care, then it becomes a question for the jury to pass upon.' Shields v. Chevrolet Truck et al., 195 S.C. 437, 12 S.E.2d 19, 23. 'It is firmly established in this jurisdiction that if the inferences properly deducible from the evidence are doubtful, or if they tend to show both parties guilty of negligence or willfulness, and there may be a fair difference of opinion as to whose act produced the injury complained of as a direct and proximate cause, then the question must be submitted to the jury.' Harrison v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., et al., 196 S.C. 259, 13 S.E.2d 137, 141. The determination of the question of contributory negligence 'must necessarily be controlled by the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The court will not decide it as one of law if the testimony be conflicting, or if the conclusion to be drawn therefrom is doubtful and uncertain. This we have decided time and again. For under such circumstances the question clearly falls within the province of the jury.' Robison v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. et al., 179 S.C. 493, ...

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  • City of Columbia v. Jennings
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • December 9, 1985
    ...a request to allow the jury to view the place in controversy is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge. Moody v. Dillon Co., 210 S.C. 458, 43 S.E.2d 201 (1947). The exercise of a trial judge's discretion in this regard will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Jo......

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